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In battle, we risk all for a taste of the immortal. In retreat, sure, we lose nothing, but what
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Gretchen can go anywhere!
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This dissertation investigates the role of Focus-sensitivity for a typology of presup-
position triggers. The central hypothesis is that Focus-sensitive triggers require
a linguistic antecedent in the discourse model, whereas presuppositions of trig-
gers lacking Focus-sensitivity are satisfied as entailments of the Common Ground.
This hypothesis is supported by experimental evidence from two borne out predic-
tions. First, Focus-sensitive triggers are sensitive to the salience of the antecedent
satisfying their presupposition, as operationalized via the Question Under Discus-
xiii
sion, and lead to interference-type effects, while triggers lacking Focus-sensitivity
are indifferent to the QUD-structure. Second, Focus-sensitive triggers are harder
to globally accommodate than triggers lacking Focus-sensitivity. The picture that
emerges from these results is that the same kind of meaning - presuppositions - is
grounded in distinct underlying representations of context in relation to an inde-
pendent property of the trigger - Focus-sensitivity - which directly affects the way
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1.1 Setting the Scene
We do not encounter language in a vacuum but as part of a larger context. Under-
standing how different aspects of such a context affect both the way in which a
linguistic unit is processed as well as the outcome of its interpretation is thus an
important task for any theory of language comprehension. The number of ways
in which context affects language comprehension in this way is manifold. For in-
stance, depending on the spatio-temporal context, the same utterance can result
in laughter during a comedy show but in indignation at a formal dinner. Unsur-
prisingly, the influence of - specifically the linguistic - context has been shown to be
pervasive for various aspects of comprehension in psycholinguistics (Frazier, 1978;
Crain & Steedman, 1985; Futrell et al., 2020; Levy, 2008). However, comparatively
little psycholinguistic work has been done on how a discourse context is repre-
sented and accessed, with the notable exception of work on referential expressions
like pronouns and definite descriptions.
The question of how a discourse is represented is particularly crucial in light of
the ubiquity of linguistic expressions whose interpretation depends on the context.
While even cases of lexical ambiguity may be considered context-sensitive insofar
as the context affects their interpretation, this relation to the context, in contrast,
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is grammaticalized in the case of context-dependent expressions. A prime exam-
ple of this latter category are pronominal expressions such as she, which are un-
interpretable in the absence of material a suitable antecedent. Other less extreme
cases that do not result in complete uninterpretability with a lack of context but
allow certain defaults are, among others, quantifiers (von Fintel, 1994), gradable
adjectives (Bartsch & Vennemann, 1972) and modals (Kratzer, 1977). What differ-
entiates these cases from the accidental context-sensitivity of lexically ambiguous
words from a psycholinguistic point of view is that context-dependent expressions
actively require accessing representations of context rather than these representa-
tions serving as a passive backdrop against which comprehension occurs.
The goal of this dissertation is to address the question of how discourse is repre-
sented by using presuppositions as a case study. Presuppositions have been stud-
ied extensively in the semantics and pragmatics literature, going back to work in
philosophy of language by Frege (1892) and Strawson (1950), but have also increas-
ingly become the subject of experimental work in recent years (e.g. Schwarz 2015a).
One linguistic trait presuppositions have come to be known for, most prominently
from work in the 70s by - among others - Karttunen (1973) and Stalnaker (1970),
is their persistence when embedded under entailment cancelling operators such
as negation. This projection behavior is illustrated with the aspectual particle again
in (1.1), where what is negated is the main event but not that a similar event had
occurred previously. Other environments that allow presuppositions to project but
prevent the main - at-issue - content to become something the speaker is commit-
ted to are questions, modals and the antecedent of conditionals, the latter being
illustrated in (1.2). This backgroundedness has led to the characterization of pre-
suppositions as indicating content that is taken for granted by the speaker, and
formally implemented as a requirement that the presupposed content is part of
the knowledge shared among interlocutors, the Common Ground (Stalnaker, 1978).
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(1.1) Gretchen didn’t take Jimmy’s car again.
(1.2) If Gretchen took Jimmy’s car again, he will be upset.
Since the early days of presupposition research, a vast number of presuppositional
expressions - so-called presupposition triggers - have been discovered, among the
most prominent ones factive verbs like regret, aspectual verbs like stop, and addi-
tive particles like too, which all pattern alike to again with respect to their potential
to project. However, it has also been noted that triggers vary in the extent to which
their presupposition projects in certain environments. One prominent account of
this type comes from Abusch (2010). The achievement verb win in (1.3a) - which
presupposes participating - can be felicitously embedded in the antecedent of a
conditional when its presupposition is suspended in the context. Given that the
expected result should be a contradiction since the presupposition is at odds with
the speaker’s initial statement, projection seems to be blocked here. In contrast, too
- in (1.3b) presupposing that someone other than Priscilla has read the proposal
- seems to be more persistent. Rather than being perfectly acceptable, the same
environment results in markedness.
(1.3) a. I have no idea whether Sam ended up participating in the Road Race
yesterday. But if he won it, then he has more victories than anyone
else in history. (ABUSCH 2010, (3d))1
b. ??I have no idea whether Lindsay read that proposal. But if Priscilla
read it too, let’s ask them to confer and simply give us a yes-no re-
sponse.
Latex-hack (ABUSCH 2010, (5a))
1Proper names in cited examples are occasionally changed throughout the thesis to ensure ap-
propriate gender representation.
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Moreover, presupposition triggers have not only been shown to vary with respect
to their projection behavior, but also, for example, the extent to which they can
be used felicitously out-of-the-blue (Kripke, 2009), whether their presupposition is
entailed or not (Sudo, 2012), or the mechanism governing the extent to which they
are obligatory when their presupposition is satisfied (Bade, 2016). This variation
across triggers with respect to a number of properties has given rise to a com-
plex typology of triggers. However, a comprehensive, coherent account of these
differences has yet to be found. This dissertation contributes to this debate by in-
vestigating the role of Focus-sensitivity for a typology of presupposition triggers
and relate it to a distinction in the representations of triggers along those lines.
The contribution of this dissertation is thus two-fold. Empirically, the dissertation
will provide novel data in relation to a distinction between triggers that has not
received much attention thus far. Theoretically, the dissertation explores a novel
account of how differences between triggers can be explained.
Focus-sensitive expressions exhibit a dependency of their interpretation on the
location of Focus2 (Beaver & Clark, 2008; Rooth, 1985). As an illustration, consider
the two sentences in (1.4), which only vary in their stress placement - indicated
by small capitals - serving as a proxy for Focus. In a context where Gretchen met
someone other than Jimmy at a wedding, but never met Jimmy anywhere else, the
sentence in (1.4a) is felicitous, whereas the sentence in (1.4b) is not. Conversely,
if Jimmy was the only person Gretchen met at a wedding but they had also met
somewhere else, (1.4b) is felicitous and (1.4a) is not. Other expressions that have
been taken to be Focus-sensitive in this sense are particles like only, even and at least,
but also negation (Jackendoff, 1972), quantificational adverbs like always (von Fin-
tel, 1994), and counterfactuals (Rooth, 1999; Dretske, 1972), among others.3
2I will henceforth capitalize ’Focus’ to indicate the technical linguistic term and differentiate it
from its informal use.
3While all these cases have been taken to be Focus-sensitive in the sense presented here, Beaver
& Clark (2008) make a more fine-grained distinction between different classes of Focus-sensitivity.
4
(1.4) a. Gretchen also met JIMMY at a wedding.
b. Gretchen also met Jimmy at a WEDDING.
The central hypothesis to be tested in this dissertation is the Focus Presupposi-
tion Antecedent Hypothesis (FoPAH)4 stated in (1.5). According to this hypothesis,
there are distinct representations that presupposition triggers access depending on
whether a trigger is Focus-sensitive or not. Triggers lacking Focus-sensitivity are
hypothesized to fit the traditional Stalnakerian picture of presuppositions as Com-
mon Ground entailments. In contrast, Focus-sensitive triggers - despite qualifying
as presuppositional by virtue of their projection behavior - are rooted in what I
will refer to as the discourse model, a record comprised of what has been previ-
ously mentioned, which has to provide a suitable antecedent. Notably, the FoPAH
is intended as a hypothesis about how different presupposition triggers are pro-
cessed rather than their treatment in formal linguistic theory, especially given that
the concept of the Common Ground applied here will be strongly simplified rela-
tive to more current models available (e.g. Farkas & Bruce 2010; Biezma & Rawlins
2017.
(1.5) Focus Presupposition Antecedent Hypothesis (FoPAH)
Focus-sensitive presupposition triggers require a linguistic antecedent in
the discourse model, whereas triggers lacking Focus-sensitivity require
their presupposition to be entailed by the Common Ground.
There are a number of proposals from research on presupposition trigger typol-
ogy that serve as precursors to this hypothesis, for instance and notably Zeevat
(2002) and Roberts (2006, 2015). These proposals have popularized the idea that
certain triggers are anaphoric insofar as they seem to target what is salient in a con-
I will come back to this distinction in Chapter 3.
4Pronounced with stress on the second syllable, like the French word for mistake.
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text rather than merely what is shared knowledge. Moreover, the widely adopted
Alternative Semantics framework by Rooth (1992) treats Focus as a propositional
anaphor (see also Wagner 2020). However, the term ‘anaphoric’ has been used in a
variety of ways such that it at best serves as a descriptive label that requires further
specification. Furthermore, even though the Focus-sensitivity of some presupposi-
tion triggers has been no secret, research on presuppositions and Focus has mostly
worked in parallel rather than result in a synthesized theoretical account. Finally,
the FoPAH is crucially only concerned with Focus-sensitive presupposition trig-
gers rather than Focus per se. While it may be possible to extend the hypothesis
to Focus beyond its grammaticalization in Focus-sensitive triggers, the results will
provide evidence that bare Focus should be distinguished from cases of Focus-
sensitivity.
An obvious question the FoPAH raises is how to conceptualize the notion of
an antecedent. Firstly, staying with the general conception of the FoPAH, the no-
tion intended here is a psycholinguistic rather than a formal one, although moti-
vated by formal linguistic theory and ideally with a close correspondence there.
Secondly, I assume this antecedent to be semantic rather than syntactic. The argu-
ment for this assumption is two-fold. First, Focus-sensitive presupposition triggers
can be satisfied by non-linguistic material. For instance, in a context that warrants
the assumption that all relevant discourse participants are attending to the same
event, the corresponding content can serve as an antecedent even if it is not linguis-
tically instantiated, as shown in (1.6).5 This property likens presupposition triggers
to deep anaphora in the sense of Hankamer & Sag (1976); Sag & Hankamer (1984)
5Note that non-linguistic material can also satisfy the presupposition of triggers lacking Focus-
sensitivity:
(i) Context: Becca and Vernon are out on a hike together, during which Vernon is loudly singing. After
a while, Becca says:
Could you stop singing?
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such as personal pronouns rather than surface anaphora, which require a linguistic
antecedent, as for instance in the case of ellipsis. I will come back to the question
to what extent examples of this sort pose a problem for the FoPAH in Chapter 6.
(1.6) Context: Lindsay sees Edgar use cilantro while making breakfast nachos and says:
Paul ALSO uses cilantro for making nachos.
The second argument against conceiving of the hypothesized antecedent of Focus-
sensitive presupposition triggers as syntactic comes from the lack of syntactic par-
allelism effects for the case of too. Göbel (2017); Göbel et al. (2018) investigated
short discourses like (1.7) and varied the first - antecedent - sentence such that
it either matched the final - target - sentence both syntactically and with respect
to the verb (Parallel), mismatched in voice (Syntactically Non-Parallel) or choice of
verb (Semantically Equivalent). Additionally, the presence or absence of too in the fi-
nal sentence was manipulated. Acceptability ratings of the target sentence showed
no differences between the type of antecedent sentence but only a significant de-
crease if too was absent. These results suggest that syntactic factors such as (lack of)
parallelism between the sentence that a Focus-sensitive presupposition trigger oc-
curs in and the sentence satisfying its presupposition affect the processing of such
triggers (see also Tanenhaus & Carlson 1990 for an experimental investigation on
parallelism effects with respect to deep and surface anaphors).
(1.7)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
At dinner, the butler disobeyed the countess. Paral.
At dinner, the countess was disobeyed by the butler. Synt. Non-Paral.
At dinner, the butler defied the countess. Sem. Equivalent
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
The other staff were worried about bad consequences for him.
Surprisingly, he disobeyed the count (too).
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Assuming the antecedent under consideration to be semantic rather than syn-
tactic still leaves open the question about the relationship between the discourse
model and the Common Ground, the latter of which is arguably semantic as well
and may in fact represent the same abstract content. However, there may still be
distinct ways in which this content can be represented, which is what is being as-
sumed here. An argument for this view comes from what Stalnaker (1998) calls
Kamp’s Argument (Kamp, 1988). Consider a variant of the so-called “marble sen-
tences" in (1.8) (going back to Barbara Partee, originals cited in Heim 1982). The
first sentences of each discourse are semantically equivalent with respect to the
Common Ground in terms of the possible worlds they are compatible with, but
nonetheless vary in the extent to which the pronoun it is able to pick out the one
ball that is not in the bag. Consequently, it may be necessary to represent the same
content in different ways. The core of the FoPAH is simply that these distinct rep-
resentations map to different classes in the domain of presuppositions, depending
on whether a trigger is Focus-sensitive or not. While there is more to be said about
the details of these representations, which I will come back to, I will assume Dis-
course Representation Theory (DRT, Kamp 1981; Kamp & Reyle 1993) as a way to
conceive of the discourse model formally for now.
(1.8) a. Exactly one of the ten balls is not in the bag. It is under the sofa.
b. Exactly nine of the ten balls are in the bag. #It is under the sofa.
Latex-hack (STALNAKER 1998, (2)-(3))
1.2 Preview of Findings
There are three predictions derived from the FoPAH that will be tested in this dis-
sertation. The first prediction is that Focus-sensitive presupposition triggers by
virtue of requiring an antecedent in the discourse model should be sensitive to
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the salience of this antecedent. An illustrative analogy would be how the process-
ing of pronouns is affected by different factors such as grammatical role or im-
plicit causality influencing the salience of potential antecedents. In contrast, trig-
gers lacking Focus-sensitivity are predicted to be indifferent to the salience of the
linguistic material satisfying their presupposition by virtue of being entailments.
A possible analogy for this case could be premises in a syllogism, which result in
the same conclusion irrespective of the order in which they are presented.
The way salience will be operationalized will rely on the Question Under Dis-
cussion (QUD, Roberts 2012) and the discourse structure it gives rise to. The central
idea behind the QUD-framework is that discourse is structured by a - often implicit
- set of questions that guide how the discourse progresses. There is ample evidence
that QUDs matter for language comprehension (e.g. Zondervan et al. 2008; Clifton
& Frazier 2018; Kehler & Rohde 2017; Tian & Breheny 2016) but less work on their
role as a discourse structuring device. Experiments 1a and 1b will use the Focus-
sensitive trigger even to investigate how the QUD-structure affects the accessibility
of linguistic material as an antecedent for even. Experiment 2 will contrast two trig-
gers from each class - also as Focus-sensitive and again as not Focus-sensitive - with
respect to how intervening material that is part of a shared QUD affects the acces-
sibility of the material satisfying the respective presuppositions in the discourse.
The second prediction to be tested is that Focus-sensitive triggers are harder to
accommodate than non Focus-sensitive triggers if their presupposition is not sat-
isfied in the context. This prediction relies on the assumption made in Stalnaker’s
work that the Common Ground is governed by cooperative principles such that
if a presupposition is not entailed by the Common Ground, a cooperative hearer
may decide to add the presupposition to the Common Ground rather than let the
conversation come to a halt. In contrast, the discourse model is assumed not to be
subject to such principles and render repair of the context in the case of an unsat-
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isfied Focus-sensitive triggers costly. Experiment 3 tests accommodation difficulty
of four trigger-pairs, one for each class, in a rating study. Experiment 4 follows
up by investigating the online processing behavior via a self-paced reading study,
focusing on again and too.
The structure of this dissertation is as follows. Chapters 2 and 3 provide back-
ground from linguistic theory and psycholinguistics on presuppositions and Focus
respectively. Chapter 4 presents the experiments on the salience prediction in re-
lation to the QUD. Chapter 5 presents more background on accommodation as
well as the experiments investigating accommodation difficulty of the two trigger
classes. Chapter 6 summarizes the findings and discusses their implications for




This chapter is dedicated to providing the background from formal linguistic the-
ory and psycholinguistics to situate the present work relative to the contemporary
research on presuppositions and clarify crucial assumptions along the way. Section
2.1 explicates the notion of presupposition adopted in this dissertation and where
presuppositions fall in a typology of linguistic meaning. Section 2.2 introduces the
most prominent formal approaches to modeling presuppositions. Section 2.3 re-
views relevant issues and debates in presupposition theory. Section 2.4 picks up
one specific issue that is central to this dissertation, namely different classifications
of presupposition triggers and relevant empirical properties. Section 2.5 concludes
the chapter with a discussion of notable psycholinguistic findings and the state-of-
the-art on what is known about the processing of presuppositions.
2.1 Presuppositions in a Typology of Meaning
The goal of this section is to spell out the assumptions on the empirical profile of
presuppositions and respective diagnostics. Doing so is particularly crucial given
the long-lasting tradition of research on presuppositions, which has led to the la-
bel not always being applied consistently. This situation makes it necessary to not
only specify what properties presuppositions have, but also indicate to what ex-
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tent the respective properties are unique to presuppositions. It is thus important to
consider presuppositions in relation to other kinds of natural language meaning
and their similarities and differences.
Presuppositions were introduced in the previous chapter as being character-
ized by their projection behavior, i.e., their persistence in the context of entailment
cancelling operators such as negation. That is, while the inference - to use a prethe-
oretical term - of (2.1a) that Cameron hired Joe is no longer warranted in (2.1b) in
the presence of negation, the inference that Cameron had hired Joe before is asso-
ciated with both sentences. Based on this pattern, these inferences have received
the labels assertion (indicated by ‘⇒’) and presupposition (indicated by ‘↝’).
(2.1) a. Katherine “Cameron" Howe hired Joe McMillan again.
⇒ Cameron hired Joe
↝ Cameron hired Joe before
b. Cameron didn’t hire Joe again.
⇏ Cameron hired Joe
↝ Cameron hired Joe before
However, it was also already noted in the introduction that projection behavior
can vary across presuppositional expressions and environments. Abusch (2010)
observes the contrast in (2.2) (repeated from (1.3)) between win in (2.2a), which
presupposes participation, and too in (2.2b), which here presupposes that someone
other than Joanie read the proposal. What is crucial here is that win is felicitous in
the antecedent of a conditional, which usually allows presuppositions to project,
despite the fact that the preceding sentence asserts that the respective presuppo-
sition is not accepted by the speaker. Thus, if the presupposition of win were to
project, it should result in inconsistency, but given the felicity of the discourse, the
presupposition seems to be suspended. In contrast, too does lead to some degrada-
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tion under the same circumstances, suggesting that its projection behavior is more
robust. While projection will be discussed in more detail in the following sections,
the takeaway here is that - given the observed variation - projection cannot serve
as a reliable diagnostic to identify presuppositions.
(2.2) a. I have no idea whether Ryan ended up participating in the Road Race
yesterday. But if he won it, then he has more victories than anyone
else in history. (ABUSCH 2010, (3d))
b. ??I have no idea whether Joanie read that proposal. But if Haley read
it too, let’s ask them to confer and simply give us a yes-no response.
Latex-hack (ABUSCH 2010, (5a))
What makes matters worse for using projection as a diagnostic for presupposi-
tions is that there are other kinds of meaning that exhibit projection behavior, most
notably conventional implicatures in the sense of Potts (2005), including apposi-
tives as in (2.3) and expressive meaning such as the epithet in (2.4) (using ‘↝’ for
projective meaning more generally). Thus, in addition to a lack of projection not
being sufficient to classifying a given inference as being not presuppositional, its
presence does not warrant the conclusion that we are dealing with a presupposi-
tion. Projection should therefore be something to be studied - as has been the case
- rather than a diagnostic.
(2.3) a. Cameron, a coding genius, works at Cardiff Electric.
⇒ Cameron works at Cardiff Electric
↝ Cameron is a coding genius
b. Cameron, a coding genius, doesn’t work at Cardiff Electric.
⇏ Cameron works at Cardiff Electric
↝ Cameron is a coding genius
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(2.4) a. That jerk Joe works at IBM.
⇒ Joe works at IBM
↝ The speaker has a negative attitude toward Joe
b. That jerk Joe doesn’t work at IBM.
⇏ Joe works at IBM
↝ The speaker has a negative attitude toward Joe
As an alternative to using projection as a diagnostic for presuppositions, I will rely
on three properties that jointly distinguish presuppositions from other kinds of
meaning. The first diagnostic is the extent to which a particular meaning compo-
nent can be directly targeted with assent or dissent (= direct targetability) (see Ton-
hauser 2012 for a detailed discussion of this diagnostic)1. An illustration is given in
(2.5). While it is possible to target the asserted content - that Gordon grew a beard
- in (2.5a), targeting the contribution of again - that Gordon had grown a beard be-
fore - in (2.5b) results in degraded acceptability. The diagnostic thus allows us to
differentiate between asserted and presupposed content, and more reliably than
projection would.
(2.5) A: Gordon Clark grew a beard again.
a. B: { No / That’s not true / I don’t think so }, I saw him clean-shaven
just this morning.
b. B: ??{ No / That’s not true / I don’t think so }, he’s never had a beard
before.
However, the direct targetability diagnostic merely differentiates presuppositions
from asserted content. Other kinds of meaning, such as conventional implicatures
1It is worth noting that the use of this diagnostic relies on the use of propositional anaphora
like that or response particles like no, which have been treated analogously (Krifka, 2013), and may
consequently be viewed as diagnosing anaphoric potential (Snider, 2017) (see also Göbel 2019b).
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(2.6a) or scalar implicatures - here the some but not all inference associated with
some (2.6b) - behave like presuppositions insofar as they cannot be directly targeted
either. The diagnostic will thus be assumed to differentiate at-issue content - as an
alternative, more specific term for what we called asserted content so far - from
not at-issue content, which includes presuppositions, conventional implicatures and
conversational implicatures, following Potts (2005, 2007a).2
(2.6) a. A: That jerk Joe tricked Cardiff Electric into hiring him.
B: ?? That’s not true, you like Joe.
b. A: Donna owns some of the shares of Mutiny.
B: ?? That’s not true, she owns all of them.
In order to further differentiate presuppositions from other not at-issue meanings,
the second property I assume as being characteristic of presuppositions is that they
are not defeasible3, in contrast to conversational implicatures.4 The standard test
to check whether an inference is defeasible or not is to see whether it is possible
to continue the discourse with the negation of the inference under consideration.
This test is illustrated in (2.7a) for scalar implicatures. Since continuing the dis-
course with a statement that negates the some but not all inference does not result
in unacceptability, scalar implicatures - and conversational implicatures more gen-
2That is not to say that not at-issue content is impervious to being challenged but rather that
it requires more roundabout ways to get at it. One such way is the "Hey, Wait a Minute" Test from
von Fintel (2004) (see also Pearson 2010). For the present purposes, it is not crucial whether the
felicity of a direct denial and the "Hey, Wait a Minute" Test are in complementary distribution since
the former is sufficient for motivating the distinction between at-issue and not at-issue content
intended here.
3An alternative term that is often used in the literature is “cancellable", which will however be
reserved for describing the projection behavior of presupposition under negation (see Section 2.4).
4On this assumption, cases of so-called conversational presuppositions discussed in (Kadmon,
2001, Ch. 11) (see also Potts 2005; Schlenker 2019) would be considered implicatures rather than
presuppositions in this respect. Conversational presuppositions have been discussed due to the
fact that they project but are defeasible. However, given that I have argued for projection to be
unsuitable as a diagnostic for presuppositions, their defeasibility should take precedence in their
classification.
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erally - can be considered defeasible. In contrast, applying the same test to again in
(2.7b) does result in unacceptability, showing that presuppositions are not defeasi-
ble.5
(2.7) a. Donna owns some of the shares of Mutiny.
In fact, she owns all of them.
b. Gordon grew a beard again.
#In fact, it was the first time he grew a beard.
Lastly, to differentiate presuppositions from conventional implicatures, I will ap-
peal to Potts’s (2007b) notion of (non)displaceability.6 Potts argues that conven-
tional implicatures are special by virtue of them necessarily being evaluated rela-
tive to the utterance context. An empirical correlate of this property is the inability
to be part of quantification over situations. Potts’s (2007b) example - credited to
Florian Schwarz - to illustrate this property for an expressive adjective is given in
(2.8). Rather than the heightened emotional state expressed by damn having to be
part of all wine-pouring situations - including previous ones - for the utterance to
5A potential concern is that the standard in fact lead up of the test fits better with the implica-
ture than other inferences due to the scalar relationship. However, we get the same result if we
slightly modify the test as in (i), where the relevant inference is canceled by a preamble rather than
a continuation. (While this test bears some resemblance to the suspension contexts of Abusch 2010
discussed earlier, they differ in that there is no sentential operator present.)
(i) a. I don’t know whether Donna owns all the shares of Mutiny.
She owns some of them though.
b. I don’t know whether Gordon ever had a beard.
#He’s currently growing one again though.
6Potts (2005, 2007a) discuss a few other properties with respect to which presuppositions and
conventional implicatures are supposed to differ, such as anti-backgrounding, cancellation by nega-
tion, and projection from verbs of saying. However, none of these hold up once we take a broader
range of triggering expression into account and therefore do not qualify as reliable diagnostics.
The two classes of meaning are also argued to differ with respect to conventional implicatures
being perspectival while presuppositions are not. However, given that perspective can be subject
to a range of pragmatic factors (see Harris 2012; Harris & Potts 2009), it seems less suited as a diag-
nostic. (The property of Obligatory Local Effect proposed by Tonhauser et al. 2013, which might be
another potential diagnostic, will be left aside here for the same reasons.)
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be felicitous, the utterance is compatible with the speaker being perfectly calm at
previous instances of the bottle dripping.
(2.8) Whenever I pour wine, the damn bottle drips. (POTTS 2007b, (12))
a. ≠ For every wine-pouring situation, there is a bottle-dripping situation
& the speaker has a negative attitude toward every bottle-dripping
situation
b. ≈ For every wine-pouring situation, there is a bottle-dripping situation
& the speaker has a negative attitude toward this fact
In contrast, presuppositions are not restricted to the utterance situation in this way
and may carry over to situations that are being quantified over. This behavior is
illustrated in (2.9) for again. For B’s reply to be felicitous and true, it has to be the
case that in all Diane-at-the-gym situations Diane smiles at Bos and has given him a
smile before during the meeting, rather than just the one time A pointed out.7
(2.9) A: Diane gave Bos a smile yesterday during the meeting.
B: Whenever she’s at the gym, she smiles at him again.
A summary of the discussion is given in Table 2.1 according to which presuppo-
sitions are uniquely identifiable by not being directly targetable, not being defea-
sible, and being (not non)displaceable. An application of the tests for a broader
range of expressions, including those featured here, as well as the presupposition
triggers discussed in Section 2.4 and used in the experiments of this thesis, can be
found in Appendix A.1.
Note that this definition of presuppositions is a purely empirical one rather
7A’s utterance is necessary here to satisfy again’s requirement without making it part of the
restrictor situations. That is, if we changed the subordinate clause to “Whenever Diane smiles at Bos,
...", again’s contribution would be vacuous, whereas omitting again in (2.9) does in fact change its
meaning.
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Directly Targetable Defeasible Nondisplaceable
At-Issue Content + - -
Conversational Implicatures - + -
Conventional Implicatures - - +
Presuppositions - - -
Table 2.1: Assumed Meaning Typology.
than other conceptual ones, such as one describing presuppositions as taken for
granted (Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet, 1990; Kadmon, 2001) or backgrounded (Levin-
son, 1983).8 Moreover, the definition is restricted to linguistic content rather than an
attempt to encompass other non-technical uses of what we might call presuppo-
sition, such as the reader being able to understand English and being aware that
this document is a linguistic dissertation, for which I will reserve the term assump-
tions (what Beaver & Geurts 2014 refer to as conversational presuppositions). With
these assumptions in place, the next section will move on to a discussion of formal
theoretical approaches to presuppositions.
2.2 Approaches to Presuppositions
The goal of this section is to review seminal work in presupposition research and
some of the debates that have shaped its history, most significantly from conceiv-
ing of presuppositions as a semantic phenomenon to the rise of pragmatic presup-
positions. Additionally, this section introduces some of the most prominent formal
approaches to presuppositions that go along with this development, namely the
dynamic semantic account by Heim (1983) and the anaphoric approach to presup-
positions embedded in Discourse Representation Theory, which will serve as a for-
mal implementation of the ideas presented in Chapter 1. Although central to these
8That is not to say that these conceptual notions could not be rephrased empirically by equating
what is taken for granted with new information and backgroundedness with the directly targetable
test. However, crucially the former does not always hold and the latter is underspecified with re-
spect to the relevant not at-issue notion at stake.
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theoretical developments, a detailed discussion of approaches to the behavior of
presuppositions in complex sentences (= the projection problem) will be delayed
until the next section, given that projection will not be directly relevant to the goals
of this thesis.
The earliest discussion of presuppositions - in the guise of referring expressions
- goes back to the philosophical work by Frege (1892) and Strawson (1950), who ar-
gued for a treatment of presuppositions in terms of preconditions for a sentence to
have a truth-value. To illustrate this intuition with the contrast between the sen-
tences in (2.10), there is a sense in which someone uttering (2.10a) would make it
impossible to judge whether what was said is true or false, given that Germany
does not have a Queen. In contrast, the truth of (2.10b) can be determined straight-
forwardly.9 Approaches that define presuppositions in terms of their impact on the
truth-value of a sentence have come to be known as semantic.
(2.10) a. The Queen of Germany lives in Bellevue.
b. The Queen of England lives in Bellevue.
In the widely adopted semantic framework of Heim & Kratzer (1998), this ap-
proach to presuppositions is formalized as treating presuppositions in terms of
definedness conditions, more precisely, as restrictions on the domain of a func-
tion. That is, presuppositions are partial functions. Illustrated with the definite de-
terminer in (2.11), the difference between presupposed and at-issue meaning can
thus be represented in a lexical entry as its domain (here the italicized part between
colon and period) and its output (here the bolded part following the period).
(2.11) JtheK =
λf : f ∈ D<e,t> & ∃ exactly one x s.t. f(x) = 1 . the unique y such that f(y) = 1
9This account has been traditionally contrasted with Russell’s (1905) treatment of sentences like
(2.10a) as resulting in falsity (see Schwarz 2015b; Kadmon 2001 for more research on this issue).
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Applied to (2.10a), the result would be undefined - with undefinedness being
treated as a third truth-value ‘#’ (see Beaver 2001; Beaver & Geurts 2014 for more
on trivalent approaches to presuppositions and specifically projection) - since the
could not compose with Queen of Germany, whereas composition in (2.10b) would
proceed flawlessly without the presupposition adding anything to the at-issue
truth-conditions. This type of approach is considered static insofar as it is con-
cerned with the definedness of individual propositions instead of their role in a
larger discourse.
An alternative to treating presuppositions in terms of their effects on a sen-
tence’s truth-value made prominent by Stalnaker (1970, 1973, 1974) (see also Si-
mons 2003) is the notion of pragmatic presupposition (or speaker presupposition in
later work). On this view, presuppositions are not properties of sentences but of
speakers and their utterances, namely something a speaker takes for granted in
a conversation. Stalnaker’s account emphasizes the role of presuppositions as an
essential aspect of general practices of communication, the assumed goal of which
is to exchange information in order to decide which of all possible worlds is the
actual one.
The formal notions central to this pragmatic view of presuppositions are the
Common Ground - identified with the context - and the Context Set (Stalnaker, 1978,
1998, 2002). The Common Ground encapsulates the shared knowledge between
interlocutors, represented as a set of propositions.10 Its counterpart is the Context
Set, which is the set of possible worlds that constitute viable candidates for the ac-
tual world - the intersection of the Common Ground. If a hearer were to accept an
assertion made by a speaker, it would increase the Common Ground by virtue of
the proposition associated with the assertion becoming part of the set of proposi-
10The notion of a Common Ground has also been widely used in work in psychology on dialogue
and audience design, see the seminal work by Clark (1996), and Brown-Schmidt & Duff (2016) for
a recent overview.
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tions and shrink the Context Set by eliminating any possible worlds in which this
proposition was not true.
A well-known formalization of these ideas based on Stalnaker (1978) comes
from Heim (1982, 1983, 1992). In her framework, the meaning of a sentence is its
Context Change Potential (CCP), namely a function from contexts to contexts, with
a context being a set of possible worlds. To illustrate how a context gets updated,
consider someone asserting the proposition It is raining. On the assumption that
the initial context is empty - the Common Ground is the empty set and the Con-
text Set is the set of all possible worlds W - the context would be updated with this
assertion to contain only those worlds in which it rains, as in (2.12). That is, the con-
text gets intersected with the asserted proposition. Presuppositions then serve as
requirements on the context, allowing an update to proceed only in those contexts
that entail the presupposition. An example for the presupposition of a possessive
- that Emma owns a cat - is given in (2.13). Frameworks of this sort - as the one
by van der Sandt (1992) discussed further below - belong to the class of dynamic
semantics - in contrast to the static one seen earlier - since they are concerned with
how information accumulates as a discourse progresses.
(2.12) For any context c, c + it is raining = {w ∈ c: it is raining in w}
latex-trick (HEIM 1992, (5))
(2.13) c + Emma’s cat is hungry is defined iff
c ⊆ {w: Emma has a unique cat in w};
where defined, c + Emma’s cat is hungry
= {w ∈ c: Emma has a hungry cat in w} (HEIM 1992, (7))
One apparent obstacle to the view that presuppositions are contextual require-
ments that need to be met in order for an utterance containing a presupposition
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trigger to be felicitous is that presuppositions can also be used to convey new in-
formation, so-called informative presuppositions (see Tonhauser 2015). For example,
Stalnaker (1974) notes that B’s reply in (2.14) does not result in infelicity in a context
where A is not aware that B has a sister.
(2.14) A: Are you going to lunch?
B: No, I have to pick up my sister. (STALNAKER 1974, fn.2)
While it has been argued that the ease with which presuppositional requirements
can be violated in such cases, in combination with the fact that these cases may be
more of the rule than the exception in terms of raw frequencies (Spenader, 2002),
constitutes a fatal flaw to the Stalnakerian picture, Stalnaker (1998, 2002, 2014) ar-
gues that this supposed violation is a feature rather than a bug in his system. Using
(2.14) as illustration, by virtue of B’s utterance, A can infer that B assumes B having
a sister to be part of the Common Ground. On the assumption that B is a coopera-
tive and reliable speaker, A can therefore conclude that B believes to have a sister
and wants A to believe that B has a sister as well, thus indirectly making A adopt
this belief. This process has come to be known as (global)11 Accommodation after
Lewis (1979) (see also von Fintel 2000, 2008; Simons 2006a; Roberts 2015). (A more
detailed discussion of accommodation can be found in Chapter 5.)
Despite the terminological contrast between semantic and pragmatic approaches
to presuppositions, Stalnaker (1970, 1973) notes that they are not mutually exclu-
sive but rather that the former may be a superset of the latter. That is, any semantic
presupposition will also be a pragmatic presupposition, but not vice versa. How-
ever, since its original conception, the semantic-pragmatic distinction has been
used to describe two different issues that should be distinguished (see Simons
11Global is meant to contrast with local accommodation, which is a mechanism employed in pro-
jection contexts discussed in Section 2.4.
22
2006b). On the one hand, there is the original characterization in terms of what
happens when a presupposition is not met, with semantic approaches arguing for
a truth-value gap and pragmatic approaches treating such a case in terms of in-
felicity. On the other hand, the contrast has also been applied to the question of
where presuppositions come from, namely whether they are a lexicalized part of
an expression’s meaning (semantic) or arise from more general principles of con-
versation (pragmatic). Examples of semantic presuppositions in this sense can be
found in the different triggers discussed thus far, while an instantiation of a non-
lexicalized presupposition would be the inference that a speaker uttering an En-
glish sentence assumes her addressee to be sufficiently knowledgeable in English -
an inference that cannot be pinned to any lexical item of the sentence but only the
communicative act itself. This latter interpretation - lexicalized vs non-lexicalized
- has also been brought to bear on differences between presupposition triggers,
for instance in (Abusch, 2010). Although these two issues - how presuppositions
are conceptualized, and where they come from (= the triggering problem, see Sec-
tion 2.3.2) - might be related, they are logically independent and should thus be
distinguished.
The last approach to presuppositions to be discussed here is the anaphoric ap-
proach proposed by van der Sandt (1992). On this account, presuppositions are
treated analogously to anaphoric expressions such as the pronoun it in the don-
key sentences in (2.15). van der Sandt’s idea of assimilating presuppositions to
anaphora is based on the observation that the projection behavior of presupposi-
tions in (2.16) appears to be parallel to that of the pronominal expressions in (2.15).
That is, the nominal expression all of Jack’s children in (2.16) is taken to presuppose
that Jack has children, but this presupposition does not arise in the sentences in
(2.16). What van der Sandt proposes is to think of these cases as presuppositions
being bound by a previously introduced nominal expression just like the donkey
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anaphora in (2.15), going as far as allowing substitution of the presuppositional
expression in (2.16) with the corresponding pronominal expression without any
interpretive difference.
(2.15) a. Katie owns a donkey. She pets it.
b. If Katie owns a donkey, she pets it.
c. Either Katie does not own a donkey or she pets it.
latex-trick (after VAN DER SANDT 1992, (14/15/16b))
(2.16) a. Tom has children and all of Tom’s children/they like soccer.
b. If Tom has children, then all of Tom’s children/they like soccer.
c. Either Tom has no children or all of Tom’s children/they like soc-
cer.
latex-trick (after VAN DER SANDT 1992, (14/15/16a))
The theory van der Sandt proposes is couched within the framework of Discourse
Representation Theory (DRT, Kamp 1981; Kamp & Reyle 1993; Geurts et al. 2020),
which - loosely - consists of a set of discourse referents and their predications.
Using (2.17) as an illustration,12 both the subject and the object are represented
as discourse referents at the top of the box (the discourse “universe"), with their
predications (or “conditions") below.






12Thanks to Julian Schlöder for sharing his LaTeX macro with me.
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This structure would make it possible that, if we were to continue the discourse
with the sentence in (2.18a), for the pronoun she to be bound by the previously
introduced discourse referent d and accumulate the additional information as the
discourse progresses. DRT furthermore specifies a set of accessibility relations be-
tween partial structures that is particularly relevant to cases of anaphora in com-
plex clauses, which will however not be discussed here.
(2.18) a. She worked together with Gordon.
b.






u worked together with g
Although the development of a formal theory of presuppositions is not the main
goal of this dissertation, for the purposes of this investigation, I will assume that
the hypothesized distinction between presupposition triggers based on their (lack
of) Focus-sensitivity maps to a distinction in their formal representation. For trig-
gers lacking Focus-sensitivity, which are hypothesized to fit the Stalnakerian pic-
ture of presuppositions as contextual entailments, I will assume an account along
the lines of Heim (1982). For Focus-sensitive triggers, which are hypothesized to
require an antecedent in the discourse model, I will assume a standard version of
DRT. The resulting picture - which will be discussed further in Chapter 6 - is thus
one in which different formal approaches are used to capture different classes of
triggers, rather than arguing for a formally unified account of presuppositions. As
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a slightly separate point, I will assume that presuppositions are specified lexically
and part of the conventionalized meaning of an expression. With these assump-
tions in place, we can move on to a review of major theoretical issues and debates
that shaped presupposition theory.
2.3 Issues in Presupposition Theory
This section is intended to cover some of the seminal research on prominent the-
oretical issues related to presuppositions. As noted earlier, the main phenomena
that has occupied research on presuppositions over the decades is their projec-
tion behavior. A less studied but in no way theoretically less important question
concerns what is known as the triggering problem, namely the question why pre-
suppositions arise in the first place. Another issue that has received more attention
in recent years concerns variation between triggering expressions, which will be
addressed in a more exhaustive fashion in the next section since it is of central
concern to this dissertation. In the current section, the projection problem and the
triggering problem will be discussed in turn.
2.3.1 The Projection Problem
What has come to be known as the projection problem is the question how to deter-
mine the presuppositions of a complex sentence given the presuppositions of their
parts (Langendoen & Savin, 1971). A solution to this problem therefore involves
an accurate description of the empirical generalizations and a theoretical expla-
nation for them. One possibility could be that a complex sentence simply inherits
all presuppositions of its parts, the cumulative hypothesis (Morgan, 1969). However,
the empirical facts are far more complex. Given that vast amount of research on
this topic (see Beaver 2001; Kadmon 2001; Beaver & Geurts 2014; Schwarz 2019 for
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some overviews), there are four issues I want to highlight in this section that have
been central to the development of different theories, namely (i) filtering, (ii) the
proviso problem, (iii) projection from quantifiers, and (iv) the behavior of factives.
(Another issue concerns accommodation, which I will leave aside for now given
that there will be more on it in the next section in the context of differences between
presupposition triggers.)
(i) Filtering
One of the earliest approaches to the projection problem that contributed greatly
to its empirical aspects is Karttunen’s (1973) plugs-holes-and-filters account. Kart-
tunen distinguishes between three classes of embeddings. The first two classes -
plugs and holes - are characterized by preventing, or allowing respectively, pre-
suppositions to project and become a presupposition of the whole sentence. Ex-
amples of plugs include verbs of saying, such as say in (2.19), and potentially
other propositional attitude verbs; examples of holes originally included a range
of verbal embedding predicates such as understand or be surprised (2.20), but has
since come to include those entailment cancelling operators which have come to
be known as comprising the family-of-sentences test (Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet,
1990) - namely negation, questions, antecedents of conditionals and modals (2.21).
(2.19) Bos said that IBM threatened him again ...
(... but he’s just making it up to scare Joe, he’s never talked to IBM).
  IBM threatened Bos before
(2.20) Bos was surprised that IBM threatened him again ...
(... #but he’s just making it up to scare Joe, he’s never talked to IBM).
↝ IBM threatened Bos before
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(2.21) a. IBM didn’t threaten Bos again.
b. Did IBM threaten Bos again?
c. If IBM threatened Bos again, Cardiff Electric might be in trouble.
d. IBM might have threatened Bos again.
↝ IBM threatened Bos before
The third, and arguably most complex group, are the filters. This group includes
all binary connectives, namely conditionals, conjunction and disjunction. What is
crucial about this class is that their projection behavior depends on the content of
the first clause. For example, while the conditional in (2.22a) seems to project the
presupposition that IBM threatened Bos before from its consequent clause, this no
longer seems to be the case when the antecedent already contains the content of
the presupposition, as in (2.22b). That is, the presupposition gets filtered out by
virtue of being entailed by the first clause of the connective.13
(2.22) a. If Cameron can’t reconstruct the BIOS code, IBM will threaten Bos
again.
↝ IBM threatened Bos before
b. If IBM threatened Bos before, they will threaten him again.
  IBM threatened Bos before
What Karttunen’s (1973) approach is lacking, despite its empirical insights, is a
proper explanation for why connectives behave the way they do. An improve-
ment in this respect is Gazdar’s (1979) cancellation account, which proposes that
context updates proceed in stages, with at-issue content taking precedence over
13Note that talking about presuppositions being "filtered out" can be somewhat confusing given
that the phrase is meant to describe both conditionals, in which case the presupposed content does
not become part of the global context, and conjunction, in which case the presupposed content does
become part of the global context, just not by virtue of the presupposition but by virtue of it being
at-issue content of the first conjunct.
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implicatures, and implicatures over presuppositions. The reason the presupposi-
tion in (2.22b) does not project is because (i) using a conditional implicates that the
speaker is not certain that the antecedent holds such that (ii) the presupposition
gets cancelled, since it conflicts with the implicature.
However, Heim (1983) notes empirical issues with this account for cases like
(2.23). Consider first (2.23), which Heim ascribes the lack of any presupposition.
According to Gazdar, the antecedent is taken to implicate that the speaker is un-
certain whether Cameron has twins, which would be compatible with her having
some children. The cancellation account would thus predict the presupposition to
go through, contrary to what is observed.
(2.23) If Cameron has twins, then Joe will not like her children.
  Cameron has children (HEIM 1983, (6))
As an alternative, Heim (1983) - building on Stalnaker (1974) and Karttunen (1974)
- proposes a dynamic semantic account that treats the meaning of sentences as their
context change potential. This account was introduced in the previous section, al-
beit without projection in mind. The crucial addition that allows Heim to extend
her ideas to capture projection behavior in complex sentences is the notion of a lo-
cal context. That is, rather than evaluating the whole sentence relative to the context
is was uttered in, the context gets updated incrementally. While the first clause, for
example of a conditional, still gets evaluated relative to the global context c, the
second clause now gets evaluated relative to the local context c’ that is the result of
updating the initial context c with the content of the first clause. A formalization
of this idea is given in (2.24) (‘\’ stands for intersection), which treats an update
of a context c with a conditional as the intersection of c with the intersection of c
being updated with the antecedent S1 (first step) and c being updated with both
the antecedent and the consequent S2 (second step).
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(2.24) Context Change Potential for Conditionals
c + If S1, then S2 = c\((c + S1)\(c + S1 + S2)) (HEIM 1983, (14))
Although Heim’s (1983) account overcomes some of the empirical issues of Gaz-
dar (1979) while being able to derive projection properties of connectives from
their context change potential, it has been argued to be too strong and overgener-
ate. For example, it is possible to define conjunction in a way that leaves its truth-
conditional content unaffected but reverses the order in which the conjuncts up-
date the context, namely with the second conjunct preceding the first. Given that
no such connective is attested in natural language, the explanation for the projec-
tion patterns of the connectives under consideration becomes stipulative.
A solution to this problem comes from Schlenker (2008) and subsequent work,
who proposes an alternative that uses classical non-dynamic semantics for connec-
tives in combination with two pragmatic principles. The first, stated in (2.25), can
be viewed as requiring people to satisfy their presupposition beforehand (where d
stands for the presuppositions associated with an expression).
(2.25) Be Articulate
In any syntactic environment, express the meaning of an expression dd’
as (d and dd’) (...unless independent pragmatic principles rule out the
full conjunction.) (SCHLENKER 2008, (13))
The second principle is called Be Brief and stands in opposition to Be Articulate by
prohibiting people from stating something that is already part of the context. Be
Brief is crucially ranked above Be Articulate such that, to use (2.26) as illustration,
choosing (2.26a) over (2.26b) will be dispreferred, unless the presupposition is not
already entailed by the initial context.
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(2.26) a. Donna is upset and Gordon knows that she is upset. (d and dd’)
b. Gordon knows that Donna is upset. (dd’)
Schlenker’s (2008) account thus avoids the overgeneration problem of Heim (1983)
by appealing to more general - but violable - pragmatic principles. One conse-
quence of this account is that filtering is no longer strictly asymmetric - with asym-
metric projection being calculated left-to-right rather than globally - but allows
the possibility for material following a presupposition trigger to prevent it from
projecting, as in (2.27). However, the empirical facts on this matter have been dis-
puted such that it is unclear whether the ability of Schlenker’s account to capture
such cases is an argument in favor of or against it.14 Another issue that Schlenker
- and most other accounts - suffer from is the proviso problem, to which we will
turn next.
(2.27) If the bathroom is not hidden, this house has no bathroom.
latex-trick (SCHLENKER 2008, (32b))
(ii) The Proviso Problem
The proviso problem is concerned with a discrepancy between the prediction of
many major theories of presupposition projection - with the exception of DRT - for
triggers occurring in the second clause of a connective and the attested intuitions
(coined after Geurts 1996). For example, both Heim (1983) and Schlenker (2008)
predict the conditional in (2.28) to have a weaker conditional presupposition rather
than the stronger unconditional presupposition it is perceived to have.
14Experimental results bearing on this issue come from Mandelkern et al. (2019), which will be
discussed in Section 2.5.
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(2.28) If Theo hates sonnets, then so does his wife. (MANDELKERN 2016, (3))
↝ If Theo hates sonnets, then he has a wife (predicted)
↝ Theo has a wife (intuitively attested)
The standard response of such accounts to the proviso problem is to appeal to
some strengthening mechanism. A crucial issue for this route is to explain why and
how this strengthening arises. One proposal made by Schlenker (2011) is that the
stronger unconditional presupposition is a result of the hearer ignoring material
irrelevant to the presupposition in order to minimize her computational load. If
we take into account the oddness conditional presuppositions may often have, see
(2.28), given that it would still have to be checked whether such a presupposition
is entailed by the context, it seems plausible that a hearer might make devise a
strategy to allow the conversation to proceed swiftly. In Schlenker’s terms, for if p,
then qq’, the hearer will look for the most conservative restriction C+ of a context
C that entails the presupposition of the full sentence for any non-presuppositional
clause p’. This mechanism successfully derives the strengthened meaning insofar
as C+ will entail q.
However, Mandelkern (2016) notes that any account of strengthening runs into
problems for cases where the antecedent is clearly relevant to the presupposition
of the consequent in the absence of obvious sources of pragmatic pressure. One
such case is given in (2.29).
(2.29) [It is common ground that Smith has gone missing, and we don’t know
whether he is still alive. A detective enters and says:]
If the butler’s clothes contain traces of Smith’s blood, then it was the
butler who killed Smith.
↝ Someone killed Smith (MANDELKERN 2016, (11))
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In this scenario, the truth of the antecedent would provide good reason to accept
the presupposition that someone killed Smith such that we should expect a con-
ditional presupposition, according to accounts like Schlenker (2011), contrary to
what is attested. Moreover, even if we were to assume that unconditional presup-
positions arise due to being more plausible than their conditional counterpart, the
given scenario constitutes the reverse case where the conditional presupposition
may be considered more plausible than the unconditional one, and yet the latter is
what seems to be the case.
Mandelkern (2016) concludes from this and similar data that the proviso prob-
lem constitutes a serious problem for the majority of projection theories. A notable
exception is the anaphoric account of van der Sandt (1992) in DRT. However, DRT-
approaches face empirical challenges in other areas. One such area is the projection
behavior of quantificational expressions, to which we will turn next.
(iii) Projection from Quantifiers
Thus far, we have only been concerned with presuppositions at the propositional
level. Quantificiational expressions, however, pose a challenge by virtue of their
standardly assumed tri-partite structure (Heim, 1982), consisting of a quantifica-
tional term, the restrictor, and the nuclear scope, illustrated in (2.30).
(2.30) a. Every nationi cherishes itsi queen. (after HEIM 1983, (7))
b. every xi; xi (is a) nation; xi cherishes xi’s queen (after HEIM 1983,
(8))
In order to handle such cases, Heim (1983) adjusts her system such that contexts
no longer consist of sets of propositions but of sets of sequence-world pairs (where
a sequence is an assignment function) that allow the relativization of any update
to a given variable assignment g. Updating the context with the presupposition of
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the definite description in (2.30) would thus look as in (2.31).
(2.31) c + xi has a queen = c ∩ {<g,w>: g(i) has a queen in w}
Independently of the formal issues that arise from devising a system that is able
to include quantificational expressions, there is also an empirical question about
what the projection behavior of presuppositions in such environments is. Heim
(1983) - as well as other theories such as Schlenker (2008) - predicts the sentence
in (2.30) as a whole to presuppose that every nation has a queen. This reading has
been labeled universal projection, in contrast to the existential reading that some
nation has a queen predicted by accounts like Beaver (2001).
However, what renders an assessment of the accuracy of these claims difficult
is that theories of projection may appeal to additional mechanisms that can apply
to whatever the basic interpretation is in order to account for diverging data. Two
such mechanisms are local accommodation, which would mean that the presuppo-
sition is interpreted as part of the restrictor (more on local accommodation in the
next section), and domain restriction, such that the sentence in (2.30) would be in-
terpreted as in (2.32). (Given that universal projection plus local accommodation
and existential projection plus domain restriction would thus yield the same final
interpretation, one source of evidence could come from psycholinguistic data on
how people arrive at this interpretation, e.g. Zehr et al. 2016.)
(2.32) Every nationi that has a queen cherishes itsi queen.
What further complicates the empirical picture is that it has been observed that
projection behavior may in fact vary by the quantifier under consideration (Chemla,
2009; Tiemann, 2014; Creemers et al., 2018), as well as the triggering expression
(Charlow, 2009; Sudo, 2012). For instance, Chemla (2009) provides experimental
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evidence showing that each and no overwhelmingly receive a universal reading,
whereas quantifiers involving numerals such as less than 3 were around chance
level. Thus, while data on the projection behavior of quantificational expressions is
an important testing ground for theories of presupposition projection, the empiri-
cal foundation is far from clear and continues to be an focal point of presupposition
research.
(iv) Projection from Factives
A qualitatively different approach to projection, which has received traction in re-
cent years, comes from Simons et al. (2010, 2017); Beaver et al. (2017). This account
is motivated by observations about the effects of prosody on the projection behav-
ior of factives. An illustration of this effect is given in (2.33), featuring the cognitive
factive verb discover, which is standardly taken to presuppose the truth of its com-
plement clause. While this presupposition seems to project from the antecedent of
the conditional in (2.33b) when the embedding verb is stressed - as expected - the
prosodification in (2.33a) with stress on the embedded verb does not seem to give
rise to the inference that the sentence as a whole presupposes that the student’s
work is plagiarized.
(2.33) A professor to a student:
a. If the TA discovers that your work is PLAGIARIZED, ...
b. If the TA DISCOVERS that your work is plagiarized, ...
... I will be forced to notify the Dean. (BEAVER 2010, (73c,d))
Simons et al.’s (2017) explanation of this contrast builds upon work by Rooth
(1992), Roberts (2012) and Beaver & Clark (2008) on Focus and its relation to im-
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plicit questions in the discourse.15 On this view, Focus indicates a set of alternatives
that marks an implicit question in the discourse, labeled the Current Question. For
instance, the sentence in (2.34a) is taken to indicate the question in (2.34b).
(2.34) a. HALEY ate a cake.
b. Current Question: Who ate a cake?
Additionally, questions are taken to give rise to certain entailments, namely of
whatever is shared among all alternatives in the set. In the case of (2.34), the ques-
tion would entail that someone ate a cake. Applied to the examples in (2.33), the
presupposition in (2.33b) is simply a by-product of the Focus-structure indicating
a question that entails the complement clause. In contrast, (2.33a) does not have
an entailment of this sort since the Focus on the embedded verb indicates that
the content of the complement clause is still under discussion, thus giving rise to
the impression that projection is blocked. Simons et al.’s account thus takes a dif-
ferent perspective on the projection problem by highlighting the relevance of the
discourses that sentences containing presupposition triggers occur in and treating
projection as a property of utterances rather than sentences.
One consequence of Simons et al.’s (2017) account is that presuppositions are no
longer lexicalized (or conventionalized) parts of the meaning of an expression, as
was assumed in the approaches we previously discussed, but arise from indepen-
dent discourse factors. In fact, the authors take the lack of projection in (2.33a) as
an empirical argument against a lexical treatment of presupposition. However, the
ability to account for effects of prosody via the pragmatic mechanism laid out by
Simons et al. come at the price of losing the standard explanation for the observed
differences between attitude verbs such as think vs know. For example, Djärv & Ba-
15Since the next chapter will provide a detailed introduction to these concepts, I will keep the
current discussion informal and restricted to the essential ideas.
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covcin (2020) provide experimental evidence that lexical differences far outweigh
effects of prosody (but see also Vaikšnoraitė et al. 2019 on production evidence sup-
porting a pragmatic account). Given these findings, Djärv & Bacovcin argue for a
multi-faceted account of projection that takes into account different factors (see
also Dudley 2017 on data from acquisition, Özyıldız 2017, 2018 for cross-linguistic
data, and Tonhauser et al. 2019 on data beyond factives). A crucial question these
findings raise, however, is where presuppositions come from, as manifested by the
debate between lexicalist and pragmatic approaches, which we will turn to now.
2.3.2 The Triggering Problem
While the majority of presupposition research has been concerned with the projec-
tion problem - as noted earlier - a less studied but just as essential question is the
triggering problem. The triggering problem refers to the question of how and why
presuppositions arise in the first place. In our discussion thus far, presuppositions
have been predominantly taken to be idiosyncratic components of the lexical entry
of certain expressions. However, while this assumption allows us to address issues
like the projection problem, it begs further questions, namely why it is that a given
expression that licenses inferences that p and q comes to be lexicalized with one in-
ference as at-issue content and the other as a presupposition rather than the other
way around (see Simons 2006b).16
Let’s use stop as an example to illustrate this issue. The sentence in (2.35a) gives
rise to two inferences, an at-issue component that Gordon does not work at Cardiff
Electric at some relevant time, and a presupposition that he used to work there
before. In principle, nothing prevents us from imagining a lexical item shtop as
16There is also a cross-linguistic perspective to be taken with respect to this problem, namely why
it is that the same kinds of inferences get lexicalized as presuppositions across languages. However,
there is relatively little research on presuppositions cross-linguistically beyond English and major
European languages such as French and German, such that I will not be able to comment on this
further, but at least impressionistically it seems like prominent presupposition triggers like stop or
too have an equivalent in other languages.
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in (2.35b) where this inference pattern is reversed, which raises the question why
such an expression is not attested in English.17,18
(2.35) a. Gordon stopped working at Cardiff Electric.
⇒ Gordon does not work at Cardiff Electric at time t
↝ Gordon worked at Cardiff Electric prior to time t
b. Gordon shtopped working at Cardiff Electric.
↝ Gordon does not work at Cardiff Electric at time t
⇒ Gordon worked at Cardiff Electric prior to time t
One account that circumvents the issues that come with stipulating presupposi-
tions as an arbitrarily lexicalized part of an expression is that by Simons et al.
(2010) mentioned in the previous subsection. Beyond its application to prosodic
effects on projection behavior discussed previously, Simons et al.’s account is an
attempt to relate projective meaning in general to effects of the Question Under
Discussion. Their hypotheses, stated in (2.36), is that anything that is relevant to
the Question Under Discussion is at-issue, and anything that is not relevant be-
comes not at-issue (with presuppositions as one type of not at-issue content).
(2.36) Hypotheses about what projects and why
a. All and only those implications of (embedded) sentences which are
not at-issue relative to the Question Under Discussion in the con-
text have the potential to project.
b. Operators (modals, negation, etc.) target at-issue content.
latex-trick (SIMONS ET AL. 2010, (12))
17Note that a potential candidate would be used to, which however only implicates that the rele-
vant state no longer holds.
18Abusch (2010) has argued that a candidate for an instantiation of such a presuppositional min-
imal pair are be right vs be aware. However, Schlenker (2010) argues that the two expressions differ
in other respects (see also Abrusán 2011).
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As an illustration of their account, consider the example in (2.37). The answer to
the question contains the factive verb know, which is standardly taken to presup-
pose its complement clause. The content of the complement clause - that you can
eat raw vegetables - here does not address the question regarding A’s surprise, and
is consequently - and correctly - predicted to project from negation. In contrast, the
sentence without negation - that the first graders knew that you can eat raw veg-
etables - does address the question, and is thus by virtue of being at-issue within
the scope of negation.
(2.37) Background scenario: a nutritionist has been visiting first grade classrooms to
talk to the children about healthy eating
Q: What most surprised you about the first graders?
A: They didn’t know that you can eat raw vegetables.
latex-trick (SIMONS ET AL. 2010, (15))
However, while this explanation makes the correct predictions for (2.37) and is ap-
plicable to a broad range of cases, it also suffers from an overgeneration problem.
As Abrusán (2011) notes, the content of the complement clause in (2.38) - that the
first graders failed the exam - may be taken as a possible answer to the question
and thus expected to project, contrary to fact. Thus, in the absence of additional
constraints, Simons et al.’s (2010) account faces serious empirical challenges.
(2.38) Q: What most surprised you about the first graders?
A: They didn’t know that they have failed the exam.
latex-trick (ABRUSÁN 2011, (14))
Abrusán (2011) proposes an alternative that is restricted to verbal triggers and
grounded in the way our attention separates foregrounded from backgrounded
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information, in an analogy with vision research. The central idea is that a sentence
has a main point and content that is independent of this main point (see also Ab-
bott 2000). The main point will be constituted by the part of the sentence that is
about the event time of the matrix predicate and become at-issue, while inferences
that are not necessarily about the event time of the matrix predicate will become
presupposed. To illustrate the idea with the sentence we looked at in (2.38), the
state of A’s knowing and the event of the first graders failing the exam could take
place at different times, and it is this independence that leads to the content of the
complement clause being presupposed.
Although Abrusán’s (2011) mechanism is able to account for the triggering be-
havior of a broad range triggers, Schlenker (2019) notes some empirical challenges
with respect to the embedding predicates in (2.39). Despite the event time of the
embedded predicate being independent of the event time of the matrix predicate
and therefore predicted to be presupposed, the content of the complement clause
fails to project from the question in (2.39b). Abrusán’s account thus seems to suffer
from an overgeneration problem much like Simons et al. (2010).
(2.39) a. The bloody gloves {demonstrate, imply, prove, show} that Diane
committed the murder.
⇒ Diane committed the murder.
b. Do the bloody gloves {demonstrate, imply, prove, show} that Diane
committed the murder?
⇏ Diane committed the murder. (SCHLENKER 2019, (32))
In addition to his criticism of previous accounts, Schlenker (2019) exacerbates the
triggering problem by pointing out evidence from the productiveness of presuppo-
sition triggering from gestures (see Tieu et al. 2019). For example, a wheel-turning
gesture seems to give rise to a presupposition that there has been a wheel, despite
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the fact that there is no lexical entry that could be appealed to, which emphasizes
the need for a triggering algorithm. Schlenker (2019) proposes an account that uses
insights from Abrusán (2011) but additionally relates the triggering problem to the
projection problem. Presuppositions are treated as semantically inert with respect
to projection, that is, they do not add meaning themselves but are meant to indi-
cate information that was already present in the context, i.e. presuppositions are
intended to be trivial. Schlenker argues that entailments that are usually known
ahead of time, i.e. are cognitively inert, should also be semantically inert and thus
be realized as presuppositions.
To relate this idea to the wheel-turning gesture, there is an entailment that there
is a wheel and an entailment that the wheel is being turned. However, in most cases
one will have acquired the knowledge that there is a wheel before learning about it
being turned. As a result, the presence of the wheel will be presupposed, whereas
the turning itself remains at-issue. Schlenker (2019) thus provides a precise charac-
terization of the intuition that presuppositions are epistemic preconditions that need
to hold relative to the at-issue content. Additionally, his account is able to cover a
broader range of triggers than Abrusán’s (2011), extending beyond verbal triggers
to definite descriptions and Focus-sensitive particles.
To sum up, there are convincing arguments that treating presuppositions as
lexical idiosyncrasies is not sufficiently explanatory and a triggering algorithm is
called for. One phenomenon that the triggering problem can be related to addi-
tionally concerns the variability in projection behavior of different triggers that
was brought up several times by now. If - at least some - presuppositions are not
lexically specified but arise pragmatically - for instance as a by-product of the or-
der in which we acquire certain information about the world - then it may not be
surprising that certain presuppositions fail to arise under certain conditions. This
reasoning brings us to one of the central issues of this dissertation, namely differ-
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ences between presupposition triggers, which will be discussed in more depth in
the next section.
2.4 Typology of Presupposition Triggers
The goal of this section is to provide an in-depth discussion of distinctions be-
tween presupposition triggers that have been proposed in the literature. In doing
so, special attention will be given to empirical correlates of these distinctions, since
some proposed distinctions are primarily conceptual and lack a clear diagnostic,
but nonetheless warrant discussion. The current section furthermore comments on
how these proposals relate to the classification in terms of Focus-sensitivity pro-
posed in the thesis. However, since a proper introduction of Focus-sensitivity and
how to diagnose it has to wait until the next chapter, the reader will have to take
for granted for now which triggers are Focus-sensitive and which are not.
A higher level question in this regard is to what extent all proposals are equally
necessary or whether some might be able to replace others, specifically with re-
spect to the present proposal. This question will be addressed where possible in the
following discussion, but otherwise deferred until Chapter 6. Nonetheless, I will
make an attempt at synthesizing and highlighting resulting overlaps and clusters
along the way, as well as provide a final summary after relevant proposals have
been reviewed.
Before delving into the discussion of the different distinctions, however, a com-
ment about the scope of this investigation is required. Based on the characteriza-
tion of presuppositions assumed in Section 2.1, the range of expressions in natural
language that qualify as presuppositional is vast such that an exhaustive classifi-
cation of all triggering expressions would be too much for a single dissertation,
but even doing justice to all triggers that have been identified in the literature -
Levinson (1983) famously attributed a list of 13 different trigger types to Karttunen
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(see Karttunen 2016; see also Beaver & Geurts 2014 for an extensive list with refer-
ences) - is hardly feasible. Instead, a selection of triggers that have been featured
more prominently across classifications and consequently in the preceding discus-
sion are shown in (2.40).19 A cross-classification of these triggers for all reviewed
proposals can be found in Appendix A.2.
(2.40) a. Definite Descriptions
The TV-show Halt and Catch Fire was never nominated for an
Emmy.
↝ There is a unique TV-show called Halt and Catch Fire
b. Selectional restrictions
Cameron is a bachelorette.
↝ Cameron is female
c. Achievement Verbs
Haley won a science competition at school.
↝ Haley participated in a competition
d. Cognitive Factives
Diane discovered that Bos hid something from her.
↝ Bos hid something from Diane
e. Emotive Factives
Joe regrets that he left Texas.
↝ Joe left Texas
f. Aspectual Verbs
Joanie stopped going to school.
↝ Joanie went to school before
19For data showing that these expressions qualify as presuppositions, see Appendix A.1.
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g. Aspectual Particles
Gordon apologized to Donna again.
↝ Gordon apologized to Donna before
h. Additive Particles
TOM got hired by Mutiny too.
↝ Someone other than Tom got hired by Mutiny
i. Scalar Particles
Ryan even quit his job.
↝ Ryan quitting his job was unexpected or noteworthy
j. Clefts
It was Katie who found Gordon.
↝ Someone found Gordon
Each trigger type may be comprised of different lexical expressions based on their
similar semantics, following previous practices. For instance, both stop and con-
tinue fall into the category of aspectual verbs based on the fact that they both pre-
suppose a previous eventuality of a certain kind, but may differ in other ways. The
term trigger class will henceforth be reserved for theoretical distinctions made that
cut across these types. In order to keep the following discussion comprehensive,
however, priority will be given to examples necessary to illustrating the relevant
contrasts.
The classifications to be discussed are the soft vs hard distinction by Abusch
(2002, 2010), entailed vs non-entailed presuppositions (Sudo, 2012), weak vs strong
presuppositions (Glanzberg, 2005; Tiemann, 2014), lexical vs resolution triggers
(Zeevat, 1992, 1994, 2002), anaphoric vs non-anaphoric triggers (Kripke, 2009; Beck,
2007), the four-way distinction of projective meaning by Tonhauser et al. (2013),
and the distinction based on different mechanisms governing obligatoriness ef-
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fects of presuppositions by Bade (2016).
2.4.1 Soft vs Hard: Abusch (2002, 2010)
The potentially most widely cited distinction of trigger types is that proposed by
Abusch (2002, 2010), building on Simons (2001), between soft and hard triggers.
The empirical basis for the distinction concerns differences in projection behavior,
as noted earlier. Since projection covers a broad range of phenomena, it is worth-
while adopting some terminology to distinguish four relevant sub-cases, following
Abbott (2006). The first, filtering, was already discussed in Section 2.3.1 and con-
cerns cases where a relevant presupposition is entailed by a previous clause. The
second case is contextual neutralization, where it is the context as a whole that
renders a presupposition implausible and thus prevents it from projecting. A fa-
mous example from Beaver (2010) is given in (2.41) where the fact that the speaker
requests to be informed about the truth of the presupposition is incompatible with
its truth already being established. Another example with too from Abusch (2010)
is given in (2.42). However, to my knowledge, no arguments have been made that
triggers differ with respect to these two types of cases.
(2.41) ...if anyone discovers that the method is also wombat-proof, I’d really
like to know! (BEAVER 2010, (32))
(2.42) I’m worried that Tom might have gone to the climbing wall. Of course if
Katie is there too, there’s no reason for concern. She is experienced and
safety-conscious. (ABUSCH 2010, (24))
The third case, which Abusch (2010) is primarily concerned with, is suspension,
as in (2.43) (repeated from (1.3) and (2.2)). A presupposition can be suspended
when it is acceptable to use a trigger inside a conditional (or another hole) after
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explicitly stating one’s uncertainty regarding the presupposed content. As noted
in previous discussions of this example, if the presupposition were to project in
such contexts, we should expect the outcome to be inconsistent and resulting in
markedness. However, such markedness is only observed for too, but not win in
(2.43), suggesting that only too still projects whereas the presupposition of win is
suspended.20
(2.43) a. I have no idea whether Ryan ended up participating in the Road
Race yesterday. But if he won it, then he has more victories than
anyone else in history. (ABUSCH 2010, (3d))
b. ??I have no idea whether Joanie read that proposal. But if Haley
read it too, let’s ask them to confer and simply give us a yes-no
response.
Latex-hack (ABUSCH 2010, (5a))
Triggers whose presupposition is suspendable are called soft triggers, and include
cognitive factives, aspectual verbs, achievement verbs, intonational Focus, ques-
tions, as well as a number of less discussed triggers like what Abusch calls af-
firmation/negation, contrastive stative predicates, inchoatives and predicates in-
volving symmetric transfer like sell. In contrast, the class of hard triggers which
resist suspension is comprised of too, again, even, it-clefts, and emotive factives.
Definite descriptions have been argued to be hard by Abbott (2006) but soft by
Walker (2012).
One superficial difference underlying the distinction worth noting here is that
the majority of soft triggers are verbs, whereas hard triggers are mostly particles
20See Jayez & Mongelli (2013); Jayez et al. (2015) for experimental results supporting the general
contrast between soft and hard triggers in terms of projection, but also evidence that the empirical
picture may be more complicated. See also Schwarz (2014) for psycholinguistic evidence that both
soft and hard triggers are processed without notable delay.
46
or adverbs. Moreover, all Focus-sensitive triggers - too/also21 and even - belong
to the class of hard triggers. Additionally, a case can be made for another hard
trigger, namely it-clefts, to depend on Focus in some way.22 Regarding a seem-
ingly problematic part of the classification, namely classifying intonational Focus
as a soft trigger, the next Chapter provides an argument for why bare Focus and
Focus-sensitive expressions do not have to be treated equivalently. The triggers
that remain to pose issues then are again and - to a slightly lesser extent - emo-
tive factives, insofar as they break the generalization that all hard triggers involve
some notion of Focus-sensitivity. To preface some of the discussion below, we will
see again play the role of the outlier in this way in other classifications as well.
The final sub-case of projection to be distinguished here is cancellation under
negation. Whereas suspension contexts are non-committal toward the truth of a
given presupposition, in cancellation contexts the truth is straightforwardly de-
nied. An example of a definite description is provided in (2.44). The reasoning
here is the same as for the suspension contexts. If the existence presupposition of
the definite description were to project from negation, it should result in a contra-
diction. However, since the utterance is (reported as) felicitous, the presupposition
seems to be cancellable. Notably, as with suspension, triggers seem to differ in
the availability of cancellation however. There seems to be a noticeable contrast to
(2.44) when trying to cancel the presupposition of too in (2.45).
(2.44) The queen of Germany isn’t bald – there isn’t any (queen of Germany)!
Latex-hack (after ABBOTT 2006, (14))
(2.45) ??CAMERON didn’t get hired by Cardiff Electric too – they didn’t hire
anyone in the first place!
21Although there are contexts in which also and too are not equivalent (e.g. Göbel 2019a), they
will be treated as equivalent for the remainder of the thesis.
22For further discussion, see Chapter 6.
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Both suspension and cancellation are often described in terms of Local Accommo-
dation (Heim, 1983) (see also Romoli & Sauerland 2017). In projection theories like
Heim (1983), local accommodation serves as a repair mechanism that applies in
cases like (2.44) to prevent the context from becoming defective. When a presup-
position is locally accommodated, it is locally computed within the scope of the
entailment cancelling operator and thus blocked from projecting and becoming
part of the whole sentence.23 The examples in (2.43a) and (2.44) above would thus
be interpreted as (2.46) and (2.47) respectively. Although I am not aware of any
work directly comparing different entailment-cancelling operators with respect to
local accommodation, there seems to be a strong correlation between suspension
and cancellation in terms of their availability for different triggers, as predicted on
this view.24 One way of describing the soft vs hard trigger distinction then would
be as soft triggers allowing local accommodation while hard triggers do not.
(2.46) I have no idea whether Ryan ended up participating in the Road Race
yesterday. But if he participated and won it, then he has more victories
than anyone else in history.
(2.47) It is not the case that there is a king of France and that he is bald.
Abusch’s (2010) own theoretical proposal however - while acknowledging this al-
ternative description - argues that the extent to which triggers can be blocked from
projecting can be traced back to the distinction between semantic and pragmatic
23Note that despite the terminological similarity, local accommodation and global accommoda-
tion yield opposite results with respect to the inferred presupposition. If a presupposition is locally
accommodated, it does not become part of the overall context. If it is globally accommodated, it
does. Beaver & Zeevat (2007) also discuss a process of intermediate accommodation that I will put
aside here.
24A potential confound that is worth keeping in mind when applying these tests is that they
depend on actually conveying the presupposed content in an adequate paraphrase. The result of
the test might thus be affected by the relative clunkiness of such a paraphrase as well. For instance
in the case of German discourse particles, the test thus becomes unusable because their content is
difficult to capture (in the terminology of Potts 2007b, ineffable).
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presuppositions, discussed in Section 2.2 earlier. While the presuppositions of hard
triggers are encoded into the semantics of the various lexical items, soft triggers
are generated by a pragmatic default mechanism that is easily defeasible and thus
does not result in markedness in suspension contexts. This default mechanism is
rooted in the presence of alternatives, either of a lexical nature or arising from the
Question Under Discussion (QUD).
Abusch (2002) illustrates the former case with know and its alternative be un-
aware, as shown in (2.48). Since both know and be unaware entail the truth of the
complement clause while differing with respect to the attitude the subject holds
toward the complement clause, the truth of the complement clause is entailed by
the disjunction of the two attitude verbs and thus ends up being pragmatically
presupposed.
(2.48) Katie knows it is raining.
alternative: Katie is unaware it is raining.
C = {Katie knows it is raining, Katie is unaware it is raining}
= { rain & k believe rain, rain & ¬k believe rain } (ABUSCH 2002, (29))
Similar reasoning applies in the case of intonational Focus, illustrated in (2.49).
The assumption is that Focus indicates an implicit question represented as a set
of propositions (more on this in Chapter 3). The disjunction of this set entails that
Gordon likes someone, which thus gets generated as a pragmatic presupposition.
(2.49) Gordon likes [Katie]F.
QUD: Who does Gordon like?
C = { Gordon likes x }
An alternative take on the soft-hard distinction comes from Romoli (2012, 2015),
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who argues that the presuppositions of soft triggers are simply scalar implicatures.
That is, much like some and every form a Horn scale <some, every> and the use of
the weaker some implicates the negation of the stronger every, a soft trigger like win
forms a scale with its weaker alternative participate. Thus, when a stronger alter-
native is embedded under negation as in (2.50a), the scalar implicature generation
mechanism - here exhaustification of alternatives via the EXH operator - outputs an
inference that the weaker alternative still holds. The observation that the presumed
presuppositions of soft triggers disappear easily in certain contexts is then analo-
gous to the defeasibility of implicatures. However, research from first language
acquisition and atypical populations suggests that soft triggers and scalar implica-
tures do not behave alike (Bill et al. 2016; Kennedy et al. 2015, more in Section 2.5),
and that Romoli’s account thus requires modifications.
(2.50) a. Diane didn’t win.
b. Alt = {¬won(d), ¬participated(d)}
c. JEXHK[¬won(d)] = ¬won(d) & ¬¬participated(d) =
¬won(d) & participated(d) (ROMOLI 2015, (35))
Criticism of Abusch’s account comes from Abrusán (2016), who emphasizes the
role of different triggering mechanisms for the observed projection behavior. Both
factives and additive particles are argued to be generated by the triggering mech-
anism proposed in (Abrusán, 2011), discussed earlier in Section 2.3.2. In the case
of factives, lack of projection is then attributed to a failure of this triggering mech-
anism to generate a presupposition in the first place, specifically the way Focus
draws attention to the main point of the utterance, similar to the account of Si-
mons et al. (2010) discussed in the same Section. Additives, however, despite be-
ing generated by the same triggering mechanism as factives, cannot be blocked
from projecting due to their anaphoric status (more on this further below) and the
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inability to be Focused in the same way.
In contrast, for the presuppositions of it-clefts and intonational Focus, Abrusán
adopts the triggering mechanism proposed by Abusch. However, Abrusán argues
that it-clefts resist suspension because the implicit question that triggers the pre-
supposition is conveyed syntactically rather than pragmatically. Thus, she appeals
to different triggering mechanisms that cut across the soft-hard distinction and
explains the variability in projection in terms of idiosyncratic properties of the re-
spective triggers in relation to those triggering mechanisms. However, given the
concerns raised by Schlenker (2019) about Abrusán’s (2011) triggering mechanism
discussed in Section 2.3.2, the adequacy of Abrusán’s (2016) proposal to account
for projection variability depends on the severity of these concerns and how they
affect the argument presented here.
Another account of the soft-hard distinction comes from Klinedinst (2016), who
relates the contrast to a difference in triggers entailing or not entailing the con-
tent of their presupposition, in addition to presupposing it. Since the question of
whether presuppositions are additionally entailed by certain triggers is a relevant
distinction in its own right in the context of this section, it will be discussed next
in proper detail.
2.4.2 Entailing vs Non-entailing: Sudo (2012)
The idea that some presupposition triggers may entail their presupposition goes
back to Fillmore (1969) and has been alluded to in different places across the liter-
ature since then but not systematized until recently. Sudo (2012) discusses the idea
in the context of projection properties of quantified sentences (see Section 2.3.1 for
related discussion) in relation to the empirical difficulty of distinguishing between
triggers with respect to their entailedness. To illustrate this issue, consider stop in
(2.51). On the view implicit in the discussion thus far, stop has an at-issue entail-
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ment that a certain state does not hold at a relevant time and a presupposition that
the state used to hold before (2.51a). However, alternatively, this presupposition
may also be part of the at-issue content, as in (2.51b).
(2.51) Raffael stopped using Mac. (SUDO 2012, (129))
a. ⇒ R is not using Mac at the moment
↝ R used to use Mac
b. ⇒ R is not using Mac at the moment & R used to use Mac
↝ R used to use Mac
Unfortunately, these two accounts make the same prediction in a simple case such
as negation in (2.52) since the presupposed content is the same and expected to
project. Based on these data, it would thus seem more economical to adopt the
view in (2.51a) instead of assuming apparently redundant at-issue content.
(2.52) Raffael didn’t stop using Mac. (SUDO 2012, (130))
a. ⇏ R is not using Mac at the moment
↝ R used to use Mac
b. ⇏ R is not using Mac at the moment & R used to use Mac
↝ R used to use Mac
However, Sudo identifies non-monotonic quantifiers like exactly one in (2.53) as an
environment that makes it possible to tease apart the two approaches. In fact, he
argues that (2.53a) is the preferred interpretation for stop, thus providing evidence
for treating the presupposition as an extra at-issue entailment.
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(2.53) Exactly one student stopped using Mac.
a. Exactly one student used Mac & does not use Mac now. ←preferred
b. Exactly one student does not use Mac now.
In contrast, the gender presupposition of the pronoun in (2.54) does not seem to
project, thus suggesting that it is not part of the asserted content.
(2.54) Exactly one student criticized herself (. . . namely Joanie).
a. Exactly one student is a female who is self-critical.
b. Exactly one student was self-critical. ←preferred
Among the triggers Sudo discusses, the presupposition of know, both of the X, and
certain verbs like curtsy or nouns like widow (both presupposing the respective
argument to be female) are classified as being part of the asserted content, like
stop. On the other end are the gender presupposition of pronouns, hard triggers
like even, the uniqueness presupposition of definite descriptions, honorifics in lan-
guages like Japanese, and implicative verbs like manage that contribute a presup-
position that is distinct from the at-issue content. Additionally, Zehr & Schwarz
(2016) and Zehr & Schwarz (2018b) provide experimental evidence that also, again,
return, and to a certain degree back are non-entailing triggers, whereas stop seems to
be entailing, as argued by Sudo. With respect to a classification in terms of Focus-
sensitivity, the overlap is much less clear than for the soft-hard distinction. Al-
though all tested Focus-sensitive triggers - even and also - are non-entailing, there
are various other triggers in the same class that lack Focus-sensitivity.
Going back to Zehr & Schwarz experimental results, the authors also report
data that go against Sudo’s account. For instance, the extent to which the presup-
position of stop or also was interpreted as entailed or not was affected by whether
participants encountered the two triggers randomly intermixed throughout the ex-
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periment or encountering each trigger separated by blocks, with both triggers be-
coming more likely to receive an entailing interpretation when encountered in the
later block. Since this tendency is surprising on Sudo’s account, Zehr & Schwarz
(2016) suggest an alternative explanation in terms of local accommodation, insofar
as it seems plausible that participants might get used to the potentially associated
cost of this repair mechanism over the course of an experiment.25
The distinction of entailed vs non-entailed presuppositions has also been ap-
plied to the projection variability associated with the soft-hard distinction dis-
cussed previously by Klinedinst (2016), as noted earlier. Klinedinst proposes the
hypothesis that soft triggers entail their (semantic) presupposition, whereas hard
triggers do not. Additionally, he assumes that presuppositions are not meant to be
“idle" but that invoking a presupposition has to be justified since semantic presup-
positions are costly.26
In the case of a hard trigger, suspending its presupposition therefore deprives
the use of the trigger of such justification while still incurring a cost, thus resulting
in the observed markedness. In contrast, soft triggers still contribute their entail-
ments such that the use of the trigger remains justified. One consequence of this
view is that there is no local accommodation in Heim’s (1983) sense but rather that
suspension is the violation of a constraint that semantic presuppositions have to
be Common Ground. As such, the account seems to predict a correlation between -
descriptively - local and global accommodation, which we will come back to later.
Independently of this prediction, Klinedinst’s proposal thus constitutes an at-
tempt to use one classification - entailing vs non-entailing - to explain another -
soft vs hard - and the empirical properties that go along with it. An open question,
25Another experimental investigation that is phrased in terms of entailed vs non-entailed pre-
suppositions is Djärv et al. (2017), focusing on the contrast between emotive and cognitive factives.
Since their experimental paradigm is more closely related to one to be discussed later in a different
context, we will put aside a proper discussion for now.
26Note that this view contrasts with accounts by Schlenker (2008, 2019) that use the idea that
presuppositions are supposed to be idle to address the projection and the triggering problem.
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however, is whether it makes accurate predictions for the ease of local accommo-
dation for triggers that have been shown to be entailing or non-entailing. For in-
stance, based on Zehr & Schwarz’s (2018b) results, back should be non-entailing,
and therefore predicted to be marked in suspension context. An example to test
this prediction is given in (2.55), but judgments seem to vary such that quantita-
tive data may be necessary to resolve this issue.
(2.55) I have no idea whether Cameron has been to COMDEX before.
But if she went back this year to help Joe, he’s gonna be very grateful.
As a correlate of Klinedinst’s (2016) attempt to define soft and hard triggers in
terms of entailing and non-entailing triggers, there is also a question how to iden-
tify entailing and non-entailing triggers beyond their projection behavior with re-
spect to non-monotonic quantifiers and whether there is something fundamental
about how triggers are mapped to each class. Zehr & Schwarz (2018b) address this
question by proposing the Removeability/Independence Hypothesis in (2.56).
(2.56) The Removability/Independence Hypothesis
Presuppositions are NOT entailed if and only if removing triggering
material yields (non-strictly) weaker interpretations of sentences.
Latex-hack (ZEHR & SCHWARZ 2018, (21))
The idea behind this hypothesis is relatively simple. If it is possible to delete a
given trigger from a sentence without the sentence becoming an illicit string, the
trigger is non-entailing; if not, it is entailing.27 Although the hypothesis was not
supported by the data (e.g. return behaved like a non-entailing trigger despite be-
ing not removeable), it thus picks up on the impression that it is verbal triggers -
which would not pass the removability test - that often contrast with presupposi-
27See Abbott (2006) for a similar idea.
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tional particles - which do. Moreover, this contrast may even arise when what is
being presupposed is quite similar, for instance in the case of stop versus again. One
account - or really two variants of one - that highlights this aspect of presupposi-
tion triggers will be discussed next.
2.4.3 Weak vs Strong: Glanzberg (2005); Tiemann (2014)
At the heart of Glanzberg’s (2005) and Tiemann’s (2014) distinction between trig-
gers - coined weak vs strong by Domaneschi et al. (2014) - is the question which
presuppositions are independent from the at-issue content, which can be consid-
ered a different perspective on the entailing vs non-entailing trigger distinction.
Glanzberg (2005) is primarily concerned with situations in which a trigger is used
despite its presupposition not being satisfied on the one hand and the status of the
conversational moves available to repair such a violation on the other.
Consider first the existence presupposition associated with a demonstrative NP,
such as that palm tree. Glanzberg proposes two tests, shown in (2.57) and (2.58), to
diagnose the status of a conversational repair a trigger gives rise to. For a demon-
strative NP, negating the statement is insufficient as a repair (2.57a); instead, the
speaker has to choose a more roundabout way of denying the presupposition
(2.57b).28
(2.57) Echo-Assessment Test
Is that palm tree about to fall? (uttered in a context where there is no palm
tree)
a. # No, that palm tree is not about to fall. (GLANZBERG 2005, (6b))
b. Er . . . no . . . , there is no palm tree. (GLANZBERG 2005, (10b))
28A related property is the extent to which trigger background their presuppositions (Cummins
et al., 2013), which will be discussed below.
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Additionally, an indirect speech report is insufficient to distance the speaker from
a given presupposition (2.58a); rather, the speaker has to directly quote a previous
statement (2.58b).29 Based on this pattern, Glanzberg attributes demonstrative NPs
the property of requiring an obligatory repair when its presupposition is not for the
context to not become defective. Other triggers of this sort are it-clefts and factive
verbs.
(2.58) Indirect Speech Report Test
a. # George said that that palm tree is going to fall.
b. George uttered ‘That palm tree is going to fall’, but there is no palm
tree. (GLANZBERG 2005, (12))
In contrast, triggers such as even or too only require an optional repair, that is, the
speaker can choose to directly accept or reject a previous statement (2.59) or report
it using indirect speech (2.60) without the context becoming defective.30 Glanzberg
links this difference back to the observation (or assumption) that the presupposi-
tional content of even and too is independent of the at-issue content and formalizes
the difference within update semantics, which will be skipped here for space rea-
sons.
(2.59) Even [Joanie]F solved the problem.
Yes, Joanie did...but why did you say ‘even’? (GLANZBERG 2005, (22))
(2.60) Even [I]F solved the problem. (Said by Joanie)
a. Joanie said that even [he]F solved the problem...but of course, that’s
a bit odd, as he would have if anyone did.
29This test also has a correlate in a different place in the literature, namely Tonhauser et al.’s
(2013) obligatory local effect, which will be discussed below as well.
30Note that the contrasting examples (2.57)-(2.58) and (2.59)-(2.60) do not constitute perfect min-
imal pairs, but the intuition seems to be reliable even if the examples were properly constructed.
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b. #Joanie said ‘Even [I]F solved the problem’, but that doesn’t make
sense, because he was most likely to have done it.
Latex-hack (GLANZBERG 2005, (23))
Again taking stock how Glanzberg’s classification relates to Focus-sensitivity be-
fore moving on to Tiemann’s (2014)’s proposal, all Focus-sensitive triggers - even
and too - are again in the same class, namely the one which allows separating the
presupposition from the at-issue content according to the proposed diagnostics.
Even more so, they are the only triggers in this class - at least for those Glanzberg
mentions. On the other hand, it-clefts, which Abusch (2010) classified as hard trig-
gers - like other Focus-sensitive triggers - and for which it was consequently sug-
gested that they involved some relation to Focus as well, are now in a separate
class. The reason it-clefts behave differently with respect to the echo-assessment
test, however, may be because their presupposition is entailed by the at-issue con-
tent. That is, the unclefted proposition in 2.61 - that Katie found Gordon - entails
that someone found Gordon. This apparent mismatch across classifications may
therefore be due to other properties of the triggering expression/construction.
(2.61) It was Katie who found Gordon.
↝ Someone found Gordon
Tiemann (2014) also focuses on the independence of certain triggers from the at-
issue content, but with respect to how the distinction affects (global) accommoda-
tion. Motivated by experimental results on German wieder (‘again’) that indicated
a lack of accommodation in a context that did neither explicitly satisfy nor deny
the presupposition – a detailed discussion of the results will be provided in Chap-
ter 5 – she argues that triggers that only convey a presupposition without affecting
the at-issue content, as is supposed to be the case for again, can be ignored in those
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contexts.
Tiemann relates this view to the proposed maxim in (2.62), assuming that ac-
commodating a presupposition is costly and consequently avoided whenever pos-
sible. Since purely presuppositional triggers like again do not affect the compu-
tation of the at-issue content, ignoring the trigger rather than accommodating it
would therefore be preferable. Note that the idea that triggers can be ignored
under such circumstances resembles the reasoning behind the Zehr & Schwarz’s
(2018b) Removability/Independence Hypothesis. Another related argument relat-
ing a triggers independence to yet a different empirical property, namely back-
groundedness, will be discussed in the next subsection in the context of the lexical
vs resolution trigger distinction.
(2.62) Minimize Accommodation
Do not accommodate a presupposition unless missing accommodation
will lead to uninterpretability of the assertion! (TIEMANN 2014, p.43)
2.4.4 Lexical vs Resolution: Zeevat (1992, 1994, 2002, 2004)
One of the earliest distinctions between trigger types - at least in terms of those
that received a particular label - is Zeevat’s (1992) distinction between lexical trig-
gers and resolution triggers. Rather than providing linguistic diagnostics as basis
for the distinction, it is mostly based on conceptual notions regarding the different
functions that are at play. Lexical triggers concern the preconditions for interpreta-
tion such as sortal restrictions of verbs and nouns (e.g. bachelorette) but also emo-
tive factives like regret. Resolution triggers, on the other hand, are characterized as
identifying entities in the discourse in order to predicate something of them, for
example definite descriptions as well as factive when- and after-clauses and possi-
bly clefts. Interestingly, neither class includes any Focus-sensitive triggers, which
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belong to a third class we will get to below.
Although Zeevat (1992) does not provide any empirical diagnostics for identi-
fying whether a trigger belongs to one class or the other beyond the description
of their functions, I want to propose such a diagnostic for lexical presuppositions,
namely even-denial. Francis (2018) observes that even in combination with nega-
tion can be used to deny a presupposition, as in (2.63). Interestingly, not all trig-
gers seem to be equally suitable for denial with even. For instance, (2.64), despite
considered felicitous by Francis, seems degraded relative to (2.63).
(2.63) A: When did Marisa stop smoking?
B: She didn’t even smoke! (FRANCIS 2018, (1))
(2.64) A: I hear Maida was late for class again.
B: ?She’s never even been late before! (FRANCIS 2018, (3), my judgment)
What this suggests is that even-denial is particularly useful - by virtue of the scalar
meaning of even - for identifying presuppositions that arise through some sort of
ranking relationship between a triggers at-issue content and its presupposition.
Relationships of this sort include certain preconditions for actions we derive from
world-knowledge (i.e. to win, you need to participate), which fit Zeevat’s char-
acterization of lexical presuppositions, but also the class of soft triggers Romoli
(2015) treats as instances of scalar implicatures. I will thus assume even-denial as a
possible diagnostic for identifying these classes of triggers.
Another approach to relating Zeevat’s (1992) distinction to empirical properties
comes from Cummins et al. (2013), who propose a hypothesis about the degree
with which different triggers background their presuppositions. Their reasoning,
however, is more based on whether the presupposition of a given trigger is inde-
pendent of the at-issue content, as was discussed previously, as well as the extent to
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which a presupposition is able to address a Question Under Discussion (although
an implicit assumption seems to be that these two properties are related; see also
the discussion of Simons et al. 2010 in Section 2.3.2). To illustrate the latter prop-
erty, consider quit and again in (2.65). The idea is that for quit, the continuation does
address the QUD, whereas for again, it fails to do so.
(2.65) a. Haley didn’t quit smoking, because she never used to smoke.
QUD: Why didn’t Haley quit smoking? → addressed by continuation
Latex-hack (CUMMINS ET AL. 2013, (11))
b. ?Rob didn’t see Amy again today, because he had never seen her
before.
QUD: Why didn’t Rob see Amy again today? → not addressed
Latex-hack (CUMMINS ET AL. 2013, (13))
Based on this reasoning, Cummins et al. (2013) conducted a rating experiment
comparing different triggers in the design in (2.66), varying acceptance/rejection
and whether the continuation targets the at-issue content or the presupposition.
While (2.66a)-(2.66c) served as controls, Cummins et al. predicted (2.66b) to be
more acceptable for triggers whose presupposition is independent of the at-issue
content (e.g. again) than for a triggers that also contribute at-issue content (e.g.
stop) since it should be easier to dissociate at-issue content from presupposition
and therefore accept the former without the latter. For (2.66d), the prediction was
the reverse insofar as rejecting the presupposition should provide a justification
for rejecting the whole sentence if the trigger contributes both at-issue and presup-
positional content, but not if it is purely presuppositional.
(2.66) Did Brian lose his wallet again? (CUMMINS ET AL. 2013, (18))
a. Yes, he did lose his wallet again.
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b. Yes, although he never lost it before.
c. No, he didn’t lose it this time.
d. No, because he never lost it before.
Cummins et al. tested regret, still, continue, and stop as assumed lexical triggers (on
their interpretation, those where a false presupposition entails the falsity of the
whole sentence), and again and too as resolution triggers (those which are indepen-
dent of the at-issue content). All lexical triggers showed a significant difference be-
tween (2.66b) and (2.66d), with (2.66d) being rated higher, whereas this difference
was not significant for again and numerically reversed for too. Amaral & Cummins
(2015) replicated this pattern with similar triggers in Spanish.
While the results thus provide evidence for the assumed difference between
lexical and resolution triggers - at least with respect to the conceptualization of
Cummins et al. (2013) - and a novel empirical correlate of the distinction, they also
raise additional questions. First, note that still patterned like stop rather than again,
despite the fact that still is purely presuppositional. This discrepancy, much like
the results from Zehr & Schwarz (2018b) discussed earlier, suggest that it might be
necessary to look at additional properties of aspectual triggers, which I will come
back to in the summary of this section. Second, while Cummins et al. describe the
observed difference in (2.66) in terms of local accommodation, the manipulation
seems to crucially rely on the properties of the response particles under consid-
eration rather than the connectives. A different way of describing the empirical
phenomenon of backgrounding as tested here might then be in terms of the extent
to which response particles are able to pick up both at-issue and presuppositional
content at once in relation to the trigger under consideration.
Moreover, Cummins et al. (2013) categorize again and too as resolution trig-
gers, incorrectly so insofar as Zeevat (1992) mentions a third class - elaborated on
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in (Zeevat, 1994, 2002, 2004) - comprised of too, also, another, again, and later clefts,
pseudo-clefts and intonational contours associated with topic-focus structure. Zee-
vat (1992) notes this class to behave differently with respect to the structures from
which it can be licensed, for instance from the complement clause of believe as in
(2.67),31 as well as their inability to accommodate. This latter observation is often
brought up as reason to treat this class of triggers as anaphoric, which will be dis-
cussed in the next subsection.
(2.67) Donna believes that Joanie was in Egypt.
Haley was there too. (ZEEVAT 1992, (30))
In terms of how the proposed distinction and the experimental results relate to
other classes, too/also and again pattern together as in every previous classification
that featured both of them. Since too and also are the only Focus-sensitive trig-
gers mentioned here, however, there is little basis for an evaluation with respect
to Focus-sensitivity, at least regarding superficial overlap or mismatches between
classes. On the other hand, a cluster that emerges from Cummins et al.’s (2013)
investigation and the classifications discussed up to this point is the contrast be-
tween verbal triggers and presuppositional particles and adverbs. This pattern
was already noted for the soft-hard distinction, but was also featured in Zehr &
Schwarz’s (2018b) Removability Hypothesis to account for the entailing vs non-
entailing distinction, the weak-strong distinction, and now Cummins et al.’s rein-
terpretation of the lexical vs resolution trigger distinction. I will come back to the
question what might be underlying this cluster at the end of this section.
31This claim is common in one part of the literature, but not all - if any - native speakers I have
consulted find (2.67) completely felicitous, such that the data should be taken with a grain of salt.
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2.4.5 Anaphoricity: Kripke (2009), Beck (2007)
The idea that certain triggers are anaphoric in some sense is not uncommon in the
literature (e.g. Roberts 2006). For example, as discussed in Section 2.2, all presup-
positions are treated like anaphors in DRT (van der Sandt, 1992). However, the
term ‘anaphoric’ has also been used to account for different, logically independent
empirical properties, namely (global) accommodation difficulty on the one hand
and quantifier binding on the other, which will be discussed below. Additionally,
accounts of these properties also vary in the formal framework in which they are
implemented. Consequently, it is particularly crucial to be precise about what the
term is intended to cover to not render it meaningless.
The characterization of certain triggers as anaphoric - outside of DRT - is com-
monly associated with Kripke (2009). Kripke argues against the existential account
of triggers like too and again by Karttunen & Peters (1979). On this account, the
presupposition of too in (2.68) would simply be that someone other than Sam is
having dinner in New York tonight. However, given the millions of people living
in New York, this presupposition should be trivially satisfied, and yet would be
infelicitous as an out-of-the-blue utterance.
(2.68) #SAM is having dinner in New York tonight, too. (KRIPKE 2009, (14))
Kripke therefore argues that the presupposition of too, as well as that of again and
it-clefts, and in contrast to stop, includes an anaphoric element that requires an ref-
erent in the context. The notion of anaphoric used here is thus meant to contrast
with a conception of presuppositions as existential (how we might conceive of in-
definite noun phrases), and appeals to an analogy with pronouns, which also usu-
ally require an antecedent in the context to be interpretable. Empirically, Kripke’s
argument has been taken as a claim about (global) accommodation difficulty asso-
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ciated with certain triggers. More research on accommodation will be discussed in
detail in Chapter 5.
However, the analogy with pronouns comes with other theoretical implica-
tions, which have been highlighted in other accounts and diverge from the identi-
fication with accommodation difficulty. In a Heim & Kratzer (1998) semantics, pro-
nouns are stereotypical examples for free variables, which are either interpreted as
denoting an entity in the discourse context or as being bound by a quantifier in
the sentence they occur in. Crucially, there are other instances of free variables in
natural language that do not result in infelicity when used out-of-the-blue such
as wh-words, which implies that interpreting the “presuppositions as anaphors"
analogy in terms of free variables yields a different classification.
The most in-depth attempt at conceiving of anaphoric presuppositions in terms
of free variables comes from Beck (2007), focusing on again. As an instance of
again’s variable being interpreted contextually, Beck provides the example in (2.69),
which gives rise to the inference that Tom’s birthday precedes Katie’s birthday (see
also Heim 1990 for a similar example, cited by Beck). Crucially, this inference dis-
appears if again is omitted. Additionally, Beck argues that again can also be bound
by a quantifier, based on the example in (2.70) using analogous reasoning. Other
triggers she considers anaphoric in this sense are also and stop, as well as still in
later work (Beck, 2020). The existence of quantifier-dependent readings has also
been argued for in the case of definite descriptions by Schwarz (2009).
(2.69) We will have pizza on Tom’s birthday, so we shouldn’t have pizza again
on Katie’s birthday. (BECK 2007, (8a))
→ Tom’s birthday is before Katie’s birthday
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(2.70) In 1995, 1996 and 1998, Diane was sick on the day of the department
party.
In each of these years, she was sick again on Thanksgiving.
Latex-hack (BECK 2007, (3))
→ In each of these years the department party was before Thanksgiving.
Notably, Beck’s (2007) categorization of stop as anaphoric contrasts with Kripke’s
(2009), which shows why describing certain presupposition triggers as anaphoric
in the absence of further qualification can be misleading. I will thus avoid the term
and focus on the empirical properties that have been discussed in the respective
context, namely global accommodation difficulty and variable-binding type infer-
ences. What is notable, however, is that yet again too and again are part of the same
class, on both accounts. Outside of research on presuppositions, accommodation
difficulty has also been labeled more theory-neutrally Strong Contextual Felicity
by Tonhauser et al. (2013), which will be discussed next.
2.4.6 Strong Contextual Felicity & Obligatory Local Effect: Tonhauser et al.
(2013)
Tonhauser et al.’s (2013) classification is the only one to be discussed here that is
not restricted to presupposition triggers but rather projective meaning in general,
including Potts’s (2005) category of conventional implicatures. It is also one of the
few instances of research on understudied languages in this area, testing a broad
range of triggers in English as well as Paraguayan Guaraní. Tonhauser et al. in-
vestigate two properties for each expression, namely Strong Contextual Felicity
and Obligatory Local Effect. The former can be equated with what we labeled ac-
commodation difficulty previously, namely the extent to which an expression is
felicitous in a context that does not explicitly license a certain inference.
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The second property concerns the extent to which inferences associated with
expressions embedded under belief-verbs are necessarily beliefs of the attitude
holder, or whether they can be attributed to the speaker. As an example, consider
stop in (2.71a), which is associated with the presupposition that Bill smoked before,
and the appositive relative clause in (2.71b). If the inference that Bill smoked before
could be attributed to the speaker rather than to Jane in (2.71a), it would be pos-
sible to attribute Jane the belief that Bill has never been a smoker. However, given
that the sentence is infelicitous, stop can be categorized as having obligatory local
effect. In contrast, interpreting the content of the complement clause as part of the
attitude holder’s beliefs seems to be optional in the case of the appositive relative
clause in (2.71b), since the sentence does not result in a contradiction.
(2.71) a. #Jane believes that Bill has stopped smoking and that he has never
been a smoker.
b. Jane believes that Bill, who is Sue’s cousin, is Sue’s brother.
Latex-hack (TONHAUSER ET AL. 2013, (39))
Combined, Strong Contextual Felicity (SCF) and Obligatory Local Effect (OLE)
yield four classes of projective content, shown below in Table 2.2 (restricted to the
English data and with presupposition triggers in boldface)32. Notably, Tonhauser
et al.’s (2013) classification is purely empirical without any theoretical claims about
what underlies each class. Nonetheless, the discussed properties are worth taking
into account as desiderata of a theory of presupposition triggers. The next subsec-
tion introduces the last property to be discussed here, obligatoriness.
32Only is not bolded here, even though it will be featured as a Focus-sensitive presupposition
trigger later in the thesis, because the current investigation is concerned with its scalar presupposi-
tion, rather than the prejacent implication that Tonhauser et al. tested.
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+SCF -SCF
+OLE pronoun (existence of referent),
too (existence of referent)
almost (polar implication),
know (content of complement),
only (prejacent implication),
stop (prestate holds)
-OLE too (salience of established alternative),
Focus (salience of alternative),




that N (property attribution),
Possessive NP
(possessive relation)
Table 2.2: Taxonomy of projective meaning, Tonhauser et al. (2013) (IBID., Table 2).
2.4.7 Obligatoriness: Bade (2016)
Despite the fact that presuppositions constitute a secondary kind of meaning by
virtue of being backgrounded and are often conveyed by closed lexical categories
such as particles that seem non-essential, it has long been observed that omitting
a presupposition trigger if its presupposition is satisfied can result in unaccept-
ability. The observation that triggers can be obligatory in this sense goes back to
Heim’s (1991) work on definites and is illustrated in (2.72), where using the indef-
inite seems odd given that a person can only have one (biological) father. Heim
proposes the pragmatic principle in (2.73) to capture this pattern.
(2.72) {#A / The } father of the victim arrived at the crime scene.
(2.73) Maximize Presupposition (Heim, 1990)
Make your contribution presuppose as much as possible!
Although a similar pattern can be found for other triggers, such as too in (2.74),
Bade (2016) argues against attributing this effect to Maximize Presupposition, and
instead that the oddity in the case of too - and some other triggers - stems from
an obligatory exhaustivity implicature that occurs when too is omitted. More pre-
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cisely, if too is omitted, Mary receives Focus by virtue of being the only new in-
formation in the sentence, which in turn triggers an exhaustivity implicature that
Mary is the only one at the party. Since this implicature is inconsistent with the pre-
ceding context, the sentence becomes odd. In contrast, if too is inserted, it prevents
the exhaustivity implicature by using the Focus itself.
(2.74) Peter was at the party.
MARY was at the party #(too).
A critical prediction of Bade’s (2016) account is that triggers like too should not
be obligatory in environments in which the exhaustivity implicature is blocked on
independent grounds. In contrast, if Maximize Presupposition was responsible for
the obligatoriness of triggers like too, their insertion should be required whenever
the respective presupposition is satisfied. One environment that therefore makes
it possible to differentiate the two accounts is embedding under negation, since no
implicature arises here. Manipulating the presence or absence of negation, as well
as the presence or absence of too in items like (2.75), Bade provides experimen-
tal evidence from a rating study that omitting too only decreases ratings when no
negation is present, but that ratings for too being omitted or not are indistinguish-
able when negation is present. The same pattern was found for again, rendering
the two triggers class-mates as in previous classifications.
(2.75) Context: Lukas and Melanie like to go to the cinema together. They agreed to
go to the cinema on Friday, if both have time. Lukas has time to go on Friday.
It is (not) the case that Melanie has time to go on Friday(, too).
Latex-hack (BADE 2016, p.58)
In contrast, using a similar design for definites, comparing the definite with the
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indefinite article in addition to varying negation in items like (2.76), ratings uni-
formly decreased with the indefinite independently of negation.33 Bade (2016) thus
provides convincing evidence for a distinction between presupposition triggers in
terms of the mechanism underlying their obligatoriness effects, as well as an em-
pirical diagnostic for categorization. The next subsection provides a summary of
the preceding discussion of trigger classes and relevant empirical properties.
(2.76) Context: Tina was looking for an apartment last weekend.
An/The apartment was (not) expensive. (BADE 2016, p.140)
2.4.8 SUMMARY
One conclusion to be drawn from the preceding discussion is that presupposition
is in fact a heterogeneous phenomenon that requires taking into account a broad
range of empirical properties beyond those used to identify presuppositional con-
tent. This heterogeneity becomes less surprising in light of the ubiquity of pre-
suppositional expressions in natural language and the differences between trigger
types that become apparent immediately. Even with the comparatively small set
of triggers that was featured in the classifications above, there was no account of
a given empirical property that did not have to allow for some exceptions, such
that one is almost guaranteed to encounter counterexamples once any distinction
is extended to a broader range of triggers. Consequently, the final solution to a ty-
pology of presupposition triggers is going to be unlikely to have a simple answer
but rather consist of a multi-faceted approach that is comprised of a number of
different factors.
Rather than leaving this issue completely unresolved, however, it is worth high-
33Additional experimental evidence supporting Bade’s proposal come from too in conditionals
by Bade (2017) and a decision time study on both, the, too and again by Aravind & Hackl (2017).
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lighting some clusters that have emerged from the previous discussion.34 One such
cluster can be found in the contrast between verbal triggers like stop and presup-
positional particles like again and too. For example, stop has been classified as soft
(easily suspended and cancelled), entailing (projecting from exactly one), less back-
grounding (hard to dissociate from at-issue content with response particles), and
easy to accommodate globally. In contrast, again is hard, non-entailing, more back-
grounding, and hard to accommodate globally.
Although this difference in syntactic category is quite apparent in itself without
requiring further tests, a much harder question is why it would correlate with this
set of other properties. A possible solution I want to suggest here is that at least
some of these correlates may receive a processing explanation. From the perspec-
tive of semantic composition, it should not matter for the final outcome whether
presuppositional content is added via a particle or adverb to an otherwise com-
plete sentence or whether it is a verb that is part of the spine of the sentence-
structure conveys a presupposition. However, a verbal trigger necessarily conveys
at-issue content in addition to its presupposition, which have to be processed to-
gether once the verb is encountered and integrated into the global structure and
meaning of the sentence. As a result, it may be harder to dissociate the two types of
meanings, which may affect a presupposition’s degree of backgrounding and even
lead to a grammaticalization of presuppositions as additional at-issue content. Par-
ticles and adverbs, on the other hand, are more easily dissociated by virtue of their
presuppositional content being processed separately.
However, as noted above, there are also exceptions to generalizing the verbal
vs particle cluster to the set of classifications on both sides. Among verbal trig-
gers, return is non-entailing, while still is less backgrounding despite its particle
status. This divergence suggests that it may be necessary to delve into potentially
34For a tabulated overview, see Appendix A.2.
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idiosyncratic properties of individual triggers in order to account for everything.
Another pattern worth noting from the previous discussion concerns again and
too/also. In all classifications that featured both triggers, they belonged to the same
class. From the perspective of the present proposal, this overlap may be concerning
given that again is argued to be not Focus-sensitive while too/also are (as will be
shown later in Chapter 3). However, as will be shown later, the two triggers do
differ with respect to other properties once the difference in Focus-sensitivity is
taken into account.
A methodological note in this regard that will emerge from Chapter 5 is that
the binariness of the above classifications may conceal non-trivial variation among
triggers within the same class. For instance, while again and too differed from all
other triggers in Cummins et al.’s (2013) experimental results, they also differed
slightly from each other. In the absence of quantitative data for some of the other
classifications and their empirical correlates, the apparent overlap between again
and too/also may then be due to again being more like too/also than like other trig-
gers, but nonetheless sufficiently different to resolve the apparent tension.
Regarding the question how Focus-sensitivity fit into previous classifications
more generally, there was no classification in which Focus-sensitive triggers were
in separate classes. A minor caveat may be the case of it-clefts - given that they
involve Focus in a certain sense - which patterned like too/also and even with re-
spect to the soft-hard distinction but fell into separate classes in terms of the weak-
strong distinction. I will come back to it-clefts in Chapter 6. Overall, there were
only few classifications that featured more than one Focus-sensitive trigger, de-
spite too/also being among the most frequently discussed triggers. This lack of
other Focus-sensitive triggers makes a larger assessment difficult, but the existing
data is nonetheless encouraging. Regarding the deeper question to what extent the
present proposal might account for properties central to other classifications and
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potentially replace them, further discussion will be postponed until later in Chap-
ter 6.
While providing an explanation that takes idiosyncratic properties of individ-
ual triggers into account constitutes a long-term project, the contribution of the
present work lies in emphasizing the representational components of different
triggers and how a difference in underlying representations relates to a difference
in processing behavior. A step in this direction has been appealed to by Zehr &
Schwarz (2018b) in relation to the unexpected behavior of return. Zehr & Schwarz
suggest that it may be necessary to consider whether aspectual triggers appeal to
continuous or discontinuous eventualities. I will come back to this idea in relation
to the results presented in Chapter 5, and provide a more detailed discussion of the
implications the present dissertation has for a typology of presupposition triggers
in Chapter 6. The next section concludes the background on presuppositions with
a review of psycholinguistic work on the topic.
2.5 Issues in Processing Presuppositions
Psycholinguistic interest in presuppositions goes back to at least Haviland & Clark
(1974) but had been until recently skewed towards investigating definite descrip-
tions. Recent years have seen a surge in experimental work on presuppositions
covering a broad range of phenomena and triggers, and integrating various pro-
posals from the formal theoretical literature, some of which was already discussed
in the previous section as far as it concerned differences between triggering ex-
pressions. The main focus of the current section will be on psycholinguistic work,
putting aside a large part of the by now extensive literature using experimental
methods to investigate issues in linguistic theory. The goal will be to provide an
overview of the research that has been done on presupposition processing and the
insights that have been gained in the course of it, as well open questions.
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The specific issues the discussion will focus on are (i) how presuppositions are
processed online, (ii) how the processing profile of presuppositions compares to
other kinds of meaning, and (iii) processing effects of presupposition projection
(see also Schwarz 2015b, 2019 for relevant overviews), followed by a summary of
the findings. Other relevant work that directly pertains to the topics covered in
the experimental Chapters 4 and 5, namely Focus-sensitive triggers and the QUD,
and (global) accommodation will be discussed in the respective chapters, although
some unavoidable overlap will be noted. Additionally, sticking with the theme of
the previous section, special attention will be given to results with implications for
a typology of presupposition triggers.
2.5.1 The Time Course of Presupposition Processing
By now, there is ample evidence from a variety of methodologies that presuppo-
sitions are processed rapidly in unembedded contexts. The majority of evidence
here comes from studies investigating the time course of detecting presupposition
failure, that is, comparing a trigger in a context that satisfies the respective pre-
supposition with a context where the presupposition is not satisfied. For example,
Schwarz (2007) shows slower reading times in chunked self-paced reading for also
in English and in German if its presupposition is not satisfied.35 Similar patterns
have been reported for the stops-making-sense task for too in English by Singh et al.
(2016), chunked self-paced reading and eye-tracking while reading for definite de-
scriptions in English by Clifton (2013), and word-by-word self-paced reading and
eye-tracking while reading for German again by Tiemann (2014) and Schwarz &
Tiemann (2017) respectively, showing effects of presupposition violation as early
as first fixations on the part of the sentence fully specifying the presupposition.
35Note that these results may also be interpreted in the context of processing Focus, given that
we are dealing with a Focus-sensitive presupposition trigger here (as well as in other studies to be
discussed). While this is worth keeping in mind, the studies will be discussed in the context they
were aimed at in order to minimize confusion.
74
One worry this set of studies might raise in light of the preceding discussion of
differences between presupposition triggers is that they are restricted to a compar-
atively small set of triggers. While this restriction seems justified insofar as this set
of triggers has been taken to be hard to accommodate and could thus maximize
any processing cost incurred from a presupposition failure, it raises the question
whether the effects can be generalized to presuppositions in general or originate
from other properties specific to this set of triggers.
Addressing this issue, Tiemann (2014) tests a broader set of triggers in German,
most relevantly stop and know in addition to those featured in previous studies,
namely again, too, and the. Tiemann compared each trigger in a context that either
satisfied, negated, or remained neutral with respect to the presupposition, as illus-
trated for again in (2.77), in a combined self-paced reading and rating study. For
know, there was an increase in reading times on the critical word (= the word at
which the presupposition is fully specified, in this case the end of the complement
clause) if the context was agnostic compared to the presupposition being satisfied.
For stop, the reverse pattern was found, with reading times being slower at the
critical word when the presupposition was satisfied compared to the context being
agnostic.
(2.77) Tiemann (2014), Exp 2, Sample Item for again
a. Positive: Susanne had bought red gloves before.
b. Negative: Susanne had never bought red gloves until now.
c. Neutral: Inge had never bought red gloves until now.
TARGET: Today, Susanne bought red gloves again and put them on
right away.
To account for this latter pattern, Tiemann appeals to Beck’s (2007) idea that stop
may contain a free variable - that is, is anaphoric - and suggests that resolving this
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variable when the presupposition is satisfied incurs a processing cost that is re-
sponsible for the longer reading times. In contrast, when the presupposition needs
to be accommodated, the variable will be interpreted existentially rather than ref-
erentially such that no equivalent processing cost arises. In combination with the
assumption that accommodating the presupposition of stop is comparatively easy,
Tiemann is thus able to account for the reading time pattern. This explanation
would furthermore suggest a way to use psycholinguistic evidence for investigat-
ing trigger classifications, specifically the notion of anaphoric triggers.
However, given that know showed a pattern consistent with an online cost for
accommodating its presupposition, despite both stop and know having been con-
sidered easy to accommodate, it raises further question about the status of accom-
modation in online processing in relation to offline felicity judgments. In fact, both
stop and know showed decreased acceptability ratings in the agnostic condition.36
An answer to the question whether all presuppositions are processed quickly or
only those that are difficult to accommodate thus has to remain tenative. Since
these results all relate to the issue of accommodation, they will be discussed in
more detail in Chapter 5.
If we assume that the studies reported thus far provide strong support for the
view that at least some triggers are computed as soon as the parser has sufficient
evidence to identify the presupposition, another question to be asked is whether
presuppositions can also be used to make predictions about upcoming linguis-
tic material. The notion that language processing is predictive has received much
attention in recent years and become a focal point of psycholinguistic research
(Futrell et al., 2020; Levy, 2008). A limitation of the methodologies featured thus far
is that observable effects are restricted to how the bottom-up input is encountered
during reading, which makes it difficult to find evidence for prediction proper. In
36However, it is worth noting that there is reason to be suspicious whether the rating results
actually reflect accommodation difficulty, see Chapter 5 for discussion.
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contrast, visual world eye-tracking, where participants listen to auditory stimuli
while looking at pictures on a screen, avoids this issue and make it possible to in-
vestigate effects of language processing that are not strictly tied to the bottom-up
input.
Romoli et al. (2015) report two visual-world studies investigating also - to which
we will restrict our discussion here - and only. Participants listened to contexts like
(2.78) while looking at a visual display with their eye-movements being recorded.
Crucially, the use of also in the target sentence presupposes that Sarah has some-
thing that Mark also has. The results showed that participants were able to use this
information to predict upcoming material ahead of time, as indicated by signifi-
cantly more looks toward the target in sentences with also compared to sentences
without it starting 200-500ms after encountering the trigger and prior to the target
noun.
(2.78) Mark and Jane are friends.
Mark has some candies and some watches.
Sarah also has some candies.
Neuroscientific evidence supporting the predictive power of presuppositions comes
from an EEG study on factive verbs by Shetreet et al. (2019). The question the au-
thors were interested in was to what extent the presupposition of a verb like was
aware in (2.79) (namely that the conference room was unused or busy respectively)
would restrict participants’ expectation to situations compatible with the presup-
position, relative to the non-presuppositional counterpart presumed, as indicated
on the target word vacant (underlined). ERPs showed a P600 for factive verbs if
the target was inconsistent with the previous information (busy-vacant), but not
for non-factive verbs, supporting the authors’ hypothesis that presuppositions can
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guide expectations of upcoming material in a discourse.37
(2.79) Calvin needed to meet with his team members in the conference room.
He {was aware / presumed } that it was { unused / busy }.
He checked and it was vacant and dark.
2.5.2 Presuppositions vs. other kinds of Meaning
Much like presuppositions are defined in terms of the empirical properties that
differentiate them from other kinds of meaning, one source of insights for a the-
ory of presupposition processing comes from comparisons with the processing be-
havior of other content such as at-issue content or scalar implicatures. Regarding
the former contrast, Schwarz (2015c) reports two visual-world studies comparing
also and the at-issue exhaustivity inference associated with only. His Experiment
2 used stimuli as in (2.80) to see whether participants are able to use (stressed)
also and only to make predictions about ways the sentence could be completed by
measuring looks to a matching target picture.
(2.80) a. Context: One of the boys is carrying a fork.
Critical Target: Click on the girl who ALSO is carrying a fork.
b. Context: One of the boys is carrying a fork and a knife.
Critical Target: Click on the girl who only is carrying a fork.
While looks converged on the target picture for also 400ms after the onset of the
trigger, convergence was delayed by an additional 400ms for only. This finding
suggests that presuppositions are not only processed rapidly but potentially faster
than the at-issue content of other particles. However, the effect might have also
37It is worth noting that the results are compatible with alternative accounts, given that measures
were taken on a target word after the presupposition was processed, which could also be indicative
of an increased integration cost, for instance due to repairing the Common Ground.
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been due to the fact that also received stress, whereas only did not, which I will
come back to later.
Regarding the comparison between presuppositions and scalar implicatures,
Bill et al. (2016) provide evidence from acquisition with a direct comparison be-
tween scalar implicatures and presuppositions - specifically soft triggers in the
sense of Abusch (2010) - in a covered box task, mentioned earlier. Target sentences
were as in (2.81), targeting both the standard some but not all inference (direct scalar
implicature) and the reverse not all but some inference under negation (indirect
scalar implicature) in addition to win presupposing participate. Participants were
given a picture violating the respective inference (e.g. all of the lions holding a bal-
loon, or the bear baking cookies at home) in addition to a covered box, and had to
choose between the picture and the covered box, on the premise that one would
match the sentence. Covered box choices thus can be viewed as rejecting the target
sentence in the depicted scenario.
(2.81) a. Some of the lions got balloons.
b. Not all of the rabbits brought balls.
c. The bear didn’t win the race.
While adults mostly chose the covered box over the target picture for both kinds of
implicatures and vice versa for presuppositions, the opposite was true for children,
who mostly accepted the target picture for implicatures but chose the covered box
for presuppositions. The results thus provide evidence for a difference between
scalar implicatures and presuppositions both in terms of their treatment in the task
as well as their acquisition path. (A similar pattern has been reported by Kennedy
et al. 2015 for a comparison between neuro-typical adults and individuals with
Broca’s aphasia.)
In contrast, Romoli & Schwarz (2015) provide positive evidence from another
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covered box study by focusing on the indirect scalar implicature of always and stop
under negation, see (2.82) for a sample item. For both types of inferences, the au-
thors compared two target pictures, with both matching the literal content but only
one also matching the respective inference. Participants almost exclusively chose
the target picture when the inference matched but only accepted it a quarter of
the time when it did not for both presuppositions and indirect scalar implicatures.
Moreover, the analysis of reaction times indicated that this inference came with a
slowdown in both cases. Even though the authors take this as evidence that there
is some similarity between the two types of inferences after all, given that they did
not investigate direct scalar implicatures - and in light of the previous results – this
conclusion has to be tentative.
(2.82) a. Benjamin didn’t always go to the movies last week.
→ Benjamin went to the movies sometimes last week
b. Benjamin didn’t stop going to the movies on Wednesday.
→ Benjamin went to the movies before Wednesday
Finally, Schwarz (2014) reports two visual-world studies comparing the hard trig-
ger again and the soft trigger stop. Given that on Abusch’s (2010) account, soft
triggers arise as a defeasible pragmatic inference while hard triggers are lexically
encoded, this account might translate into the processing of soft triggers being de-
layed relative to hard triggers, on the assumption that pragmatic inferences such as
scalar implicatures have been shown to take time (e.g. Bott & Noveck 2004). How-
ever, Schwarz finds that both stop and again are processed practically immediately.
While this finding does not contradict Abusch’s account, given that pragmatic in-
ferences are not necessarily processed with a delay (see Degen & Tanenhaus 2019
for a recent overview), it nonetheless discourages an equation of certain triggers
with scalar implicature-like inferences.
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2.5.3 The Processing of Presupposition Projection
To come to the final issue, the processing behavior of presuppositions with re-
spect to projection has been investigated in a number of embedded environments.
Schwarz & Tiemann (2017) provide evidence from eye-tracking, offline acceptabil-
ity judgments and the stops-making-sense task that processing the presupposition
of German wieder (‘again’) when embedded under negation adds a cost. Moreover,
an additional eye-tracking while reading study investigated the length of the pro-
jection path - that is, loosely the number of embeddings a presupposition has to go
through to be checked at the global level, as measured by DRT - in pseudo-German
discourses like (2.83).
(2.83) a. Tina was ice-skating last week.
If she wasn’t ice-skating yesterday, ...
b. Tina wasn’t ice-skating last week.
If she was ice-skating yesterday, ...
c. ...she’ll certainly go { again not / not again } today.
The discourses varied whether the context sentence specified that an ice-skating
event occurred or not, followed by a conditional that contained the respective re-
verse in its antecedent (compare (2.83a) vs (2.83b)) and additionally manipulated
the order of again and not in its consequent (2.83c). For example, the length of
the projection path of (2.83a) followed by again not would be one, since the pre-
supposed negative swimming event is satisfied by the antecedent clause of the
conditional. In contrast, the projection path length of (2.83a) followed by not again
is three, since the presupposed (positive) swimming event has to “pass through"
negation, the conditional and its negation. Reading times on the verb following the
again-not sequence at which the presupposition was fully specified were directly
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predicted by projection path length, further suggesting that projection incurs pro-
cessing cost, as well as providing evidence for DRT as a model of the cognitive
processes underlying presuppositions.
Moving from negation and conditionals to disjunction, Hirsch et al. (2017) in-
vestigated sentences like (2.84) with a presupposition trigger in the first disjunct
(their experiment 2) in the visual-world paradigm combined with a covered box
task. Target sentences were matched with three kinds of pictures: one that would
make the presupposition be true and two others in which the presupposition was
false. Fixations on the target picture - compared to the covered box - after the sec-
ond disjunct was encountered were more likely when the presupposition was true,
indicating that participants were rapidly able to process the presupposition as well
as the projection rules for disjunction.
(2.84) Either Henry stopped going to the aquarium on Wednesday, or he waited
until Saturday to go to the movies.
Finally, experimental evidence on conjunction comes from Mandelkern et al. (2019).
Their results bear on the question whether asymmetries in the order of conjuncts
with respect to presupposition projection - specifically filtering - are due to more
general properties of how we process sentences or encoded in the linguistic repre-
sentation of conjunction. Focusing on their experiment 3 - an acceptability rating
study - the authors looked at conjunction embedded in a conditional, as in (2.85a)
comparing a presuppositional expression with a non-presuppositional control, as
well as varying the order of the conjuncts (cf. (2.85b)), in addition to a control with-
out conjunction (2.85c).
(2.85) a. If Mary {has stopped / now frowns on} doing yoga and she used to
do Jivamukti yoga, then Matthew will interview her for his story.
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b. If Mary used to do Jivamukti yoga and she {stopped / now frowns
on} doing yoga, then Matthew will interview her for his story.
c. If Mary {has stopped / now frowns on} doing yoga, then Matthew
will interview her for his story.
These target sentences were preceded by a context that either satisfied the presup-
position (2.86a) or expressed ignorance toward (i.e. suspended) it (2.86b). The only
conditions for which ratings were decreased were the conjunct-first condition and
the conjunction-less control if they contained a presuppositional expression and
were preceded by the ignorance context. Crucially, if the asymmetry of filtering is
merely a processing preference that could be overridden to rescue an otherwise
infelicitous sentence - as in the case of the suspension contexts here - we would
expect the conjunct-first condition to make use of this option, contrary to what
was found. The results thus suggest that asymmetries in projection from conjunc-
tion should be attributed to the semantics of the connective rather than a general
processing preference.
(2.86) a. Mary always was involved in a lot of sports, and she used to do
yoga, too.
b. Mary always was involved in a lot of sports, but I don’t know
whether she ever did any yoga.
2.5.4 SUMMARY
One conclusion to be drawn from the studies mentioned above is that there is
little to no evidence for the processing of presuppositions being delayed in any
relevant sense, both in simple and complex sentences and for a relatively broad
range of triggers. Rather, presuppositions seem to be computed as soon as there
is sufficient linguistic material to identify its content. This rapid calculation may
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even lead to anticipatory effects, where the linguistic context in combination with
the visual input - and the assumption that the speaker uses presupposition triggers
felicitously - enables the parser to make predictions about upcoming material in a
sentence.
While presuppositions being processed incrementally may not be surprising
given the vast amount of research in psycholinguistics making similar arguments
for a broad range of semantic and pragmatic phenomena, this characterization
was far from trivial just 15 years ago. Moreover, when taking into account the
conceptual role of presuppositions as being backgrounded and by definition not
contributing the main point of an utterance, the findings remain to be noteworthy.
From this perspective, one could have easily imagined that presuppositions are
evaluated at a later point and that at-issue content takes precedence for conceptual
reasons.
However, if we take presuppositions as preconditions for the felicity of an ut-
terance, it might be expected that presuppositions are computed as quickly as pos-
sible insofar as the main point of an utterance depends on them being met despite
their ultimately secondary status. On this view, the finding from Schwarz (2015c)
that the presupposition of also is processed quicker than the at-issue contribution
of only is less surprising. A caveat to these results though is that the comparison
between also and only was only indirect. In order to make an argument that pre-
suppositions take precedence over at-issue content in online processing one would
have to find a way to let the point at which a presupposition is evaluated coincide
with the point at which the at-issue content is being evaluated for the same sen-
tence and manipulate truth and falsity of each meaning component.
Another caveat regarding Schwarz’s (2015c)’s finding is that the observed dif-
ference could also stem from other differences between also and only beyond the
kind of meaning they contribute. For instance, only is sometimes argued to have a
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scalar component, which may add another layer of processing complexity to the
computation and result in a delay. Although this issue of drawing conclusions
about a larger class of meaning from its individual instantiations is not specific
to research on presuppositions, it might be more severe given the previously dis-
cussed differences between trigger types.
Evidence that some of these issues carry over to how presuppositions are pro-
cessed has already been noted above, for instance in the comparison between know
and stop by Tiemann (2014). In this regard particularly relevant seems to be an ex-
tension to a broader range of triggers, specifically those like know that have been
claimed to be easy to accommodate, to be able to differentiate accommodation
from more general processing. Developing a processing theory of presuppositions
will thus have to happen simultaneously with investigations of the processing ef-
fects of potentially idiosyncratic properties of individual trigger types, much like
the research in linguistic theory. The present dissertation aims to contribute to this
endeavor by examining how Focus-sensitivity impacts the processing of presup-




This chapter provides the counterpart to the previous chapter with respect to Fo-
cus, introducing the relevant background on the topic that the upcoming experi-
mental chapters are grounded in. The chapter begins with a broad introduction to
the notion of Focus in Section 3.1, followed by a more specific introduction to Focus
as formalized in Alternative Semantics in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 then zooms in on
the issue of Focus and its interaction with other expressions, which will be central
to this thesis, and introduces relevant diagnostics. Section 3.4 discusses the Ques-
tion Under Discussion framework as it relates to Focus, and Section 3.5 concludes
the chapter with a review of relevant psycholinguistic work on these topics.
3.1 General Introduction
Much like in the case of presuppositions, the notion of Focus has been used in a
variety of ways, for instance in terms of which part of a sentence contains new or
highlighted information (Halliday, 1967), or as one half of the focus-background or
focus-topic distinction (von Stechow, 1990; Gundel & Fretheim, 2008). On the most
fundamental, pre-theoretical level, Focus - in intonational languages like English
and German - describes effects of stress placement. Emphasizing this correlate of
Focus has come to be known as prosodic or linguistic Focus, which is the one I will
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be concerned with here.
Prosodic Focus is one common way in which intonation contributes pragmatic
effects about the discourse conditions in which an utterance - a string in combina-
tion with its prosodification - is appropriate. For instance, the utterance in (3.1a)
(small capitals indicating stress) is a felicitous response to the question in (3.1),
whereas (3.1b) is not. Vice versa, the same responses can become (in)felicitous
when preceded by a different question (3.2). This phenomenon is known as question-
answer congruence: the location of Focus has to align with the wh-word in the pre-
ceding question.1
(3.1) A: Where did Cloud grow up?
a. B: He grew up in NIBELHEIM.
b. B: #He GREW UP in Nibelheim.
(3.2) A: What did Cloud do in Nibelheim?
a. B: #He grew up in NIBELHEIM.
b. B: He GREW UP in Nibelheim.
However, if we only take into account stress placement, utterances can be under-
specified with respect to the questions they can be a response to. For example, all
questions in (3.3) are compatible with the indicated prosody of B’s response.
(3.3) a. A: Where did Cloud grow up?
b. A: What is something that happened to Cloud?
c. A: What happened?
B: Cloud grew up in NIBELHEIM.
1An alternative characterization of this pattern could be in terms of the flipside to Focus, namely
deaccenting. Rather than attributing the infelicity of examples like (3.1b)-(3.2a) to a lack of Focus
on what the question is about, one could instead argue that it is the lack of deaccenting on the
elements of the sentence that are already given in the question. A formal account in this vein is
Schwarzschild’s (1999) GIVENness theory, which I will leave aside here for reasons of space.
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To avoid this underspecification and make a connection between the prosodic rep-
resentation of a sentence and its syntactic structure, it is commonly assumed that
Focus is syntactically marked (Jackendoff, 1972). That is, prosodic Focus is a cor-
relate of syntactic F(ocus)-marking. The same utterance can thus map to different
underlying structures, as illustrated in (3.4). The question how accenting relates to
the syntactic F-marking of constituents is the subject of Focus projection theories
(e.g. Selkirk 1995; Büring 2016), which will not be discussed here.
(3.4) a. Where did Cloud grow up?
B: Cloud grew up in [NIBELHEIM]F.
b. What is something that happened to Cloud?
B: Cloud [grew up in NIBELHEIM]F.
c. What happened?
B: [Cloud grew up in NIBELHEIM]F.
Beyond its role for question-answer congruence, Focus has also been associated
with corrective exchanges as in (3.5). Here, prosodic Focus has to fall on the part
of the sentence that the speaker disagrees with. This type of Focus is sometimes
referred to as corrective or contrastive Focus, in opposition to its informational or
presentational use in question-answer pairs.
(3.5) A: Tifa owns a bar in Wutai.
a. B: No, she owns a bar [in MIDGAR]F.
b. B: #No, she [OWNS]F a bar in Midgar.
While this distinction is seemingly expressed the same way in English and solely
defined through the discourse context, Kiss (1998) provides evidence from Hun-
garian that other languages may use different means to express different Focus
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types. In fact, it has also been argued that contrastive and informational Focus
may vary in their prosodic realization in English, with contrastive Focus being
expressed with a more pronounced pitch accent (in Pierrehumbert & Hirschberg
1990’s terms, an L+H* rather than an H*). Additionally, contrastive Focus has been
argued to contribute an exhaustive inference, namely in the case of (3.5a) that
Midgar is the only place Tifa owns a bar at (see Gotzner 2019 for recent experi-
mental work on this issue).
Another kind of intonationally conveyed meaning that should be distinguished
from prosodic Focus are Contrastive Topics. Contrastive Topic is expressed via a ris-
ing tone in English and often precedes a Focus to give rise to a hat or bridge contour
(Büring, 1997), illustrated in (3.6) (the rising tone indicated by a ‘/’). Informally, a
contrastive topic conveys a sense of incompleteness, for instance in the case of (3.6)
that someone else fights with a different weapon. Formal accounts vary in whether
they treat Contrastive Topic as a primitive notion (Constant, 2014) or derive Con-
trastive Topic from Focus (Tomioka, 2010; Wagner, 2012a). For the purposes of this
dissertation, I will put aside Contrastive Topics, as well as questions regarding the
specific prosodic realization of Focus and make the simplifying assumption that
the instances of stress we will be concerned with are in fact cases of prosodic Fo-
cus.
(3.6) /AERITH fights with a STAFF.
An obvious question that the previous discussion raises is how to characterize
Focus in a way that captures these different uses. Following Krifka (2008), I will
assume that the core function of Focus is evoking alternatives, which brings us to
the formalization of Focus in Alternative Semantics presented in the next section.
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3.2 Focus in Alternative Semantics
The formal account of the previously introduced notion of Focus adopted in this
thesis will be Alternative Semantics (Rooth, 1985, 1992). Alternative Semantics pro-
vides a framework to interpret syntactic F-marking semantically. In order to do so,
Rooth proposes distinct dimensions of meaning for a given expression, namely its
ordinary semantic value, where F-features can be ignored, and a focus-semantic
value, where the F-feature gets substituted for a variable to generate a set of al-
ternatives. This effect is illustrated in (3.7) for the sentence in (3.1a) above. The
ordinary semantic value is simply the proposition that Cloud grew up in Nibel-
heim (3.7a), whereas the focus-semantic value is a set consisting of all propositions
of the form Cloud grew up in x.
(3.7) a. JCloud grew up in [NIBELHEIM]F.Ko =
λw . Cloud grew up in Nibelheim in w
b. JCloud grew up in [NIBELHEIM]F.Kf =
{λw . Cloud grew up in Nibelheim in w,
λw . Cloud grew up in Cosmo Canyon in w,
λw . Cloud grew up in Corel in w, ...}
For the focus-semantic value to enter the semantic composition, Rooth (1992) im-
plements the semantic effects of Focus via his squiggle operator ‘∼’, which attaches
to a sentence S and comes with a silent pronoun C, representing a set of propo-
sitions in the context, with respect to which the operator introduces the presup-
positions outlined in (3.8): C has to be a subset of the focus-semantic value of S,
containing S and at least one other proposition.2
2Note that the characterization of Focus as presuppositional is directly relevant to the objective
of this dissertation and will be picked up below.
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(3.8) J S ∼ CK presupposes:
(i) C ⊆ JSKf (C is a subset of the focus-semantic value of S)
(ii) JSKo ∈ C (the ordinary value of S is an element of C)
(iii) ∣C∣ > 1 (C has to contain at least 2 elements)
How a derivation involving squiggle proceeds compositionally is shown in (3.9).
For the purposes of this dissertation, it will be assumed that squiggle is a proposi-
tional operator attaching at the root level. However, it should be noted that relax-
ing the syntactic restrictions on where squiggle can attach in the structure, as well
as ‘nesting’ of squiggle operators has been used elsewhere to account for effects of
Contrastive Topic (e.g. Wagner 2012a) or multiple Foci (Büring, 2015).
(3.9) S
S
Cloud grew up in [NIBELHEIM]F
∼ C
To illustrate how this account captures the data discussed so far, consider first the
corrective case in (3.5) mentioned earlier. The set of propositions provided in the
context are A’s statement and B’s reply. Let’s assume that Focus on Midgar evokes
the set of alternatives in (3.10b) by virtue of its focus-semantic value. Since A’s
statement is a subset of this focus-semantic value, as is the bare prejacent, the two
propositions jointly satisfy the conditions in (3.8) if we assume them to constitute
the set of propositions in C, shown in (3.10c).
(3.10) a. JTifa owns a bar [in MIDGAR]F.Ko =
λw . Tifa owns a bar in Midgar in w
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b. JTifa owns a bar [in MIDGAR]F.Kf =
{λw . Tifa owns a bar in Midgar in w,
λw . Tifa owns a bar in Wutai in w,
λw . Tifa owns a bar in Junon in w, ...}
c. C = { Tifa owns a bar in Midgar, Tifa owns a bar in Wutai}
In contrast, what goes wrong with (3.5b), despite the same propositions - in terms
of their ordinary value - being available in the context, is that Focus on the verb
would evoke propositions ranging over relations that Tifa has with respect to a bar
in Midgar, as in (3.11b). Consequently, A’s statement is no longer a subset of the
focus-semantic value such that C no longer satisfies (3.8)-(i), shown in (3.11c), or
alternatively the bare prejacent would be the only proposition in C if one were to
exclude A’s statement (3.11d), thus violating (3.8)-(iii).
(3.11) a. JTifa [OWNS]F a bar in Midgar.Ko =
λw . Tifa owns a bar in Midgar in w
b. JTifa [OWNS]F a bar in Midgar.Kf =
{λw . Tifa owns a bar in Midgar in w,
λw . Tifa rents a bar in Midgar in w, ...}
c. C1 = { Tifa owns a bar in Midgar, Tifa owns a bar in Wutai}
→ violates (3.8)-(i)
d. C2 = { Tifa owns a bar in Midgar}
→ violates (3.8)-(iii)
In order to account for the question-answer case in (3.1) above, additional assump-
tions regarding the semantics of (wh-)questions are in order. Adopting a Hamblin-
semantics for questions (Hamblin, 1973), assume that wh-questions denote the set
of their true answers, which can be derived from substituting the wh-word with a
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variable that ranges over type-appropriate alternatives, as in (3.12), yielding a set
of propositions.
(3.12) JWhere did Cloud grow up?K =
{ λw . Cloud grew up in x in w ∣ x ∈ De }
The meaning of a wh-question thus matches the focus-semantic value such that we
do not have to worry about (3.8)-(i). However, given that the question denotation
is a set, there is actually an open issue regarding what another value of C could be.
The answer given by Kadmon (2001) is that the specific value can be pragmatically
inferred, given that asking the question would not be sensible if there were not
at least two possible options available (also see the discussion of Abusch 2010 in
Section 2.4).
Having shown that Alternative Semantics can account for the data regarding
Focus that were previously introduced, there are two issues that warrant further
discussion. The first concerns the status of Focus as presuppositional, the second
the question what the set of alternatives consists of and how it relates to the content
of C. I will discuss these issues in turn.
When characterizing Focus as presuppositional, it is important to distinguish
between the squiggle operator being formalized in terms of a presupposition, and
the idea that Focus triggers an existential presupposition that is derived from sub-
stituting the Focused element with an existential quantifier, e.g. (3.13) presupposes
that someone fights with a staff.
(3.13) [AERITH]F fights with a staff.
“↝" Someone fights with a staff
However, the status of this latter inference has been a matter of debate (see Kad-
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mon 2001). For instance, while the inference may project from negation as in (3.14a),
it is also easily cancellable, as in (3.14b).3 More severely, the at-issue content may
directly contradict this assumed presupposition without resulting in infelicity when
a negative quantifier is Focused, as in (3.15). I will thus assume that this existential
inference associated with Focus should be treated as an implicature rather than a
presupposition due to it being defeasible and will not discuss it further here, but
come back to it in the discussion of the Question Under Discussion in Section 3.4.
(3.14) a. [AERITH]F doesn’t fight with a staff, [VIVI]F does.
b. [AERITH]F doesn’t fight with a staff, I don’t think anyone does.
(3.15) [NOBODY]F fights with a staff.
The matter regarding squiggle itself being presuppositional is more complex. A
first question regarding Rooth’s (1992) treatment of squiggle - and consequently
the semantic and pragmatic effects that come with it - as presuppositional is whether
his notion of presupposition matches the one assumed here. Recall that presuppo-
sitions were defined in Section 2.1 as being not directly targetable, not being de-
feasible, and being displaceable. The issue with applying these tests adequately,
however, is that they assume that the meaning contribution of a certain expression
can be paraphrased somewhat accurately. For example, the reason that B’s denial
in (3.16) is infelicitous might not be because Focus is not directly targetable, but be-
cause the paraphrase of its contribution simply does not make sense (the meaning
of Focus is ineffable in Potts 2007b’s terms).
(3.16) A: Cloud grew up in [NIBELHEIM]F.
B: #That’s not true, there is no alternative to “Nibelheim".
3The contrast here may also correlate with a subtle difference in pitch accent, see Meyer (2015)
for related examples and ideas.
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Given these issues, I conjecture that the formalization of squiggle as a presuppo-
sition should be taken to contrast its contribution with at-issue meaning, namely
as a contextual requirement. That is, the infelicity of previous examples such as
(3.1b) and (3.5b) is a result of a presupposition failure insofar as the requirements
of squiggle are not met by the free variable C. Crucially, this approach is only ex-
planatory on the assumption that the respective presupposition is hard to accom-
modate, or in other terms has the property of Strong Contextual Felicity, as in fact
argued for by Tonhauser et al. (2013). This behavior is part of the reason why Focus
has been described as anaphoric, with C acting similar to personal pronouns, only
on the propositional level.
Put differently, what Focus presupposes is salience (Wagner, 2020) or activation
(Dryer, 1996) of certain material rather than it being shared knowledge in the (Stal-
naker, 1974) sense. These characterizations thus resemble the description of Focus-
sensitive presupposition triggers in the Focus Presupposition Antecedent Hypoth-
esis proposed in Chapter 1, and not by accident. However, Focus per se - that is,
Focus in the absence of a Focus-sensitive triggering expression - is intentionally not
included in the hypothesis, for reasons to be discussed later once more details on
association with Focus and the Question Under Discussion have been introduced.
Of course, this interpretation of the nature of squiggle’s presupposition de-
pends on the assumption we make regarding the content of C in a given discourse,
which brings us to the second issue previously mentioned, namely what the set of
alternatives that Focus evokes consists of and how the evoked alternatives relate
to C.
This issue has again multiple facets to it. First, there is the question of what to
assume about the content of C in a given discourse. In the preceding discussion,
the assumption was that C consists minimally of all propositions explicitly given
in the discourse, at least for sufficiently short discourses. Additionally, it cannot be
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the case that any (assumed) alternative evoked on the focus-semantic dimension
becomes part of C, since the Strong Contextual Felicity of Focus would become a
puzzle otherwise.
However, there are also cases where Focus is felicitous in the absence of an
explicitly provided alternative, although such cases are restricted to specific cir-
cumstances. One factor making such cases possible is world-knowledge rendering
an implicit alternative sufficiently salient, as in (3.17). Since the ball is supposed to
be kicked into the goal in soccer, rather than thrown, kick the ball becomes available
as a salient alternative satisfying squiggle’s presupposition.
(3.17) A: Why do you think he hasn’t played soccer before?
B: He [THREW]F the ball into the goal. (WAGNER 2020, (48))
Another type of exception are lexical items that form a natural scale, for instance
when Focusing a number word as in (3.18). These cases can be described from
a formal perspective as an alternative evoked on the focus-semantic dimension
becoming so salient that it can be added to C and thus meet the contextual require-
ments of squiggle.
(3.18) A: Why are you home so late?
B: I might have had [ONE]F drink on the way home.
Shifting our attention to the question of what elements are included in the set of
evoked alternatives - which is in principle distinct from C - a first uncontroversial
conjecture is that alternatives are restricted in some way, since evoking literally
every possible alternative to a Focused constituent would seem cognitively im-
plausible. However, beyond this assumption, there are many possible options.
On Rooth’s (1992) view, any type-appropriate substitution constitutes a possi-
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ble alternative, and the actually relevant set is inferred via pragmatic reasoning.
In contrast, Wagner (2012b) argues that alternatives have to be mutually exclusive.
For example, Focus on red in (3.19a) - in interaction with only, which we will get to
in the next section - is taken to exclude blue in (3.19b), but not necessarily cheap in
(3.19c).
(3.19) a. John only owns [RED]F convertibles.
b. John only owns [BLUE]F convertibles.
c. John only owns [CHEAP]F convertibles. (GOTZNER 2015, p.89)
Assessing these accounts based on intuition is difficult, but a prime example where
psycholinguistic evidence can be useful (e.g. Gotzner 2015a). I will accordingly
come back to this issue during the discussion of psycholinguistic research on Focus
in Section 3.5. For the current purposes, the exact nature of the set of alternatives
is not essential such that assuming sets as in (3.7b) previously will be sufficient.
With these assumptions in place, we can move on to another central research
topic featuring Focus, namely association with Focus.
3.3 Association with Focus & Focus-sensitivity
Thus far, Focus has been discussed in terms of its pragmatic effects on the felicity
of an utterance in relation to the discourse context the utterance occurred in. That
is, Focus had no easily detectable effect on truth conditions. However, it has been
shown that Focus can in fact have truth-conditional effects in the presence of other
operators (Rooth, 1985), such as always in (3.20) (von Fintel, 1994). The rendition in
(3.20a) can truthfully describe a scenario in which Tiffany orders chicken tempura
ten out of ten times she eats at Thai Garden, but would be false if she had pad
thai instead on every tenth occasion. Vice versa, (3.20b) would be true in the latter
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scenario, as long as Tiffany does not order chicken tempura from anywhere else.
Such effects, where the meaning contributed by an expression - in this case always -
varies with the Focus-structure of a sentence, have come to be known as association
with Focus.
(3.20) a. Tiffany always orders [CHICKEN TEMPURA]F from Thai Garden.
b. Tiffany always orders chicken tempura [FROM THAI GARDEN]F.
Expressions that exhibit this kind of behavior are called Focus-sensitive (Beaver &
Clark, 2008). The notion of Focus-sensitivity is central to this dissertation given
that its main hypothesis, the Focus Presupposition Antecedent Hypothesis, re-
peated from (1.5) in (3.21), relies on distinguishing presupposition triggers based
on this property. We will thus first look at diagnostics to categorize an expression
as Focus-sensitive or not Focus-sensitive, and turn to the formal implementation
of association with Focus afterwards.
(3.21) Focus Presupposition Antecedent Hypothesis (FoPAH)
Focus-sensitive presupposition triggers require a linguistic antecedent
in the discourse model, whereas triggers lacking Focus-sensitivity re-
quire their presupposition to be entailed by the Common Ground.
The standard diagnostic with which Focus-sensitivity was introduced in Chapter
1 and used to illustrate its effects in relation to always in (3.20) is the stress placement
test.4 Much like we varied the location of stress previously - and by assumption
which constituent receives F-marking - to assess its pragmatic effects with respect
to the contextual requirements of its appropriate use, the same reasoning applies
when investigating Focus in the presence of another expression. What is crucial,
4This label for the test is my own, as the test has - to my knowledge - been used across the
literature without it being attributed to anyone in particular nor received a specific label.
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however, is that the test is concerned with how the meaning contributed by an
expression of interest changes on top of whatever change comes with varying the
location of Focus.
A semi-formal definition of the test is given in (3.22).5 To briefly illustrate how
the definition relates to its previous application, consider the examples in (3.20)
above. The expression of interest α in this case is always, and (3.20a) and (3.20b)
stand for sentences S1 and S2 respectively that only differ in the location of Fo-
cus. Crucially, as shown in the discussion of the example above, the two sentences
differ in their truth-conditions in a way that a change in the meaning of always is
responsible for. Thus, we can conclude that always is Focus-sensitive.
(3.22) Focus-sensitivity Diagnostic: Stress Placement Test
An expression α is focus-sensitive iff, given two sentences S1 and S2 that
only differ in the location of Focus as indicated by stress, the meaning
contributed by α varies between S1 and S2.
In the application of the test to the presupposition triggers we will be concerned
with for the rest of the thesis, however, I will make two small changes relative to
how this previous application (and how it is usually used in the literature). First,
the scenarios with respect to which the sentences are going to be evaluated will
be made explicit to reduce the need for inferring or imagining relevant scenarios.
Second, each utterance will be embedded into a dialogue that licenses the use of
Focus independently. This latter issue is crucial since we saw earlier that Focus has
undeniable effects by virtue of putting restrictions on the context of use. Conse-
quently, in order to assess whether an expression is Focus-sensitive, we have to
look at what Focus does in addition to the usual contribution of Focus.
5Note that this test is underspecified with respect to the respective notion of Focus-sensitivity,
as discussed by Beaver & Clark (2008). I will come back to this issue shortly.
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The triggers this test will be applied to are also/too, even, only, (concessive) at
least, again, (temporal) still, continue, stop, and back, insofar as they will be used
in the following experimental chapters. Notably, given that these expressions vary
more or less in the meaning they convey, the application of the test for each expres-
sion may require some modifications. To keep the present discussion manageable,
we will restrict our attention to also and again as sample members of each class that
will figure most prominently in the remainder of the thesis. The data applying the
test to the remaining expressions can be found in Appendix A.3.
Let’s start with again, since the application of the test is more straightforward
than for also. Plus, since we have gained some intuitive understanding of Focus-
sensitivity, again serves as a contrasting illustration of what it looks like when the
test fails - to preface the conclusion. First, it should be noted that I am not aware
of any proposals in the literature that treat again as Focus-sensitive. Rather, what
seems to be the most common treatment is that again modifying a sentence S pre-
supposes that there is an eventuality like the one denoted by S at a time previous
to the reference time of S.
A concrete formal implementation of this idea from Beck (2020) is shown in
(3.23), where the previous presupposed time is represented as an anaphoric ar-
gument t* and the eventuality as a property of type <i,t>, with i being the type
of time intervals. Applied to the sentence in (3.24), we thus predict that what is
presupposed has to match what is at-issue, only differing in the respective times,
independently of Focus.6
(3.23) JagainK = λt*.λt.λP<i,t> : t*<t & P(t*) . P(t) (BECK 2020, (29b))
6A caveat concerns the so-called restitutive reading of again (Beck & Johnson, 2004), which does
not require the subject to be the same, but we will only be concerned with the repetitive reading
here.
100
(3.24) JTiffany ordered chicken tempura from Thai Garden againK
is defined if Tiffany ordered chicken tempura from Thai Garden at a
time t* preceding t.
If defined, the sentence is true iff Tiffany ordered chicken tempura from
Thai Garden at t.
An alternative possibility might be that again is indeed Focus-sensitive and trig-
gers a weaker presupposition derived from existentially closing over the Focus
constituent.7 For example, the sentence in (3.25) with the indicated Focus-structure
would no longer presuppose that Tiffany ordered chicken tempura from Thai Gar-
den before, but merely that she ordered something from Thai Garden before. We
can test the predictions of this Focus-sensitive account of again and the one based
on (3.23) with the stress placement test.
(3.25) Tiffany ordered [CHICKEN TEMPURA]F from Thai Garden again.
?↝ Tiffany ordered something from Thai Garden before
For each expression, there will be two test contexts A and B, and two Focus-
structures, which yields four discourses to consider. The first context is given in
(3.26). The two Focus-structures of the same sentence are given as the last sentence
in the dialogues in (3.27). To be maximally thorough, each dialogue repeats the
content of the context in the italic part such that there will be two versions of the
full dialogue of each Focus-structure for each context. Note that the question pre-
ceding each of the final sentences in (3.27a) and (3.27b) renders the target sentences
felicitous and true if again is omitted, serving as a control. However, again itself is
infelicitous in either Focus-structure in this context.
7In the absence of any proposals arguing for again being Focus-sensitive, this existential account
is just one possibility to make such a proposal more concrete. There are other logically possible
alternatives, but given the lack of arguments made in favor of any such alternative, the present
discussion will be restricted to one such straw man.
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(3.26) Context A
On Monday, Tiffany had pad thai from Thai Garden.
On Tuesday, she had chicken tempura from Thai Garden.
(3.27) a. (A: What happened on Monday?
B: Tiffany ordered pad thai from Thai Garden.)
A: What did Tiffany order from Thai Garden on Tuesday?
B: She ordered [CHICKEN TEMPURA]F from Thai Garden (#again).
b. (A: What happened on Monday?
B: Tiffany ordered pad thai from Thai Garden.)
A: Where did Tiffany order chicken tempura from on Tuesday?
B: She ordered chicken tempura [FROM THAI GARDEN]F (#again).
The second context, shown in (3.28), differs from Context A only in the first part
such that the target sentences in (3.29a) and (3.29b) are again felicitous and true
without again. However, as with Context A, it is infelicitous to use again here. This
result stands in opposition to the proposed Focus-sensitive account of again where
its presupposition is existential with respect to the Focused constituent. Rather, the
infelicity of again is predicted by the formalization in (3.23), according to which
again requires a previous eventuality that matches the sentence it modifies in full.
(3.28) a. Context B
On Monday, Tiffany had chicken tempura from Asian Taste.
On Tuesday, she had chicken tempura from Thai Garden.
(3.29) a. (A: What happened on Monday?
B: Tiffany ordered chicken tempura from Asian Taste.)
A: What did Tiffany order from Thai Garden on Tuesday?
B: She ordered [CHICKEN TEMPURA]F from Thai Garden (#again).
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b. (A: What happened on Monday?
B: Tiffany ordered chicken tempura from Asian Taste.)
A: Where did Tiffany order chicken tempura from on Tuesday?
B: She ordered chicken tempura [FROM THAI GARDEN]F (#again).
To further show that the not Focus-sensitive account makes the right predictions
and the infelicity of again is not due to idiosyncratic properties of the dialogues,
consider the control context in (3.30) and the corresponding dialogues in (3.31). If
there is an eventuality that matches the content of the sentence that again modifies,
again is felicitous in both Focus-structures in (3.31a) and (3.31b). Other presupposi-
tion triggers that show the same pattern as again in analogous examples - and thus
do not qualify as Focus-sensitive according to (3.22) - are (temporal) still, continue,
stop, and back (full data in Appendix A.3).
(3.30) Control Context
On Monday and Tuesday, Tiffany had chicken tempura from Thai Gar-
den.
(3.31) a. (A: What happened on Monday?
B: Tiffany ordered chicken tempura from Thai Garden.)
A: What did Tiffany order from Thai Garden on Tuesday?
B: She ordered [CHICKEN TEMPURA]F from Thai Garden (again).
b. (A: What happened on Monday?
B: Tiffany ordered chicken tempura from Thai Garden.)
A: Where did Tiffany order chicken tempura from on Tuesday?
B: She ordered chicken tempura [FROM THAI GARDEN]F (again).
Having shown that again is not Focus-sensitive, we can come back to also. As be-
fore, we use two contexts that minimally vary so that each target sentence in the
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dialogues is true, as well as have each target sentence be preceded by a question
that licenses the Focus so that the target sentence is felicitous if also were omitted.
The first context is given in (3.32) and the respective dialogues varying the Focus
structure in (3.33).
(3.32) Context A
Tiffany ordered pad thai and chicken tempura from Thai Garden.
(3.33) a. (A: What is something Tiffany ordered?
B: She ordered pad thai from Thai Garden.)
A: Did Tiffany order anything else from Thai Garden?
B: She (also) ordered [CHICKEN TEMPURA]F from Thai Garden.
b. (A: What is something Tiffany ordered?
B: She ordered pad thai from Thai Garden.)
A: Did Tiffany order chicken tempura from anywhere?
B: She (#also) ordered chicken tempura [FROM THAI GARDEN]F.
There are two changes in the dialogues from the versions used for again. One minor
change is that the italicized preambles ask about the object rather than the whole
VP, since the variation between days necessary for the temporal nature of again’s
presupposition was removed. A less innocent change concerns the question pre-
ceding the target sentence in (3.33a), which includes else as an additive element
usually used in questions (Theiler, 2019).
Notably, else serves a function similar to also, such that the former usually can-
not be used if the latter cannot, and conversely the latter often becomes marked as
an answer to a question without else. In fact, if we were to omit else in the ques-
tion in (3.33a), also would not become completely infelicitous, but it seems like its
presupposition would have to be accommodated. However, since what is central
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here is assessing whether the felicity of also varies with the context in relation to
the Focus-structure of the sentence it occurs in, the outcome of the test is insight-
ful despite these concerns. With respect to the results for Context A above, also is
felicitous in (3.33a) but not in (3.33b).
Critically, for the second context, shown in (3.34), the results are reversed. While
also is no longer felicitous when chicken tempura is Focused, as in (3.35a), it is now
felicitous in (3.35b) when Thai Garden is focused (including the added else in the
question).
(3.34) Context B
Tiffany ordered chicken tempura from Asian Taste and Thai Garden.
(3.35) a. (A: What is something Tiffany ordered?
B: She ordered chicken tempura from Asian Taste.)
A: Did Tiffany order anything from Thai Garden?
B: She (#also) ordered [CHICKEN TEMPURA]F from Thai Garden.
b. (A: What is something Tiffany ordered?
B: She ordered chicken tempura from Asian Taste.)
A: Did Tiffany order chicken tempura from anywhere else?
B: She (also) ordered chicken tempura [FROM THAI GARDEN]F.
To relate this outcome back to our definition of the stress placement test in (3.22),
we have two sentences S1 and S2 that only vary in their Focus, namely (3.33a)-
(3.35a) and (3.33b)-(3.35b) respectively, both/all of which are true and felicitous if
also were omitted, thus showing that independent effects of Focus are accounted
for. With respect to these sentences, also serves as expression αwhose felicity varies
by context within the same Focus-structure. Consequently, the resulting (in)felicity
can only be attributed to the meaning of also interacting with the Focus-structure,
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and also thus qualifying as Focus-sensitive. Other expressions that show the same
pattern and will be used later in the thesis are even, only, and concessive at least
(full data again in Appendix A.3).
Although the stress placement test can be considered the standard test for Focus-
sensitivity, it is worth asking whether there are any other diagnostics that could be
used to validate the present results. One candidate for such a diagnostic comes
from so-called intervention effects in wh-questions (Pesetsky, 2000; Kotek, 2017).
Beck (2006b) argues that intervention effects result from a Focus-sensitive oper-
ator intervening between a wh-phrase and the question operator evaluating the
wh-phrase. The effect is illustrated for only by the contrast in (3.36). The occurrence
of intervention effects in similar examples may thus be used to test whether the
results of the stress placement test hold up.
(3.36) a. Which girl did only Mary introduce to __ which boy?
b. ??Which boy did only Mary introduce which girl to __?Latex-hack
(BECK 2006, (23))
Applying the test to again in (3.37), there is tentative support for this idea insofar
as the contrast between the two examples seems less strong than for only in (3.36).
However, both examples involve a reasonable amount of complexity, which makes
the outcome difficult to assess in the absence of quantitative data. I will thus avoid
using intervention effects as a diagnostic, but note that they provide a potential
locus of additional evidence for classifying an expression as Focus-sensitive or not.
(3.37) a. Which girl did Mary again introduce to __ which boy?
b. ?Which boy did Mary again introduce which girl to __?
Before concluding the discussion of Focus-sensitivity and turn to its formal imple-
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mentation, it is worth noting that not all Focus-sensitive expressions are created
alike. As discussed by Beaver & Clark (2008), an expression may pass the test in
(3.22) without this Focus-sensitivity being a conventionalized aspect of its mean-
ing. More specifically, Beaver & Clark argue for a distinction between three types
of Focus-sensitivity.
The first class is what the authors refer to as Quasi-association, and can be illus-
trated with the case of negation in (3.38). The relevant difference in inferences here
supporting a treatment of negation as Focus-sensitive according to (3.22) is that
(3.38a) seems to convey that Emma ordered something from Red Robin, but that it
wasn’t onion rings, whereas (3.38b) conveys that Emma ordered onion rings from
somewhere, but not from Red Robin.
(3.38) a. Emma didn’t order [ONION RINGS]F from Red Robin.
b. Emma didn’t order onion rings [FROM RED ROBIN]F.
Beaver & Clark (2008) characterize this difference in meaning as a pragmatic infer-
ence that arises indirectly by taking into account the circumstances under which
a speaker would utter (3.38a) or (3.38b). Given the contextual requirements of Fo-
cus discussed previously, Beaver & Clark argue that what would have to be under
discussion to license either utterance is what Emma ordered from Red Robin or
where she ordered onion rings from, respectively. Raising either of these issues
would only be sensible if there is in fact something that Emma ordered or some-
place Emma ordered onion rings from, respectively, similar to the explanation we
gave for how a question can license the Roothian presuppositions of Focus. The in-
ference arising in the context of negation is therefore merely a side-effect of an in-
dependently motivated contribution of Focus. Beaver & Clark furthermore argue
that this Quasi-association is restricted to non-veridical propositional operators,
others of which include disjunction or certain modals, since the relevant inference
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would already be entailed if the operator was veridical.
The second type of Focus-sensitivity is Free Association, which we have already
witnessed in the case of always in (3.20), repeated in (3.39). This kind of Focus-
sensitivity is a result from restricting the implicit domain of a quantifier such as
always. That such implicit domain restriction is called for becomes obvious when
we consider that a sentence like (3.39a) does not mean that during every point in
her life, Tiffany can be witnessed ordering chicken tempura from Thai Garden. At
the very least, she would have to be sleeping every once in a while. Thus, we may
ask what mechanisms guide implicit domain restriction.
(3.39) a. Tiffany always orders [CHICKEN TEMPURA]F from Thai Garden.
b. Tiffany always orders chicken tempura [FROM THAI GARDEN]F.
Based on previous work such as (von Fintel, 1994), Beaver & Clark argue that the
Focus-structure is one of those mechanisms, in order to account for the Focus-
sensitivity exhibited by always. Given an utterance like (3.39a), we may ask what
the situations are that always is restricted to. The answer is that in light of the Fo-
cus structure, what always quantifies over are all situations in which Tiffany or-
dered something from Thai Garden, asserting that in all those situations, she or-
dered chicken tempura. Conversely, in the case of (3.39b), what is at stake are sit-
uations in which Tiffany ordered chicken tempura, in all of which she ordered it
from Thai Garden. Consequently, Focus-sensitivity arises due to the effects Focus
has on the implicit domain of always rather than being a conventionalized part of
the meaning of always.
What we are left now is the third kind, namely Conventional Association, which
is a grammaticalized dependency on Focus that includes Focus-particles like only,
even and also. While the difference between Conventional Association and Free
Association - for instance when comparing only and always as expressions from
108
each class that are close to each other in meaning - may be difficult conceptually,
Beaver & Clark discuss a range of empirical diagnostics where the two expressions
diverge. Since, however, not all their diagnostics easily extend to other particles
(e.g. only licenses NPIs, whereas always doesn’t, but neither does even), I will restrict
the discussion to one diagnostic that seems reliable in its generality, namely the
observation that conventionally associating expressions require their associate to
be able to carry a pitch accent, whereas freely associating expressions can associate
with reduced material.
This contrast is illustrated in (3.40) for what Beaver & Clark call leaners. As
shown in (3.40a), always is felicitous whether the pronoun is reduced or stressed,
whereas only in (3.40b) becomes infelicitous in the reduced case. To generalize this
argument, in fact all expressions that passed the stress placement test pattern like
only in this respect (3.40c)-(3.40e).
(3.40) I can see AOC, but can you see Bernie? (after BEAVER & CLARK 2008,
(6.44))
a. I always see’im/ see [HIM]F.
b. I can only #see’im/ see [HIM]F.
c. I can also #see’im/ see [HIM]F.
d. I can even #see’im/ see [HIM]F.
e. I don’t see AOC but at least I can #see’im/ see [HIM]F.
What the preceding discussion shows then is that all the Focus-sensitive expres-
sions we will be concerned with fall into the category of conventional associa-
tion. Note, however, that the previous formulation of the Focus Presupposition
Antecedent Hypothesis in Chapter 1 was not restricted to a specific type of Focus-
sensitivity. Nonetheless, there may be reason to assume that only conventionally
associating expressions require an antecedent in the discourse model, for instance
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by virtue of only this type of Focus-sensitivity being formalized in terms of the
free variable C, as we will see in a moment. Moreover, restricting the investigation
to one notion of Focus-sensitivity has the methodological advantage of avoiding
confounds due to mixing different types. I will come back to the question how
the FoPAH relates to other types of Focus-sensitivity and how the results to be
presented in the upcoming experimental chapters may extend to these types in
Chapter 6.
With this background on Focus-sensitivity in mind, we can turn to how (con-
ventional) association with Focus can be formalized. On the account proposed by
Rooth (1992), which will be adopted here, a Focus-sensitive expression like also
comes with its own silent free variable C, which serves as the first argument to
also. Additionally - although not part of Rooth’s (1992) original theory - Focus-
particles are mostly treated as propositional-level operators in contemporary for-
mal semantic theory, which will be adopted here as well as a simplification (but
see for instance Hirsch 2017 for an alternative proposal for only).
A sample lexical entry for also, modeled after Bade (2016), and its application to
an example are given in (3.41)-(3.42). Also has moved out of its surface position at
LF, thus modifying the whole sentence. It is through C and the restrictions imposed
by squiggle that the contribution of also is specified to the Focus-structure of its
propositional argument, in this case to the set of propositions of the form Tiffany
ordered x. The final contribution of also is that it presupposes the existence of a true
proposition in C that is not entailed by the prejacent, and leaves the bare prejacent
as at-issue content.





Tiffany ordered [chicken tempura]F
Notably, by virtue of a Focus-sensitive operator coming with its own C variable
however, the relation between the operator and Focus is only indirect (see Wold
1996 for an alternative). That is, the two Cs in (3.42) may or may not have the
same value. Even though this flexibility may be taken as rendering association
with Focus too weak, Rooth (1992) provides empirical arguments for an indirect
view of association with Focus (see also Wagner 2020). For instance in example
(3.43), if only were to associate with eat instead of the deaccented rice, it would
result in a contradiction, since the sentence is meant to comment on people doing
something else with rice, namely growing it.
(3.43) People who [GROW]F rice generally only [EAT]F rice. (Rooth 1992, (70))
This indirect association also makes it possible for the Focus Presupposition An-
tecedent Hypothesis to be restricted to Focus-sensitive expressions without neces-
sarily making claims about bare Focus per se. Moreover, there may be reason to
assume that Focus serves a function that may require distinct mechanisms for bare
Focus and Focus-sensitive expressions, namely in relation to the Question Under
Discussion, which we will turn to next.
3.4 Focus and the Question Under Discussion
The Question Under Discussion (QUD) framework originating from Roberts (2012)
has been applied to a broad range of phenomena in semantics and pragmatics since
111
its conception and become a prominent approach to discourse coherence by plac-
ing questions at the center of how communication proceeds (see Benz & Jasinskaja
2017 for an overview). Moreover, and most relevant to the current investigation,
Roberts’s framework views the role of Focus in terms of how a sentence relates
to the QUD. Before delving into this aspect of the theory however, the formal de-
tails behind the idea that questions serve as discourse structuring devices will be
presented, which will be necessary background for the experiments in Chapter 4.
Thus far, the discussion has only been concerned with simple question-answer
pairs, as in (3.1) above. However, natural conversation is rarely as simple as an-
swering a single isolated question. Rather, most conversations revolve around a
number of different topics, the discussion of which may involve longer stretches
of discourse for each topic. On Roberts’ view, such stretches of discourse all work
toward an answer to the big question “What is the way the world is?", adopting a
gameified approach in the spirit of (Stalnaker, 1978; Lewis, 1979).
However, what makes it possible for us to say that a stretch of discourse re-
volves around a certain topic is that humans tend to organize conversation in a
way that maximizes the coherence of a discourse on a local level, rather than trying
to answer the big question by answering one question at a time followed by a com-
pletely unrelated one. The QUD-framework provides a formalization for capturing
intuitions about how sentences relate to an overarching topic by using questions -
explicit and implicit - as discourse structuring devices.
To illustrate the intuition behind questions structuring discourse with a con-
crete example, consider the overly explicit discourse in (3.44). The discourse as a
whole constitutes a strategy of inquiry to answer the overarching question at the top.
This question is then broken down into the subquestions in (3.44a)-(3.44b), which
are in turn broken down into the subsubquestions in (3.44a-i)-(3.44b-ii). Each act
of raising or answering a question constitutes a move in the discourse game. An-
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swering a question, if accepted, updates the Common Ground with the respective
proposition, much like in the dynamic semantic theories discussed in Chapter 2.
Additionally, the model is augmented by a QUD-stack, which is where a question
is placed, if accepted. The idea then is that the discourse progresses in a way that
continuously resolves questions from the stack in an orderly fashion.
(3.44) Who can cast which spells? (after ROBERTS 2012, p.16)
a. What spells can Cid cast?
(i) Can Cid cast Cure?
Yes, Cid can cast Cure
(ii) Can Cid cast Ultima?
No, Cid cannot cast Ultima
b. What spells can Yuffie cast?
(i) Can Yuffie cast Cure?
Yes, Yuffie can cast Cure
(ii) Can Yuffie cast Ultima?
Yes, Yuffie can cast Cure
In order to understand what it means to resolve questions in an orderly fashion
and what it is about (3.44) that makes the discourse qualify as coherent, it is first
necessary to say more about the semantics of questions as assumed by Roberts
(2012). The assumption for wh-questions we saw already in (3.12), repeated in
(3.45a), where the meaning of a wh-question is the set of propositions generated
from substituting the wh-word with a variable. A polar question simply denotes
the proposition it asks about as a singleton set (3.45b).
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(3.45) a. Wh-question
JWhere did Cloud grow up?K =
{ λw . Cloud grew up in x in w ∣ x ∈ De }
b. Polar Question
JDid Cloud grow up in Nibelheim?K =
{ λw . Cloud grew up in Nibelheim in w }
With these assumptions in place, we can define what it means for a proposition
to constitute an answer to a question. Roberts distinguishes between partial and
complete answers in this respect, as stated in (3.46) (in the framing of Kadmon
2001).
(3.46) a. Partial Answerhood
A proposition p is a partial answer to a question Q iff p contextually
entails the truth-value of at least one element of the denotation of
Q.
b. Complete Answerhood
A proposition p is a complete answer to a question Q iff p contextually
entails the truth-value of each element of the denotation of Q.
Applied to the discourse in (3.44), the answer in (3.44a-i) thus constitutes a com-
plete answer to its preceding polar question, since it entails the truth of all elements
of the denotation of this polar question, namely the singleton proposition denoted
by the polar question itself. With respect to the next higher wh-question in (3.44a),
however, the answer only constitutes a partial answer, since it leaves other propo-
sitions denoted by the wh-question - such as (3.44a-ii) - open.
Building on the notions of partial and complete answerhood, we can now cap-
ture how questions can be related to each other to form a strategy of inquiry,
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namely in terms of what it means for a question to be a super- or sub-question
to another question, as shown in (3.47) (again from Kadmon 2001).
(3.47) Subquestionhood (KADMON 2001, p.341)
A question Q2 is a subquestion to a question Q1 iff the complete answer
to Q2 contextually entails a partial answer to Q1.
Using the dialogue in (3.44) again as illustration, the polar question in (3.44a-i)
would thus constitute a subquestion to the wh-question in (3.44a), since its com-
plete answer - “Cid cannot cast Cure" - is a partial answer to (3.44a). In turn, the
wh-questions in (3.44a)-(3.44b) would themselves be subquestions to the multiple
wh-question at the top of (3.44). One way to represent the hierarchical structure of
such a strategy more comprehensively is in terms of d(iscourse)-trees (Büring, 2003),












Conceiving of a discourse as being structured by questions does not only allow
us to model dialogues such as (3.44), but also restricts the shape of possible dis-
courses by making it possible to state a notion of relevance that unifies assertions
and questions, namely by relating moves to the last QUD on the stack, as in (3.49).
As mentioned earlier, a move can either answer a question - an assertion - or raise
a question - a question. Last(QUD(m)) stands for the most recent question under
115
discussion at the time the move is made.
(3.49) Relevance (ROBERTS 2012, (15))
A move m is Relevant to the question under discussion q, i.e. to last(QUD(m)),
iff m either introduces a partial answer to q (m is an assertion) or is part
of a strategy to answer q (m is a question).
An assertion would then be relevant iff it is a partial answer to the last QUD, so
(3.50a) would be relevant, but (3.50b) would not, as supported by the contrast in
acceptability. For a question to be relevant, it has to be part of a strategy of inquiry
relative to the last QUD, i.e. be a subquestion to it. Given the question in (3.51)
then, (3.51a) would meet this restriction but (3.51b) would not.
(3.50) Who grew up in Nibelheim?
a. Cloud grew up in Nibelheim.
b. #Cloud worked for Avalanche.
(3.51) Who grew up in Nibelheim?
a. Did Cloud grow up in Nibelheim?
b. #Did Cloud work for Avalanche?
In light of the previous discussion in Section 3.2, however, we can think of alter-
native explanations for the infelicity of (3.50b) and (3.51b), which brings us to the
role of Focus in Roberts’s (2012) theory. Roberts follows Rooth (1992) in assum-
ing that Focus invokes alternatives via its focus-semantic value, but extends this
idea to questions. That is, wh-words in questions make the same contribution as
F-marking in assertions such that the wh-word gets substituted with a variable for
its focus-semantic value. Restrictions on Focus structure can thus be captured by
the constraint in (3.52) (adopted from Kadmon 2001) to not only previously dis-
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cussed cases of question-answer congruence in (3.53) (repeated from (3.1)) but also
question-question congruence as in (3.54).
(3.52) The QUD constraint on Focus (KADMON 2001, p.344)
An utterance B whose logical translation is of the form β or ?[β], where
β is a formula, is felicitous only if JβKf = last(QUD(JBKo)).
(3.53) A: Where did Cloud grow up?
a. B: He grew up in [NIBELHEIM]F.
b. B: #He [GREW UP]F in Nibelheim.
(3.54) A: Where did Cloud grow up?
a. B: Did Cloud grow up in [NIBELHEIM]F?
b. B: #Did [CLOUD]F grow up in Nibelheim?
Additionally, Focus plays a crucial role for Roberts’s theory by virtue of serving as
a cue for what the current QUD is. In the examples thus far, questions were always
made explicit, which is of course an oversimplification, since natural conversation
rarely behaves like a quiz-show. Due to that situation, an important issue is how
to deal with discourses where questions are not made explicit. Roberts’s answer
is that questions may also be - and in fact mostly are - left implicit. In such cases,
it is the Focus structure of an utterance that indicates what the current QUD is.
Roberts captures this idea as the presupposition in (3.55) (see Büring 2003; Con-
stant 2014 for modified versions and additional discussion). That is, in the absence
of an overt question, hearers rely on the Focus-structure as a cue to identify the
QUD and accommodate it (in the sense of Lewis 1979, for possible constraints on
accommodation of this type see Beaver & Clark 2008).
117
(3.55) Presupposition of prosodic focus in an utterance β∗ (ROBERTS 2012, (26))
aβ is congruent to the question under discussion at the time of utterance.
The notion of presupposition that (3.55) appeals to should be viewed as being
close, if not identical to the one discussed for squiggle in the previous section,
namely one in terms of the contextual requirements of Focus. That is, although
the Focus-structure is meant to help a hearer accommodate an otherwise implicit
QUD, it also accounts for the Strong Contextual Felicity of Focus. Treating the rela-
tion to questions as the primary function of Focus also allows us to do away with
the explanation for how a question satisfies the requirements of squiggle, which -
adopting the explanation from Kadmon (2001) - relied on inferring the member of
C from the pragmatic requirements on asking a question, namely that there are at
least two possible true answers.
Assuming (bare) Focus to be about QUDs also allows us to keep bare Focus
separate from association with Focus with respect to the Focus Presupposition An-
tecedent Hypothesis. That is, while Focus serves the function assumed in Roberts
framework, association with Focus may still be viewed as proposed by Rooth
(1992).
A(n) - to my knowledge novel - empirical argument for treating bare Focus
and association with Focus separately comes from a comparison of squiggle with
the widely assumed semantics of additive particles like also. Recall from Section
3.2 that squiggle, loosely speaking, required there to be two distinct propositions
as elements of C, one being the prejacent. Interestingly, according to the entry for
also in (3.56), repeated from (3.41), an additive particle presupposes that C con-
tains one proposition not entailed by the prejacent, which is the almost identi-
cal requirement. Additionally, both bare Focus and additives have the property of
Strong Contextual Felicity such that this requirement has to be met for them to be
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felicitous.
(3.56) JALSOK = λC.λp.λw: ∃q[q ∈ C(w) & p⇏ q ∧ q(w) = 1]. p(w)
However, while a question seems to be able to satisfy this requirement for bare
Focus, as in (3.57a), it does not license the use of an additive (3.57b) (see Chapter
5 for experimental evidence for this contrast). If we assume that the requirements
of Focus are satisfied because Focus carries the presupposition in (3.55), while the
additive does in fact require a proposition of the form specified in (3.56), we do not
have to stipulate that the element inferred from using the question - again adopting
Kadmon’s explanation - is able to satisfy bare Focus but not the additive, and can
keep the requirements of the additive as is. Consequently, bare Focus does not in-
volve the same notion of antecedent as Focus-sensitive particles do, which justifies
leaving bare Focus out of the Focus Presupposition Antecedent Hypothesis.
(3.57) A: Where did Barret live over the course of his life?
a. B: Barret lived in [Corel]F.
b. B: #Barret also lived in [Corel]F
Before concluding this section, it is worth noting that - despite rigorous formal
definitions outlined above - the notion of a QUD has been used in ways that goes
far beyond and outside of Roberts’s (2012) framework, by being assimilated to
the less strict concept of a discourse topic, without Focus playing the central role
it does for Roberts. It is therefore important to be aware of possible confusions
and equivocations and be precise in the application of the concepts at play. These
extensions of Roberts’s theory have been particularly prominent in experimental
work, which we will turn to next.
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3.5 Processing Focus and QUDs
This section reviews psycholinguistic research on Focus and QUDs. For Focus, af-
ter providing a broad overview of important findings, special attention will be
given to work on the representation of alternatives and the time course of process-
ing Focus-sensitive expressions. For QUDs, the discussion will be grouped into its
application to semantic and pragmatic phenomena on the one hand, and syntactic
phenomena on the other.
3.5.1 Focus
(i) Broad Overview
There has been a considerable amount of research on the role of Focus for language
comprehension, although the adopted notion has mostly been in terms of Focus as
new or highlighted information, until relatively recently. Cutler & Fodor (1979)
provided evidence for the role of Focus in allocating attention by showing that
Focused material in relation to a preceding question was facilitated in a phoneme
detection task. In line with this finding, Bredart & Modolo (1988) showed that the
extent to which certain semantic illusions arise (e.g. the so-called Moses illusion,
Erickson & Mattson 1981) is modulated by whether the critical word (e.g. Moses) is
Focused (see also Sturt et al. 2004).
Furthermore, there is evidence that Focused words have a privileged status in
memory. Using syntactic constructions such as clefts to manipulate Focus, Birch
& Garnsey (1995) showed that phonological information of a Focused word was
remembered better in a naming and in a recall task, although for the latter only
with a delay. Moreover, Focused material is referred back to more often in a sen-
tence continuation task and recognized faster in a probe recognition task, but again
only when the probe occurs with a delay (Birch et al., 2000). Relatedly, Foraker &
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McElree (2007) showed that Focusing the antecedent of a pronoun leads to faster
resolution.
Regarding the issue of how Focus affects reading, results are more mixed how-
ever. While Birch & Rayner (1997) report Focused material being read slower in
eye-tracking, Birch & Rayner (2010) found the opposite effect. Benatar & Clifton
(2014) note that this apparent inconsistency may be due to differences in how Fo-
cus was manipulated - via a preceding question, clefting, or syntactic position - and
more crucially how Focus was conceptualized theoretically. Adopting Schwarzschild’s
(1999) notion of Focus as the counterpart to givenness, they provide evidence that
Focused - or new - information is in fact read slower, whereas what is Given shows
facilitation in reading. In relation to the previous studies, the additional time spent
on reading Focused material may thus be causal in the noted benefits of Focus
across different tasks. Taken together, these studies suggest that Focus leads to an
enhanced memory representation, potentially due to more attention being allo-
cated to Focused material, which results in facilitation of encoding and integration
processes.
Focus has also been shown to affect syntactic processing. Using only to inves-
tigate temporary structural ambiguities such as the main-verb/reduced-relative-
clause analysis (e.g. The horse raced past the barn fell.), Ni et al. (1996) provided evi-
dence from self-paced reading and eye-tracking while reading that the presence of
only reduced garden path effects. In a follow-up to this study, Paterson et al. (1999)
argued that only facilitated reanalysis processes rather than initial parsing behav-
ior however. With respect to another structural ambiguity, namely relative clause
attachment to a complex NP (e.g. The daughter of the colonel who...), Schafer et al.
(1996) showed that an accented noun increased the likelihood of the correspond-
ing NP to become the head of the relative clause.
Beyond syntactic parsing, Focus also plays a role for the processing of ellipsis
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constructions. For example, Frazier et al. (2007) showed that in a situation where
VP-ellipsis can either be resolved to the predicate in a matrix or an embedded
clause (e.g. Julie said Maria went to the rally and Greg did too.), accenting the sub-
ject of a given clause increases the likelihood for the ellipsis to be resolved to the
predicate of this clause. For ellipsis in coordinating structures (e.g. Danielle couldn’t
pass the quiz, let alone the final/Kayla.), Harris & Carlson (2018) find a similar pattern,
namely that accenting a non-local constituent renders resolution of the ellipsis to
this constituent more likely. However, this accenting effect does not fully overturn
a bias for the local constituent, which the authors attribute to a default preference
for material occuring late in a clause to receive informational Focus (Carlson et al.,
2009).
One way to interpret these findings by relating it to the results on attention and
memory would be to assume that the enhanced memory representations induced
by Focus affect how syntactic representations are accessed during parsing. When
the parser has to retrieve syntactic information while building the structure, Fo-
cused material may increase the activation of the corresponding representations
such that they are more likely to be chosen for attachment or retrieved for ellipsis.
The psycholinguistic research thus supports a characterization of Focus in terms
of its effects on underlying memory representations. A different question concerns
whether the effects of Focus go beyond the representation of the Focused word or
constituent, which we will turn to next.
(ii) The Representation of Alternatives
According to Rooth’s (1985) theory of Alternative Semantics, the essential role of
Focus is to evoke alternatives. However, given that alternatives are left implicit -
that is, Focusing Tifa does not tell you what specific alternatives are being evoked
- there are limits to the kind of evidence linguistic theory can provide to support
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this view. Psycholinguistic evidence, on the other hand, may be able to provide
important insights to this issue.
One source of evidence comes from studies showing effects of Focus on alterna-
tives mentioned in the discourse. Fraundorf et al. (2010) showed that a contrastive
accent not only improves recognition of the Focused words (e.g. BRITISH) but also
of related words that were previously mentioned (e.g. French). Moreover, no such
effect was found for related words that were not mentioned in the context (e.g.
Portuguese).
Contrastive accents have also been shown to influence processing in the visual-
world paradigm. Comparing a contrastive with a non-contrastive accent (nuclear
L+H* vs H+L*) in either a broad or a narrow Focus condition in German, Braun
et al. (2018) show that narrow Focus leads to more looks to contrastive associates
(e.g. swimmer vs diver, displayed as words rather than pictures) than to non-contrastive
but semantically related ones (e.g. swimmer vs bath), but only when the narrow Fo-
cus is conveyed with a contrastive accent. Additionally, a second pair of experi-
ments showed that the same pattern occurs in the presence of an additive parti-
cle, suggesting that it is the accent that is responsible for the increased activation
rather than the particle activating alternatives on its own. In a related study, Braun
& Biezma (2019) replicate this qualitative pattern for a different comparison in ac-
cents, namely between prenuclear L*+H - assumed to indicate a contrastive topic
- and nuclear L+H*, suggesting that activation of alternatives is not restricted to a
single accent type in German.
In two cross-modal priming studies in Dutch, where participants that are lis-
tening to a sentence have to indicate whether a visually presented prime is a word
or a non-word, Braun & Tagliapietra (2010) investigated how different intonational
contours affected the performance of different primes. The contour was either neu-
tral or contrastive, with the latter placing a contrastive accent on the final word of
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the test sentence, after which the prime was presented. Participants were faster
to respond to primes that were contrastively related to the final word of the test
sentence (e.g. flamingo - pelican) than to non-contrastive but related primes (e.g.
flamingo - pink) when the test sentence carried a contrastive contour, but not when
it was presented with a neutral contour.
Following up on this result, Husband & Ferreira (2016) showed facilitation rela-
tive to an unrelated control prime for both contrastive and non-contrastive primes
if a contrastive accent was present, opposed to Braun & Tagliapietra’s lack of fa-
cilitation for non-contrastive primes. Husband & Ferreira attribute this apparent
tension to differences in the degree of semantic relatedness in Braun & Tagliapi-
etra’s stimuli. However, Husband & Ferreira furthermore provide evidence on the
time course of activating alternatives. In a second experiment, in which the tar-
get words were presented 750ms after the offset of the prime carrying the neutral
or contrastive accent, rather than immediately after, only the contrastive prime
showed facilitation, suggesting that Focus initially activates a larger set of alterna-
tives which is restricted to relevant ones at a later stage.
These findings provide evidence that the alternative sets evoked by Focus are in
fact cognitively real. A subsequent issue is what the set consists of and what alter-
natives are being evoked. One factor that seems to play a role in light of Fraundorf
et al.’s (2010) results is whether an alternative is explicitly mentioned in the con-
text, since mentioned alternatives showed an advantage in terms of recognition
relative to unmentioned ones even when both where otherwise contrastive.
However, in a follow-up study, Fraundorf et al. (2013) showed that this advan-
tage to mentioned alternatives is only present when the alternative is plausible or
relevant. In discourses like (3.58), both Saturn and Neptune are contrastively re-
lated to Jupiter, but only the former constitutes a plausible alternative, given that
Neptune had not been visited yet. While recognition was improved for mentioned
124
and plausible alternatives (e.g. Saturn), there was no such effect for mentioned but
implausible ones (e.g. Neptune). This finding suggests that participants take de-
tails of the discourse into account when computing alternatives, at least in a late
measure such as recognition performance.
(3.58) Originally, the space probe Cosmo III was designed to fly past Jupiter
and Saturn and send photos and measurements back to NASA from
both planets. NASA needed this information to guide the videos they
were going to take of Neptune on a future mission.
However, due to a glitch in the programming of the Cosmo III, it lost
the photos taken of JUPITER and put the future mission in trouble.
In contrast, the facilitation for contrastive items with respect to cross-modal prim-
ing and the visual-world reported earlier did not rely on alternatives being men-
tioned. This apparent tension, however, may be due to task differences, given that
these online methodologies are able to tap into the incremental processes under-
lying the generation of alternatives, whereas the recognition task may only detect
the most privileged alternatives, in line with Husband & Ferreira’s (2016) finding
that the set of alternatives may be restricted quickly.
An alternative explanation for the contrast may be found in relation to Rooth’s
(1992) theory, which distinguishes between the alternatives evoked in the focus-
semantic dimension and the propositions that are part of C. The recognition ben-
efit for plausible mentioned alternatives could thus be conceived of as resulting
from those alternatives being included in the set of propositions C, whereas early
facilitation in priming and the visual-world may be related to the activation of
focus-semantic alternatives that may not necessarily be part of C.
With respect to advantages in online measures, it is worth emphasizing that
what was referred to as non-contrastive primes or associates were still semanti-
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cally related to the target word (e.g. swimmer-bath or flamingo-pink). However, as
Gotzner (2015b) notes (see also Gotzner 2015a, Ch. 5 and Gotzner & Spalek 2017),
studies varied in whether the non-contrastive associate constituted as proper re-
placement for the target word in the sentence it occurred in, often between items.
For example, for the sample item in (3.59) from Husband & Ferreira (2016), substi-
tuting the non-contrastive associate extinct with the target word mammoths would
result in ungrammaticality. The observation that non-contrastive associates might
not be facilitated even though they are semantically related would thus be in line
with Rooth’s (1992) proposal that alternatives are restricted to appropriate types.
(3.59) Scientists found the fossils of several MAMMOTHS during their excava-
tion.
Contrastive: dinosaurs; non-contrastive: extinct, unrelated control: corpo-
rate
On the other hand, Rooth also argued for a permissive view according to which a
type-match is all that is required to constitute a viable alternative, contrasting with
Wagner’s (2012b) restrictive view that alternatives have to be mutually exclusive,
discussed in Section 3.2. Gotzner (2015b) provides evidence in favor of Rooth’s ac-
count by showing that semantically unrelated primes may still receive facilitation
if they constitute a possible replacement. That is, while lychees in (3.60a) was in-
distinguishable from the related prime socks, the unrelated prime sofas in (3.60b)
was slower than the related prime beetles. This difference thus show that the set
of alternatives may in fact be quite broad, once their replaceability is taken into
account.
(3.60) a. Possible replacement
He (only) bought JACKETS. prime: lychees
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b. No Possible replacement
He (only) caught FLIES. prime: sofas
To sum up the findings regarding the nature of the alternative set, there are a few
notable factors that play a role for the alternative computation. First, being men-
tioned in the discourse results in a privileged status, but for recognition effects only
for plausible alternatives. Second, semantic relatedness is not sufficient for facili-
tation in cross-modal priming or the visual-world paradigm, but potentially only
as long as the related alternative is not replaceable. When comparing replaceable
alternatives in terms of relatedness, even unrelated alternatives are facilitated.
However, notably not all factors have been tested within the same methodol-
ogy such that more work needs to be done to dissociate the relevance of certain
factors from the context of the task in which they were assessed. Furthermore, it
was pointed out that different effects may also relate to different aspect of the un-
derlying theory, namely what alternatives are being evoked on the focus-semantic
dimension and which may be part of the free variable C.
The last aspect to be discussed in the present context pertains to how Focus-
particles affect the computation of the alternative set. The studies discussed thus
far were primarily concerned with bare Focus expressed via a contrastive accent,
with the exception of Braun et al. (2018), who investigated the influence of additive
particles on the retrieval of alternatives in the visual-world paradigm but found no
effect.
In contrast, Kim et al. (2015) (see also Kim 2012) showed in a visual-world
study that the presence of only in target sentences as in (3.61) increased the pro-
portion of looks to a target display containing some apples faster than when only
is not present. Additionally, when apples was previously mentioned (rather than
lanterns), resolution toward the target display occurred earlier, but even more so
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with only. This finding not only constitutes another example of the benefits of pre-
vious mention for the computation of alternatives, but adds to this picture by pro-
viding evidence that Focus-particles may facilitate accessing alternatives available
in the discourse.
(3.61) Neil has some {apples/lanterns} and some cards.
Jane (only) has some [apples]F.
Additional evidence for the facilitatory effects of Focus-particles comes from two
recall studies on German by Spalek et al. (2014) (see also Gotzner 2015a, Ch. 3).
The authors compared even and only to a bare Focus condition in a target sentence
preceded by a context sentence introducing a set of alternatives, as in (3.62). While
there was no difference between the conditions for the recall of the Focused ele-
ment, the presence of a Focus-particle resulted in better recall rates of alternatives
relative to the bare condition. These results thus extend the findings of Fraundorf
et al. (2010, 2013), suggesting that Focus-particles require deeper processing of the
alternative set, which may boost the independent memory benefits of Focus.
(3.62) Matthias receives a package with shirts, trousers and jackets.
He considered what he liked.
He kept { only / even / ∅ } the shirts.
In contrast, Focus-particles may also lead to interference. In two experiments using
items similar to (3.62), Gotzner et al. (2016) (see also Gotzner 2015a, Ch. 4) found
that the presence of a Focus-particle - in this case only or even - slowed down the ac-
ceptance of mentioned alternatives and the rejection of unmentioned alternatives
in a probe recognition study, as well as slowed down response times to mentioned,
unmentioned or unrelated alternatives in a lexical decision task. The authors argue
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that these interference effects are due to Focus-particles activating additional alter-
natives, which leads to competition among alternatives in the alternative set and
inhibited computation.
Gotzner 2015a, Ch. 6 adds to this finding by investigating the effects of different
Focus-particles in combination with a contrastive accent in two probe recognition
studies. The first study used items as in (3.63), comparing four conditions: a bare
neutral accent, a bare contrastive accent, and either only or also combined with a
contrastive accent. The probe would always be the alternative to the Focused word
mentioned in the first sentence of the discourse, here witness, and appear either
after the target sentence (the second sentence in (3.63)) or after the filler sentence
(the third sentence in (3.63)). Reaction times to the probe showed no difference
between any condition when presented right after the target sentence. However,
with the delay of the additional filler sentence, there was facilitation for contrastive
accents relative to the neutral accent, but less so when the accent was combined
with only or also rather than being bare.
(3.63) The judge and the witness followed the argument.
{ The [judge]F / { Only / Also / ∅ } the [JUDGE]F } } believed the defen-
dant.
He announced the verdict.
A follow-up experiment used the same basic design, but instead of manipulating
the timing of the probe, participants had to do a simple math problem after lis-
tening to the target sentence (filler sentences were excluded) and before being pre-
sented with the probe. Diverging from the first experiment, it was the contrastive
accent in combination with only leading to interference relative to a neutral ac-
cent. The bare contrastive accent and its combination with also, on the other hand,
were numerically slower than the neutral accent but not significantly different.
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This finding further supports the view that Focus-particles lead to interference,
potentially due to competition, but also shows that not all particles behave alike
and that the time course of the alternatives generation process may not be linear,
but rather exhibit facilitation early and interference later.
Relating these findings to Rooth’s (1992) theory again, the fact that Focus-particles
exhibit different effects than bare Focus may be due to - or even support for - the in-
direct relationship between squiggle and the particle, which both come with their
own hidden C variable. The co-presence of these variables may also account for
Focus-particles leading to interference rather than facilitation, since gauging the
contents of each set could result in competition. Alternatively, the observed in-
terference effects may arise from the additional semantic contribution of a Focus-
particle, which requires establishing a specific relationship among members of the
alternative set, in contrast to alternatives being evoked but not operated on. Differ-
ences between particles, as observed by Gotzner (2015a), may constitute an impor-
tant source of evidence for addressing this latter possibility. The next subsection
adds to this point by reviewing results on the incremental processing of Focus-
particles.
(iii) The Time Course of Processing Focus-particles
Regarding the question whether and how Focus-particles are processed incremen-
tally, there has already been substantial evidence in the studies presented above.
For instance, Kim et al. (2015) showed that only facilitated looks to a target display
more so than a bare contrastive accent. This finding provides initial evidence that
Focus-particles are in fact computed quite rapidly. Similar studies discussed in the
previous chapter in Section 2.5 in the context of presuppositions further consoli-
date this result, such as Romoli et al. (2015) for also. However, both of these studies
used the visual-world paradigm, which might exaggerate certain effects due to
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the special task demands and a restricted linguistic context, and may therefore not
carry over easily to language comprehension in a more naturalistic setting.
A notable exception to these methodological choices comes from an eye-tracking
while reading study by Filik et al. (2009), comparing only and even. In sentences like
(3.64) (‘∣’ indicating analysis regions), first-pass reading times in the region contain-
ing passed the examination were slower when only was present and followed by an
unlikely event (=worst teacher). The reverse pattern - slower reading times for a
likely event (=best teacher) - was found for even, but only in the final region of the
sentence. This contrast suggests that, although even may be processed incremen-
tally, its processing may be delayed relative to only.
(3.64) { Only / Even } students taught ∣ by the {worst / best } teacher ∣ passed
the examination ∣ in the summer.
Interestingly, in another study from Section 2.5, Schwarz (2015c) found that antic-
ipatory looks to a target display in the visual-world paradigm occurred earlier for
also than for only. This difference was interpreted in terms of also being presuppo-
sitional, whereas the exhaustive inference contributed by only is at-issue. The same
contrast holds for only and even, with the contribution of the latter being presup-
posed. However, while presuppositions may take precedence over at-issue content
in the visual-world paradigm, potentially due to presuppositions being necessary
to assess the truth of a proposition to meet specific task demands, computing the
presupposition of even may have been more costly in a more naturalistic reading
task. Alternatively, the differences may be due to even requiring the calculation of
a scale.
What these results thus show is that Focus-particles, despite sharing certain
properties that may be reflected in similarities in their processing behavior, also ex-
hibit points of idiosyncratic variation that may affect processing in distinct ways. I
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will come back to these idiosyncrasies in the context of the results on accommoda-
tion in Ch. 5. The next subsection moves on to experimental research on the QUD.
3.5.2 QUDs
(i) Semantic & Pragmatic Phenomena
The concept of a QUD has been used in experimental work on a wide variety of
phenomena in semantics and pragmatics. One of the earliest set of studies comes
from Zondervan (2009) (see also Zondervan 2010), who investigated the scalar im-
plicature of or in Dutch (= X or Y implicates either X or Y, but not both). Zondervan
manipulated whether the disjunct was Focused or not, either via explicit ques-
tions, as in (3.65), or with an implicit question raised in the context. The rate of im-
plicature calculation was significantly increased when the disjunct was Focused,
relative to when it was deaccented. Zondervan interpreted these results in terms
of QUDs determining the Focus-structure of a sentence, which in turn determines
what parts of the sentence receive an exhaustive interpretation, corresponding to a
scalar implicature. If the disjunct containing the weak scalar element or is Focused,
the likelihood of scalar inferences is therefore increased.
(3.65) a. A: What did Katja find? (Focus)
b. A: Who found a crab or a starfish? (Non-focus)
B: Katja found a crab or a starfish.
Directly related to these findings, Ronai & Xiang (2019) elaborate on the relation-
ship between questions and scalar inferences with an elicitation task and a timed
sentence-picture verification task on some. The results from the elicitation task,
which had participants indicate what question preceding a sentence containing
some matched a picture that was either compatible with the scalar inference or not,
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showed that a broad range of questions was compatible with either interpretation,
the most common of which are given in (3.66).
(3.66) a. What color are the shapes?
b. Are any of the shapes blue?
c. Are all shapes blue?
Target: Some of the shapes are blue.
With respect to these questions, the sentence-picture verification task showed that
any-questions were more likely to be interpreted literally - that is, without the
scalar inference - compared to all-questions, which leaned stronger towards the
implicature enriched interpretation. Additionally, response times for any-questions
were slower when rejecting a literal interpretation, providing evidence for the role
of QUDs for implicature processing.
QUDs have also been used to study the interpretation of modal expressions
like might and must. Jeong (2018) presents experimental evidence that scopally am-
biguous sentences containing a modal (every x might have a y), which have been
argued to only allow the reading where the modal takes wide scope, can be inter-
preted with a narrow scope of the modal if the QUD makes this reading relevant
(for other QUD-effects on scope ambiguities, see also Zondervan et al. 2008 on
quantifiers and negation, and Chen et al. 2019 on comparatives).
Investigating the issue of whether might is best described as being interpreted
in relation to a contextually determined body of knowledge or relative to an indi-
vidual assessor, Beddor & Egan (2018) provide evidence for the latter view based
on experimental results showing that the truth-value of a modal statement is sensi-
tive to the implicit QUD set up by the context. Taken together, these results provide
strong evidence for the role of QUDs for sentence interpretation.
One set of studies that is particularly relevant in the present context is reported
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in Tian & Breheny (2016). Their studies addressed previous research on the pro-
cessing of negative sentences, showing that the positive argument of a negative
sentence (=the prejacent) is often represented in early stages of processing, as well
as processing difficulty associated with negative sentences. In a sentence-picture
matching task, Tian & Breheny compared clefted to unclefted negative sentences
(e.g. (It was) Jane (who) didn’t cook spaghetti) and had participants indicate whether it
matched a given picture, which either showed raw spaghetti or cooked spaghetti.
While replicating the finding that participants are faster to respond to a mismatch-
ing picture for unclefted negative sentences (i.e. the cooked spaghetti), clefted sen-
tences showed the opposite pattern, with faster response times for the matching
picture.
Using the same task, the authors kept the target sentence the same (e.g. The
banana isn’t peeled) but added a factor to the picture manipulation, namely either
presenting - to illustrate their sample item - a peeled banana or an unpeeled ba-
nana on its own, or next to an apple that mismatches the banana’s state. For the
single-object picture, there was a training effect such that a matching sentence
takes longer than a mismatching sentence at the beginning of the experiment but
less so toward the end. In contrast, the two-object picture condition showed no
such training effect, with matching sentences consistently taking longer. Finally, a
visual-world study comparing positive and negative sentences in their clefted or
unclefted version showed that negative sentences are delayed relative to positive
ones in their unclefted form, but indistinguishable in their cleft form.
The reason Tian & Breheny’s (2016) studies are relevant here is because they
implicitly provide support for the connection between Focus and QUDs. What the
cleft manipulation may have done is indicate the Focus-structure, when the un-
clefted version would not have provided any clues to that effect and consequently
been interpreted with broad Focus. Similarly, the two-object pictures provided a set
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of alternatives that justifies Focus on the subject, whereas the single-object picture
would have been most natural with broad Focus in the absence of further context
cues. The studies thus not only illustrate the role of implicit QUDs for the process-
ing of negation, but also how they can be evoked, with Focus being a crucial cue,
in line with Roberts (2012). The question what other cues there might be is also
going to be central for a number of studies presented in the following subsection.
(ii) Syntactic Phenomena
In the domain of psycholinguistic work on syntax, QUDs have been primarily
brought to bear on issues related to ellipsis. A set of studies by Malt (1985) - which
preceded the QUD-framework but still yields important insights - showed that
questions facilitate processing of VP-ellipsis relative to assertions. In discourses
like (3.67), the final sentence containing the ellipsis was read faster when the an-
tecedent was presented in a question (i) compared to an assertion (ii). In the context
of the current discussion, this finding may be interpreted in terms of the raised
question being left open on the stack and thereby keeping the syntactic form of
the question active in memory and accessible for ellipsis resolution. In contrast,
whichever question may be accommodated by the corresponding assertion would
be immediately resolved and render its content less accessible.
(3.67) Everyone was returning from vacation.
(i) “Did Greg see Maureen and Marjorie last night?" Helen asked.
(ii) “Greg saw Maureen and Marjorie last night" Helen remarked.
“I think they just got back in town."
“Yes, he did" Sophia replied.
In a more recent investigation, Grant et al. (2012) examined so-called non-actuality
implicatures triggered by modal verbs like want, should or need. By virtue of ex-
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pressing possibilities rather than actual states of affairs, expressions of this sort are
taken to implicate that this actual state of affairs does not hold. Interestingly, the
authors show that presence of an non-actuality implicature decreases the penalty
of a voice mismatching VP-ellipsis relative to a non-modal control in sentences like
(3.68) in terms of acceptability ratings and eye-tracking while reading (see also Ex-
periments 2 and 3 of Clifton & Frazier 2012). Grant et al. argue that this effect is
due to non-actuality implicatures indicating an implicit QUD - with respect to the
given example, Did the information get released? - which highlights the antecedent
of ellipsis and facilitates its repair. Non-actuality implicatures may thus be viewed
as cues for finding or accommodating an appropriate QUD, much like Focus in
Roberts’s (2012) original proposal.
(3.68) a. This information was released but Gorbachev didn’t.
b. This information needed to be released but Gorbachev didn’t.
Miller & Hemforth (2014) suggest that another kind of cue for accommodating a
QUD are polar nouns like participation, which are argued to behave like concealed
polar questions in certain contexts. For instance, the polar noun in (3.69) raises the
question Did Kate participate?.
(3.69) The outcome depends on Kate’s participation.
Initial support for this idea comes from a norming study, where participants had to
indicate the similarity between a manner paraphrase (how Kate participated) and a
polar paraphrase (whether Kate participated), and polar paraphrases for assumed
polar nouns received high similarity ratings. Additionally, an acceptability rat-
ing, manipulating whether the polar noun occurred in a context that made its
underlying question salient (3.70a) or not (3.70b) as well as VP-ellipsis versus
136
do it-anaphora8, showed that a salient question improved ratings of VP-ellipsis,
whereas ratings decreased for do it-anaphora.9
(3.70) a. It is impossible to predict Andrew’s participation in the chess tour-
nament.
He is sure to win if he does/does it.
b. Everyone was annoyed by Andrew’s participation in the chess tour-
nament.
His fans could not understand why he did/did it.
These results are in line with previous results insofar as they support the view that
QUDs affect the salience of linguistic representations in memory, which in turn
may make them more accessible as an antecedent for ellipsis or provide material
for repair. The contrast between VP-ellipsis and do it-anaphora can be interpreted
in terms of questions containing sufficient material to provide an appropriate an-
tecedents for ellipsis, whereas anaphora to entities does not match well with the
content of a question.
The findings furthermore adds to the list of means with which implicit QUDs
can be accommodated through linguistic cues beyond Focus in the absence of an
explicit question. As Grant et al. (2012) show, such cues may even be computed
quickly enough to guide incremental processing, as indicated by the eye-tracking
while reading results. There is thus extensive evidence that QUDs play an impor-
tant role in language comprehension. The next chapter turns to the contribution
this thesis makes to this issue by investigating the structural role of QUDs with
respect to presupposition triggers varying in terms of Focus-sensitivity.
8The experiment additionally compared nominal with verbal antecedents, which is omitted here
to keep the discussion comprehensive.
9For related unpublished results on the role of QUDs for VP-ellipsis, as well as sluicing, see





This chapter tests the first prediction made by the Focus Presupposition Antecedent
Hypothesis (FoPAH), which states that Focus-sensitive presupposition triggers re-
quire a linguistic antecedent in the discourse model to be satisfied, whereas non-
Focus presupposition triggers require their presupposition to be entailed by the
Common Ground. The prediction to be tested here is that Focus-sensitive triggers
should be sensitive to the salience of a linguistic antecedent, similar to for example
pronouns.
In contrast, triggers lacking Focus-sensitivity by virtue of being entailments
should be indifferent to the salience of the linguistic material that ultimately satis-
fies the respective presupposition, at least when it comes to assessing their gram-
maticality, even if salience may affect their processing in other ways. To illustrate
this characterization, imagine a syllogism with a set of premises. For a conclusion
to be valid in this case solely depends on whether it follows from the premises,
irrespective of the order in which they occur or the particular syntactic form.1 Put
differently, anything prior to the conclusion becomes part of a uniform body of
1Note that this analogy is primarily used as an illustration here, given that how people draw
inferences from a syllogism may be subject to other factors (see Johnson-Laird & Bara 1984). I will
come back to this issue in Chapter 6.
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knowledge with respect to which the validity of the conclusion is assessed.
The way salience will be operationalized here is in relation to the QUD-structure.
As shown in Subsection 3.5.2 of the previous chapter, there is ample evidence for
the relevance of QUDs for language comprehension. However, little work has been
done investigating its role as a discourse-structuring device that goes beyond sin-
gle question-answer pairs. Thus, a secondary contribution of the present chapter
in addition to testing the prediction of the FoPAH is to explore the idea that QUDs
constitute processing domains, where a processing domain is to be understood as
regulating which representations in memory remain actively accessible and which
decrease in activation. This concept has been explored in a variety of ways in psy-
cholinguistics, but less so in relation to work in formal linguistic theory, specifically
for discourse processing.
Finally, the present chapter also bears on a formal theoretical issue, namely the
relationship between QUDs and Focus. As discussed in Section 3.4 of the previous
chapter, there exists a tight connection between approaches to Focus and questions,
as instantiated by for instance Roberts (2012) and Beaver & Clark (2008).
One characterization emerging from this work is that the QUD determines the
set of alternatives generated by Focus by restricting it to all relevant alternatives. Al-
though this characterization is primarily intended to capture the requirement that
the set of Focus alternatives matches that of the QUD (e.g. “Who designed Chrono
Trigger?" and “[Akira Toriyama]F designed Chrono Trigger." both invoke the set “x
designed Chrono Trigger"), it can be extended to address the question of what the
invoked set actually consists of, in relation to the discussion in Section 3.5. That is,
much like “Crono survived every battle" cannot plausibly be meant to include battles
prior to Crono’s birth, “Only [Lucca]F lives in Guardia" can truthfully describe a sce-
nario where some people live somewhere else without requiring the population of
Guardia - a fictional kingdom - to be literally one.
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As such, the present work may therefore also yield insight into the role of the
QUD with respect to determining what material in the discourse becomes part
of the calculation of alternatives. Moreover, using the QUD to operationalize the
salience of a linguistic antecedent becomes less arbitrary given that the antecedents
we will be concerned with are those of Focus-sensitive presupposition triggers.
4.2 Previous research
The concept of processing domains is a rather general one in psycholinguistics
that has been applied to a variety of phenomena. The phenomenon I want to use
here as an illustration is that of verbatim memory, or memory for the surface form
of linguistic material. This issue has been studied extensively in psycholinguistic
research, going back to Sachs (1967), who found that it can take as little as 80 sylla-
bles for comprehenders to no longer be able to reliably recall whether an auditorily
presented sentence occurred in its active or its passive form (but see Sachs 1974 for
a lack of forgetting with written materials; see Fodor et al. 1974 for related dis-
cussion). However, it has been shown that there are many factors that can affect
verbatim memory and enhance recall (see Gurevich et al. 2010 for an overview).
One such factor that serves as an example of the role of processing domains for
memory comes from the work of Gernsbacher (1985) in the form of what she la-
bels processing shifts.
Gernsbacher’s (1985) idea is that memory consists of substructures, with in-
coming information that is congruent to an already existing structure getting inte-
grated, while non-congruent information will result in the construction of a new
substructure - a processing shift. While building a given substructure, information
within this substructure will be active and thus more accessible, whereas shifting
to a new substructure decreases activation of material from a previous one. On
this view, the rapid loss of surface form is accounted for by appealing to process-
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ing shifts happening in the time between a target is encountered and the time it is
recalled.
Evidence for Gernsbacher’s theory comes from two of her experiments, one
testing memory for spatial orientation of objects on a picture-sequence and the
other memory for word order of sentences in written stories. The narratives were
presented either as a coherent sequence or in a scrambled random order, and par-
ticipants were asked after each narrative to recall the relevant surface information.
For both modalities, recall in the coherent sequence was improved relative to the
random one. These results support Gernsbacher’s account of processing shifts in-
sofar as random sequences are more likely to involve processing shifts and thus
decrease activation of relevant material, whereas a coherent sequence minimizes
the number of required substructures.
While I do not want to claim that these results can be rephrased in terms of
QUDs - especially since it is unclear whether QUDs should be applied to non-
verbal stimuli - QUDs may nonetheless serve a similar purpose by providing the
processing domains in which material remains accessible or decreases in activation
once a QUD has been resolved and a new QUD gets raised. Put differently, material
within the same QUD-domain would remain co-active, whereas material outside
the QUD-domain would get shunted or decrease in activation. However, there may
also be gradience within co-active material based on other factors such as recency.
Moving from the concept of processing domains to a concrete example inves-
tigating some related issues, Kim (2015) addresses the question how also finds its
antecedent in discourses like (4.1).
(4.1) a. The roommates often go to the farmer’s market together.
b. Beth always buys bread.
c. Andy usually buys some celery.
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d. His doctor told him he needs to eat more vegetables.
e. Today Andy treated himself to a croissant.
f. He also bought some [NECTARINES]F.
The final sentence in (4.1f) presupposes that Andy bought something other than
nectarines, but what this other thing might be has to be inferred from the con-
text. Crucially, the preceding discourse context contains a number of objects that
could in principle serve as an antecedent (underlined).2 Moreover, the discourse
also varies in its structure and consequently the way in which the material is intro-
duced. Adopting a looser QUD-approach, Kim assumes that (4.1b) and (4.1c) share
a superquestion, whereas (4.1d) and (4.1e)-(4.1f) address subquestions to (4.1c).
The first two experiments simply asked participants what Andy bought to tar-
get the interpretation of also in discourses like (4.1) - and (4.2) further below - and
provided different interpretative options corresponding to possible combinations
of objects mentioned in the discourse. For discourses like (4.1), participants chose
the local option (nectarines+croissants) around 65% of the time, with an interme-
diate option including celery at around 30%. While these results do not warrant
strong conclusions about the source of the interpretation, given that celery simply
may have been included due to the generic phrasing of (4.1c), it at least shows that
also does not have to include all possible alternatives mentioned in the discourse.
For discourses like (4.2) below, results were more varied. While the linearly
local option (nectarines+croissants) was still chosen most frequently with around
30%, the second most frequent choice at around 18% was one including items that
were structurally local with respect to the QUD (nectarines+carrots+bread). Inter-
mediate interpretations comprised of either nectarines+carrots or nectarines+crois-
sants+carrots received slightly less responses with 10% and 5% respectively. While
2Note that only (4.1e) asserts that someone bought something, whereas (4.1b)-(4.1c) only suggest
it to various degrees.
142
the non-factive status of (4.2d) again compromises any stronger conclusions, the
results suggest that discourse-structural may indeed play a role for finding alter-
natives of also and that linear distance - albeit a strong cue - is only one cue among
many.3
(4.2) a. The roommates went to the farmer’ s market together.
b. Beth bought some bread.
c. Frank bought some carrots.
d. When his girlfriend is there, she always gets some croissants.
e. Andy also bought some [NECTARINES]F.
In addition to the interpretation data, Kim (2015) also provides evidence about the
incremental processing of discourses like (4.3) from a visual-world eye-tracking
study. The experimental manipulation included three different types of visual dis-
plays: one where the linearly-local interpretation (nectarines+carrots+apples) was
the only image consistent with the discourse, one where the structured-local inter-
pretation (nectarines+apples+carrots+bread) was the only viable image, and one
that contained images corresponding to both the linearly-local and the structured-
local interpretation (=competition display).
First comparing the linearly-local and the structured-local display, fixations
converged on the target image earlier in the structured-local display than the linearly-
local display, with this difference already being present in the time window be-
tween the onset of also and the onset of the target word. This preference for a
structured-local interpretations was also present in response times for each display
type, with linearly-local taking longer than structured-local, as well as proportion
3As an additional caveat, note that the target in (4.2) introduces Andy as discourse-new, which
would require accenting and potentially entail Focus-marking, such that the Focus-structure and
consequently what also associates with is more ambiguous than indicated by Kim. A likely interpre-
tation might be that Andy serves as a contrastive topic (Constant, 2014), which therefore confounds
the interpretation of the experimental results here.
143
of responses in the competition display, with the structured-local paraphrase being
chosen around 70% compared to around 20% for the linearly-local. Finally, in line
with these offline data, fixations on the structured-local target image in the com-
petition display were more likely than fixations on the linearly-local target image
in the window 500ms after the target word. Taken together, the results thus pro-
vide - albeit suggestive (see caveat in previous footnote) - evidence that discourse-
structural factors can override a preference for linear distance when it comes to
finding Focus-alternatives for also.
(4.3) a. The roommates went to the farmer’s market together.
b. Beth bought some bread.
c. Frank bought some carrots and some apples.
d. Andy also got some [NECTARINES]F.
Another study on the processing of additive particles, this time on too, comes from
Chen & Husband (2018), who investigated sentences as in (4.4). They manipulated
whether the antecedent of the conditional matched the presupposition of too, as
well as the distance between the antecedent and the trigger, using a speeded binary
forced-choice task.
(4.4) If the editor {resigned / plagiarized}, then
(everyone from the publishing house would be shocked to hear that)
the critics resigned too.
In the acceptance rates, adding distance led to a decrease in accuracy (i.e. less ’yes’
responses for the match condition and less ’no’ responses for the mismatch condi-
tion), in addition to an overall decrease in accuracy in mismatch conditions. More-
over, response times in the mismatch condition were longer than in the match con-
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dition, and there was a marginal interaction between the two factors such that
distance increased response times in the match condition but decreased response
times in the mismatch conditions.4 In the context of the present discussion, these
results can be taken as evidence that decreasing the activation of the antecedent
for a Focus-sensitive trigger by adding intervening material results in decreased
acceptability.
To sum up, there is evidence that the structure of a discourse has effects on
the availability of representations in memory. More specifically, the QUD has been
shown to play a role in the way also retrieves its Focus alternatives in the dis-
course beyond linear distance, which nonetheless affects the acceptability of a
Focus-sensitive trigger. The following experiments will elaborate on these find-
ings by investigating another Focus-sensitive trigger, namely even, in Experiments
1a/b, and directly comparing a Focus-sensitive with a non Focus-sensitive trigger,
namely also and again, in Experiment 2.
4.3 Experiment 1a
The goal of this experiment was to test whether the QUD-structure as a proxy for
salience affects the accessibility of a linguistic antecedent for a Focus-sensitive pre-
supposition trigger. The test case for this prediction was the scalar presupposition
of even. In a case such as (4.5), even conveys that Marle making first place was a rela-
tively unlikely or noteworthy outcome.5 This contribution is formalized as in (4.6),
where even presupposes of all non-entailed alternative propositions q that they be
weaker than the prejacent p on some contextually inferred scale, and leaves the
4Chen & Husband additionally report results from a drift diffusion model fitted against the data
from the speeded acceptability task, which I will not go into here as it would require additional
background that is tangential to the current discussion.
5While the relevant scale is most commonly framed in terms of likelihood, such a restriction
would lead to difficulty for the wide range of contexts even can occur in (see for instance Kay
1990; see also Greenberg 2016) such that I will not commit to a particular view here (see also the
following).
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bare prejacent as at-issue.6 Interestingly, relevant scalar alternatives to even seem
to be relatively easily inferable (e.g. made first place vs made second place etc.) and do
not need to be given explicitly, as shown by the felicity of (4.5) out-of-the-blue.
(4.5) Marle participated in the race and even [made first place]F.
(4.6) JEVENK = λC.λp.λw: ∀q[(q ∈ C(w) & p⇏ q) → q > p]. p(w)
Nonetheless, if even associates with a value that is relatively low on an inferable
scale, as in (4.7), where making it to the finish line should be ranked low on a scale
of possible outcomes, there is a notable decrease in acceptability. However, once
a lower ranked alternative is explicitly provided in the context, as the negation
of the prejacent in (4.8), the use of even becomes acceptable again. The following
two experiments will use this property of even to address the question about the
accessibility of linguistic antecedents in relation to the QUD-structure.
(4.7) ?Marle participated in the race and even [made it to the finish line]F.
(4.8) Ayla participated in the race but didn’t make it to the finish line.
Marle participated too and even [made it to the finish line]F.
4.3.1 Materials & Design
The experiment operationalized the relevant properties of even sketched above in
short question-answer dialogues as in (4.9a). The target sentence was modeled af-
ter cases like (4.7) and always contained even associating with a relatively com-
mon event and therefore expected to be less than maximally felicitous without any
contextual support, serving as a baseline. The first manipulation then involved
providing this contextual support by either having B1’s utterance indicate a value
6I will ignore the debate about even also having an additive presupposition here for simplicity’s
sake, but see (Greenberg, 2016; Francis, 2018, 2019). The same goes for the debate regarding the
quantificational force assumed for even.
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ranked above the one in the target sentence as in (4.9a), or ranked below it, as in
(4.9b) (relevant parts in italics), with the latter expected to ameliorate the relative
infelicity of the target sentence, as in (4.8). Secondly, to investigate how the QUD-
structure might affect the salience of the material in B1’s utterance, A1’s question
either differed only in the subject from A2’s question (4.9a)-(4.9b), or additionally
varied the object, as in (4.9c)-(4.9d).7
(4.9) Sample Item Experiment 1a
a. IMMEDIATE SUPER-QUD + High Value
A1: Did Anne participate in the BIKE RACE?
B1: She did but she didn’t win a medal.
A2: Did Beth participate in the bike race?
B2: Yes. She even made it to the finish line.
b. IMMEDIATE SUPER-QUD + Low Value
A1: Did Anne participate in the BIKE RACE?
B1: She did but she didn’t make it to the finish line.
A2: Did Beth participate in the bike race?
B2: Yes. She even made it to the finish line.
c. REMOTE SUPER-QUD + High Value
A1: Did Anne participate in the ROWING CONTEST?
B1: She did but she didn’t win a medal.
A2: Did Beth participate in the bike race?
B2: Yes. She even made it to the finish line.
7This manipulation is a simplification insofar as the target sentence containing even comments
on a new QUD, which might be construed as a sub-question to the yes-response. However, this
caveat applies to all conditions equally.
Additionally, given that the REMOTE conditions change both the subject and the object in A2, the
responses may be more susceptible to a Contrastive Topic interpretation, which may affect the
prosody of the target sentence, specifically on she. Given that the present study relied on silent
reading, resolving concerns regarding prosodic effects will have to be put aside here.
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d. REMOTE SUPER-QUD + Low Value
A1: Did Anne participate in the ROWING CONTEST?
B1: She did but she didn’t make it to the finish line.
A2: Did Beth participate in the bike race?
B2: Yes. She even made it to the finish line.
The resulting QUD-structures were thus such that A1 and A2 were immediate sub-
questions to the question “Who participated in the bike race?", or were apart by an
additional level, addressing the remote superquestion “Who participated in what?".
The assumed structures are shown in (4.10).
(4.10) a. IMMEDIATE SUPER-QUD Structure
Who participated in the bike race?
Did Anne participate? Did Beth participate?
b. REMOTE SUPER-QUD Structure
Who participated in what?
Who participated
in the rowing contest?
Did Anne participate?
Who participated
in the bike race?
Did Beth participate?
There were 16 items like (4.9) (the full set being listed in Appendix A.4.1), in addi-
tion to 12 fillers, all of which contained various presupposition triggers that were




The experiment was implemented via Ibexfarm and conducted online. Each trial
started with a dash on the screen, after which participants pressed the space bar
to move from sentence to sentence through the dialogue, with each sentence be-
ing displayed in full on its own in the center of the screen. After the final sen-
tence of each dialogue, participants were presented with a 7-point Likert scale and
asked “How easy was it for you to comprehend the final sentence of this dialogue?", with
the 1-end marked as “Very hard" and the 7-end as “Very easy". Participants were
instructed to think of comprehension difficulty in terms of “to what extent [the sen-
tence] requires additional background knowledge". After filling out a consent form, a de-
mographic form and receiving instructions, participants saw three practice items
of varying acceptability to familiarize them with the procedure and illustrate the
intended use of the scale. The experiment concluded with a post-experiment sur-
vey that asked participants to indicate on a four-point scale for two sentences “how
hard is it for you to imagine a context in which you would use or hear such a sentence". This
survey was meant to serve as a proxy for a participant’s accommodation abilities
but did not yield any insights and will thus not discussed further. The experiment
took about 10 minutes.
4.3.3 Subjects
A total of 48 participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk and each re-
ceived $1.50. 12 subjects were excluded because they either rated fillers containing
a presupposition failure on average better than the non-presuppositional control
(six people), or more than 25% of their sentence reading times were below 500ms
(ten people, four of which overlapped with the previous criterion), leaving 36 par-
ticipants for data analysis.
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4.3.4 Predictions
According to the Focus Presupposition Antecedent Hypothesis, Focus-sensitive
triggers require a linguistic antecedent rather than being entailed by the Common
Ground, which predicts that the salience of such a linguistic antecedent should af-
fect how a Focus-sensitive trigger is comprehended. On the assumption that the
QUD-structure affects the salience of linguistic material, the critical prediction is
that the presence of a Low Value should improve the acceptability of even relative
to the High Value more when it occurs in an IMMEDIATE SUPER-QUD than in the
REMOTE SUPER-QUD, resulting in an interaction.
4.3.5 Results
Prior to data analysis, we first excluded one trial for which the reading time for
one sentence was more than 50 standard deviations above the average in order to
avoid this trial skewing the overall standard deviations for following data exclu-
sion. Trials with a reading time below 400ms or three standard deviations above
the mean were furthermore excluded, which affected 5.1% of the total data.
Ratings. Mean ratings per condition are shown in Figure 4.1. The data were
analyzed using an ordinal mixed effects model with a maximal random effects
structure. There was a marginal effect of QUD with IMMEDIATE rated higher than
REMOTE (z=1.95, p<.1●), a significant effect of SCALE VALUE with low rated higher
than high (z=-4.57, p<.001***), and a significant interaction such that a low value
increased ratings more in the IMMEDIATE condition than in the REMOTE condition
(z=-2.01, p<.05*).8
Reading Times. In addition to the rating data, full sentence reading times of the
target sentence were analyzed, means per condition of which are shown in Figure
8The same analysis was also run on the data set that included all data points without the noted
exclusions (henceforth raw data) to ensure the exclusions did not affect the outcome. This analysis
yielded the same qualitative results.
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Figure 4.1: Mean ratings per condition Figure 4.2: Mean RTs of target sentenceper condition
4.2. Using linear mixed effects models with a maximal random effects structure -
following (Barr et al., 2013) - on the log-transformed reading times, we found a
significant effect of QUD with IMMEDIATE being read slower than REMOTE (t=3.16,
p<.01**) and a significant effect of SCALE VALUE with low being read faster than
high (t=2.78, p<.05*). The interaction was not significant (t=0.61, p=.55).9
4.3.6 Discussion
The prediction that the QUD-structure should affect the accessibility of Focus-
alternatives to even was borne out in the rating data: providing contextual sup-
port for an otherwise degraded use of even due to it associating with a low ranked
value by providing an even lower ranked value improved the acceptability of even
relative to a context with a higher ranked value. Crucially, however, this effect
was more pronounced when the low value occurred in response to a question that
shared an immediate super-question with the target sentence compared to the re-
sponse being an additional layer of structure away.
In contrast, reading times of the target sentence containing even showed a some-
what different pattern. While reading times decreased in the presence of a low
9The same qualitative pattern was also found for the raw data set.
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value providing contextual support in line with the rating results, reading times
in the IMMEDIATE SUPER-QUESTION conditions were longer than in the REMOTE
SUPER-QUESTION conditions, thus diverging from the IMMEDIATE condition mar-
ginally improving ratings. Moreover, there was no interaction between the two
factors in the reading times.
A possible explanation for the increased reading times for the IMMEDIATE con-
ditions could be that the closer QUD-structure requires additional integration pro-
cesses due to previous material being still active in memory, whereas there is less
material to integrate in the remote condition as the target sentence is more sep-
arated from the previous discourse. We will put aside further discussion of this
finding for now, as it is tangential to the current investigation.
Leaving the reading times pattern aside however, a more serious concern with
respect to the experiment as a whole would be an alternative explanation that at-
tributes the rating pattern to more general reasoning from world-knowledge rather
than the accessibility of alternatives for even. To illustrate this explanation, consider
the - condensed - sample item in (4.11) repeated from (4.9). On this view, the rea-
son the target sentence improved more when the questions match might have been
because learning that someone did not reach the finish line could be taken as evi-
dence that the bike race is particularly difficult and as such make it more likely for
other participants to do poorly. In turn, the content of the prejacent may become
more informative, which might also affect acceptability.
(4.11) A1: Did Anne participate in the { BIKE RACE / ROWING CONTEST }?
B1: She did but she didn’t { win a medal / make it to the finish line }.
A2: Did Beth participate in the bike race?
B2: Yes. She even made it to the finish line.
An initial reply to this alternative explanation would be that not all items allowed
152
such reasoning. For instance with respect to the item in (4.12), it seems less plau-
sible that knowing about Frank not getting a date would lead to adjusting our
preconceptions regarding the prom, but rather tells us something about Frank that
should be independent of how Jake is doing. However, in order to properly ad-
dress this concern, we conducted a follow-up experiment that tested the same dis-
courses without even.
(4.12) A1: Did Frank go to the { PROM / CHARITY GALA }?
B1: He did but he didn’t get { a limousine / a date }.
A2: Did Jake go to the prom?
B2: Yes. He even had a date.
4.4 Experiment 1b
In order to test whether the pattern of results found in Experiment 1a was indeed
due to the QUD-structure affecting the salience of linguistic material that serves
as antecedent for the computation of the scalar presupposition of even, rather than
general world-knowledge reasoning invited by the QUD manipulation, the cur-
rent experiment used the same stimuli and design but replaced even with a non-
presuppositional control.
4.4.1 Materials & Design
As Experiment 1a, this experiment used a 2x2 design manipulating SCALE VALUE
and QUD. The only thing different from Experiment 1a was the target sentence,
which instead of even either contained might’ve, as in (4.13), or apparently, as in
(4.14). These substitutions were chosen since they allowed for overall acceptable
discourses, and simply removing even might have resulted in decreased acceptabil-
ity due to pressure to insert the trigger when it is licensed, particularly in the Low
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Value condition. Additionally, we used two substitutions, split evenly across items,
in order to avoid any accidental issues specific to either one of them, for instance
apparently by virtue of being able to express mirativity being Focus-sensitive.10
There were again 16 critical items (full set listed again in Appendix A.4.1), in addi-
tion to 16 fillers, which were items for another experiment not reported here.
(4.13) Sample Item Experiment 1b, Type I
A1: Did Anne participate in the { BIKE RACE / ROWING CONTEST }?
B1: She did but she didn’t { win a medal / make it to the finish line }.
A2: Did Beth participate in the bike race?
B2: Yes, and she might’ve made it to the finish line.
(4.14) Sample Item Experiment 1b, Type II
A1: Did Frank go to the { PROM / CHARITY GALA }?
B1: He did but he didn’t get { a limousine / a date }.
A2: Did Jake go to the prom?
B2: Yes. Apparently he had a date.
4.4.2 Procedure
The procedure was the same as for Experiment 1a, aside from two minor changes:
(i) two additional items were included to gather pilot data following the main ex-
periment; and (ii) the post-experiment survey now asked participants for a justifi-
cation of their rating regarding a sample filler item and included an open response
question to screen for bots. The experiment took about 12 minutes.
10Thanks to Seth Cable (p.c.) for pointing out this possibility.
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4.4.3 Subjects
A total of 58 participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk and each
received $1.75. 10 subjects were excluded because either they failed the bot-check
(two people), or more than 25% of their sentence reading times were below 500ms
(nine people, two of which also failed the bot-check). An additional subject was
excluded to balance the lists, chosen based on the highest number of reading times
below the 500ms threshold, leaving 48 participants for data analysis.
4.4.4 Predictions
If the pattern found in Experiment 1a - ratings improved more when the low value
was in an immediate super-question to the target sentence compared to the low
value being an extra layer in the QUD-structure apart - was due to the linguistic
antecedent of even becoming more salient rather than general reasoning based on
world-knowledge, we expect to find no significant interaction of the kind reported
for Experiment 1a. Additionally, we thus predict the interaction to be modulated
by EXPERIMENT, which should result in a three-way interaction for an analysis on
the combined data set of Experiment 1a and 1b.
4.4.5 Results
As in Experiment 1a, the data was trimmed based on trials containing reading
times three standard deviations above the mean, which affected 7.2% of trials. (A
low-end cutoff was ignored due to filler items containing a number of compara-
tively shorter segments such that an absolute threshold was hard to justify.)
Ratings. Mean ratings per condition are shown in Figure 4.3. Data were first an-
alyzed using ordinal mixed effects models with a maximal random effects struc-
ture and QUD and SCALE VALUE plus their interaction as fixed effects. QUD was
highly significant with IMMEDIATE conditions rated higher than REMOTE condi-
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tions (z=3.48, p<.001***), whereas scale value did not show a significant effect
(z=-0.42, p<.67). Moreover, there was a marginally significant cross-over interac-
tion with the low condition rated higher than the high condition when the super-
question was IMMEDIATE, but low rated lower than high in the REMOTE QUD con-
dition (z=-1.69, p<.1●).11
In a next step, the data were split up by item type to investigate whether the pat-
tern was consistent for both might’ve and apparently. Mean ratings by condition for
each subset are shown in Figure 4.5. We first ran the same analysis as employed for
the total data on each subset. Whereas none of the factors reached significance for
the subset containing might’ve (QUD: z=1.64, p=.10; SCALE VALUE: z=-0.93, p=.35;
INTERACTION: z=-0.92, p=.36), the results for apparently matched those for the total
data (QUD: z=2.67, p<.01**; SCALE VALUE: z=-0.48, p=.63; INTERACTION: z=-1.78,
p<.1●). We also ran an analysis on the full data set with ITEM TYPE included as
a fixed effect (with a smaller model to allow convergence), showing the same pat-
tern as the total data and the apparently subset, without any of the interaction terms
involving ITEM TYPE reaching significance (all p>.5).
Finally, we combined the data from Experiments 1a and 1b and included EX-
PERIMENT as a fixed effect to test whether the critical interaction of QUD and SCALE
VALUE was modulated by the experiment. The three-way interaction did not reach
significance however (z=-0.47, p=.64), with the interaction between EXPERIMENT
and SCALE VALUE being the only term involving EXPERIMENT that was significant
(z=-2.62, p<.01**).
Reading Times. As for Experiment 1a, we used linear mixed effects models on
log-transformed reading times to analyze full sentence reading times of the tar-
get sentence. Mean reading times are shown in Figure 4.4. The only term that ap-
proached significance was SCALE VALUE with high conditions being read faster
11The same pattern was present found for the raw data.
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Figure 4.3: Mean ratings per condition. Figure 4.4: Mean RTs of target sentenceper condition.
Figure 4.5: Mean ratings per condition split by Item Type.
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Figure 4.6: Mean RTs per condition split by Item Type.
than low conditions (z=1.84, p<.1●), both QUD and the interaction were not signifi-
cant (z=-0.47, p=.65; and z=-0.08, p=.94 respectively).12
A look at the reading times for each item type, shown in Figure 4.6, revealed
that the effect of SCALE VALUE was driven by the subset containing might’ve, the
corresponding term being the only significant effect for models run on both subsets
(z=2.83, p<.01**). However, the corresponding interaction term in a model includ-
ing ITEM TYPE as fixed effect was only marginally significant, with SCALE VALUE
being the only other term reaching significance (z=2.03, p<.05*). (A model com-
paring Experiments 1a and 1b was left aside given that the critical interaction of
Experiment 1a was only present in the rating data.)
4.4.6 Discussion
The experimental results provided tentative support for the interpretation of Ex-
periment 1a as evidence for the Focus Presupposition Antecedent Hypothesis inso-
far as the pattern differed in the absence of even. Although we found a marginally
12For the raw data, SCALE VALUE was also non-significant.
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significant interaction in the ratings, its underlying pattern was different from that
of Experiment 1a. While the interaction in Experiment 1a was super-additive, that
is, increased ratings for low relative to high values but more so for IMMEDIATE than
REMOTE, Experiment 1b exhibited a cross-over interaction, with low (numerically)
rated higher than high for IMMEDIATE but high (numerically) rated higher than
low for REMOTE. As such, the contrast speaks in favor of attributing the pattern
of Experiment 1a to the availability of even’s antecedent being modulated by the
QUD-structure rather than general reasoning about the kinds of discourses under
consideration, given we did not find the same pattern when substituting even with
a modal auxiliary or epistemic adverb.
On the other hand, the analysis on the combined data set failed to provide
evidence in favor of the critical interaction being different between the two exper-
iments. Thus, the evidence from Experiment 1a has to remain tentative. While the
pattern matched the prediction of the Focus Presupposition Antecedent Hypothe-
sis, the evidence is not conclusive to completely rule out an alternative explanation.
The next experiment is meant to provide evidence for the FoPAH from a differ-
ent paradigm that avoids the concerns raised here. Additionally, since Experiments
1a/b were only concerned with one half of the hypothesis - namely Focus-sensitive
triggers requiring linguistic antecedents but without a contrast to triggers lacking
Focus-sensitivity - the manipulation will include a direct comparison between a
contrasting trigger-pair, namely also and again.
4.5 Experiment 2
This experiment used a different paradigm than the previous two experiments to
test the prediction of the Focus Presupposition Antecedent Hypothesis that Focus-
sensitive triggers should be subject to the salience of their antecedent in the dis-
course, whereas non Focus-sensitive triggers should not. Rather than manipulate
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the QUD-structure itself and the position of the antecedent relative to it, the ex-
periment investigated whether accessing an antecedent that is further away in the
QUD-structure but governed by the same super-question would lead to difficulty
for Focus-sensitive triggers but not those lacking Focus-sensitivity.
Anecdotal evidence for this prediction comes from cases like (4.15), where too
seems degraded due to the sentence intervening between its prejacent and the an-
tecedent sentence.
(4.15) Crono has very strong physical attacks.
Marle’s attacks are rather weak.
?[Ayla]F is very strong too.
Moreover, in order to generalize to both classes of triggers, one trigger from each
class was compared directly, namely also and again. This comparison is possible
due to the two triggers conveying almost equivalent meanings when also associates
with a temporal phrase, as in (4.16) (with the only difference being that again adds
a temporal precedence relation, whereas also does not).
(4.16) Lucca developed a new invention last week.
a. She also developed a new invention [this week]F.
b. She developed a new invention again this week.
4.5.1 Materials & Design
As for previous experiments, items were set up as short question-answer pairs to
make the QUD-structure explicit and fix the Focus. The response to the first ques-
tion B1st (henceforth antecedent sentence) always provided the content satisfying
the presupposition of the final target sentence Blast, which either contained also or
again. The second factor was whether there was a question-answer pair interven-
160
ing between the target sentence and the antecedent sentence, with (4.17a)-(4.17b)
as the baseline being compared to (4.17c)-(4.17d).13
(4.17) Sample Item Experiment 2
a. no intervener + also
A1st: Where did Amber stay when she was in LA?
B1st: She stayed at a motel.
Alast: Where did she stay when she was in Boston?
Blast: She also stayed at a motel in Boston.
b. no intervener + again
A1st: Where did Amber stay when she was in LA?
B1st: She stayed at a motel.
Alast: Where did she stay when she was in Boston?
Blast: She stayed at a motel again in Boston.
c. intervener + also
A1st: Where did Amber stay when she was in LA?
B1st: She stayed at a motel.
Aint: Where did she stay when she was in Chicago?
Bint: She crashed at a friend’s house.
Alast: Where did she stay when she was in Boston?
Blast: She also stayed at a motel in Boston.
d. intervener + again
A1st: Where did Amber stay when she was in LA?
B1st: She stayed at a motel.
13An obvious difference between also and again here lies in their syntactic position. Although
this difference should not matter given it is kept constant across the QUD-conditions, one way in
which it might have an indirect effect is through (implicit) prosody (see Beck 2006a on Focused
again). However, given that materials were presented in written form, addressing this issue will be
left for future research.
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Aint: Where did she stay when she was in Chicago?
Bint: She crashed at a friend’s house.
Alast: Where did she stay when she was in Boston?
Blast: She stayed at a motel again in Boston.
Notably, all questions only varied in one place, thus being dominated by the same
super-question, as shown in (4.18).
(4.18) Assumed QUD Structure for Sample Item
Where did Amber stay when she was where?
In LA? (In Chicago?) In Boston?
Additionally, based on the intuition that the intervening material might matter,
there was an informal and exploratory between-item manipulation based on how
much the intervening material contrasted with the antecedent sentence. Contrast
was assessed based on intuition rather than formally defined. For example, the in-
tervener in (4.19) implicitly negates that Derek visited anyone rather than contrast
with respect to who he visited, whereas the sample item in (4.17) merely contrasts
with respect to the manner of Amber’s lodging.
(4.19) Sample of Contrasting Item
A1st: What did Derek do on Thanksgiving?
B1st: He visited his parents in Idaho.
(Aint: What did he do for Christmas?
Bint: He stayed home because his flight got cancelled.)
Alast: What did he do for Easter?
Blast: He (also) visited his parents (again) for Easter.
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There were 16 critical items, evenly split with respect to contrast (full list accessible
in Appendix A.4.2), in addition to 12 filler items, which varied the presence or ab-
sence of other presuppositional expressions and served as catch trials, in addition
to some exploratory factors.
4.5.2 Procedure
The procedure was essentially the same as for Experiments 1a/b in that partici-
pants read each dialogue in a self-paced fashion one utterance at a time, followed
by a rating screen. However, there was no additional post-experiment survey or
debriefing screen included this time. The experiment took about 10 minutes.
4.5.3 Subjects
A total of 52 subjects was recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and compen-
sated with $1.50 each. 17 subjects were excluded because they either rated fillers
containing a presupposition failure on average better than the non-presuppositional
control (15 people), or more than 25% of their sentence reading times were below
500ms (two people), which left 35 participants for data analysis.
4.5.4 Predictions
The Focus Presupposition Antecedent Hypothesis predicted that adding interven-
ing material between the target sentence and the antecedent sentence should incur
processing difficulty for also, since the antecedent is no longer the most salient
proposition available within the super-question, but not for again. If again only
requires its presupposition to be entailed by the Common Ground, it should not
matter where the sentence satisfying the presupposition is located in the discourse.
We thus predict an interaction between INTERVENER and TRIGGER.
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Figure 4.7: Mean ratings per condition. Figure 4.8: Mean RTs of target sentenceper condition.
4.5.5 Results
As in previous experiments, data was trimmed such that trials with at least one
reading time three standard deviations above the mean were excluded (6.2% of
total trials).
Ratings. Mean ratings per condition are shown in Figure 4.7. An ordinal mixed
effects model indicated a significant effect of INTERVENER with the presence of
intervening material decreasing ratings (z=-3.04, p<.01**) and no effect of TRIGGER
(z=-1.54, p=.12). Moreover, there was a significant interaction such that intervening
material led to a decrease for also but not again (z=-2.47, p<.05*).14
An additional model included CONTRAST as a between-item factor to assess
whether the intuition that the extent to which the intervener contrasts with the
antecedent sentence, discussed with respect to (4.19), is supported by the data. The
mean ratings split by this factor are shown in Figure 4.9. There was a numerical
trend in the expected direction such that the decrease for also was larger for items
that had a strong contrast, but the crucial three-way interaction was not significant
(z=-0.41, p=.68). The only significant effects were INTERVENER (z=-2.97, p<.01**)
and the interaction between INTERVENER and TRIGGER (z=-2.98, p<.01**), as in the
14The same qualitative pattern was found for the raw data.
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Figure 4.9: Mean ratings per condition split by Item Type.
original model. Given this null result, CONTRAST will not be discussed further.
Reading Times. Full sentence reading times of the target utterance were log-
transformed and analyzed using linear mixed effects models. Means per condition
are given in Figure 4.8. The results matched those of the ratings: there was a signif-
icant effect of INTERVENER with longer reading times when intervening material
was present (t=2.9, p<.01**), no effect of TRIGGER (t=0.05, p=.96), and a significant
interaction such that reading times increased with intervening material for also but
not again (t=2.66, p<.05*).15
4.5.6 Discussion
The results of the experiment supported the Focus Presupposition Antecedent
Hypothesis both in ratings and full sentence reading times. For also, when there
was intervening material between the target sentence and the antecedent sentence,
there was a decrease in ratings as well as an increase in reading times indicative
of a processing cost. On the view advocated here, this processing cost arises due
15The same qualitative pattern was again found for the raw data.
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to also trying to access a linguistic antecedent in the discourse that satisfies its pre-
supposition, but the antecedent being less salient in the INTERVENER condition.
Notably, the notion of salience involved here depends on the QUD-structure.
The reason intervening material causes difficulty is because it is part of the same
super-question as the antecedent sentence and the target sentence. However, the
pattern found here could also be accounted for by a simple recency effect, in that
also requires its antecedent to be in the immediately preceding sentence.
While the experimental data here does not distinguish between these possibili-
ties, the results reported in Kim (2015) discussed earlier point toward an important
role of the QUD-structure for determining alternatives to also. Moreover, there is
anecdotal evidence against a strict recency restriction from the corpus example in
(4.20), where the antecedent of also is located several sentences prior to its prejacent
(both underlined).
(4.20) You know, before I came here, I had been in a cage. It was a nice cage;
I can’t complain. Being in Russia in the 1970s and 1980s was great. But
of course I wanted to breathe the air of the free world. Everything I
recorded up to Radio Silence was basically a bridge between Russia and
the West. When I got to the West, I felt the need to build a bridge back. A
lot of people are arguing right now that contemporary Russia is also a
cage, comparing it to the Soviet times. (COCA)
A potential way to follow-up on this issue properly would be to manipulate where
intervening material occurred relative to the QUD-structure, as in (4.21). While the
intervener in (4.21a) occurs within the same super-question as before, the interven-
ing question-answer pair in (4.21b) is one level removed from the target in that the
super-question is no longer “Where did Amber stay when she was where?" but “Who
stayed where when they were where?". This change should render the intervener less
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salient and decrease the observed penalty. I will have to leave an investigation of
this sort for future research however.
(4.21) a. local intervener
A1st: Where did Amber stay when she was in LA?
B1st: She stayed at a motel.
Aint: Where did she stay when she was in Chicago?
Bint: She crashed at a friend’s house.
Alast: Where did she stay when she was in Boston?
Blast: She also stayed at a motel in Boston.
b. non-local intervener
A1st: Where did Amber stay when she was in LA?
B1st: She stayed at a motel.
Aint: Where did Beth stay when she was in LA?
Bint: She crashed at a friend’s house.
Alast: Where did Amber stay when she was in Boston?
Blast: She also stayed at a motel in Boston.
Assuming that the QUD does in fact matter for also specifically and other Focus-
sensitive triggers more generally, a deeper question is where this relation should
come from. On the view adopted here, Focus invokes a set of propositions such
that what also is looking for is a matching proposition within this set. In the cases
considered here where all utterances are governed by a larger super-question, the
intervening material will consequently be a subset of that super-question together
with the antecedent sentence and the target sentence, thus creating interference.
In contrast, if the intervening material is not part of the same super-question, as
in (4.21b), it is not part of the relevant set of alternatives and does not lead to (as
much) interference. This view might serve as a starting point for fleshing out a
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retrieval mechanism underlying the processing of Focus-sensitive expressions in
discourse that is able to account for more fine-grained properties of the sentences
the discourse is comprised of.
Turning to again, there was no effect of intervening material on ratings or read-
ing times. The lack of a difference is predicted by the hypothesis that again requires
its presupposition to be entailed by the Common Ground. The results consequently
also provide evidence for a particular notion of the Common Ground, namely one
where it lacks the internal structure to keep track of the order of propositions with
which it gets updated.
However, this view should not be taken to claim that the extent to which mate-
rial within the Common Ground becomes uniform is infinite such that again would
behave the same when checked against a two-sentence discourse or at the end of
a two-hundred page novel. The claim is merely that checking whether the pre-
supposition of again is satisfied is analogous to assessing the truth of an utterance
without a presupposition trigger.
One further prediction that this view makes is that the presupposition of again
and other triggers like it should show the same memory retrieval pattern like notic-
ing a contradiction. That is, when a sentence without any presupposition triggers
is asserted as a proposal to update the Common Ground with its propositional con-
tent, its truth-value has to be evaluated relative to the Common Ground at the time
of utterance. This process is tantamount to checking whether a given presupposi-
tion is true in the Common Ground. To illustrate this with an example, consider
the discourse in (4.22):
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(4.22) Context: Crono never spoke to Ayla during the whole time they knew each
other.
(Intervening material: They had met each other when Crono was thrown into
a time gate that brought him back to a pre-historic age. Together, they defeated
the Reptites, and eventually Lavos, which was about to destroy the world.)
a. Crono spoke to Ayla yesterday.
b. Crono didn’t speak to Ayla again yesterday.
The statement in (4.22a) contradicts what was stated previously in the context sen-
tence so in order to recognize that the statement constitutes a contradiction it be-
comes necessary to access the content of the Common Ground (see O’Brien & Al-
brecht 1992; Albrecht & O’Brien 1993 and subsequent work for similar designs;
more on these studies in Chapter 6). This situation is thus equivalent to what is
necessary for evaluating the (falsity of the) presupposition in (4.22b). The effect
intervening material might have on this process is therefore predicted to be the
same. However, this prediction should not be taken to mean that processing the
presupposition in (4.22b) is the same as the assertion in (4.22a), but that the way
they relate to the context and access the Common Ground should be.
Lastly, it is worth emphasizing that the observed contrast between also and
again is unique with respect to the previous classifications of presupposition trig-
gers reviewed in Section 2.4. Also(/too) and again are grouped together according
to Abusch’s (2010) soft-hard distinction, Zehr & Schwarz’s (2018b) experimental
results on the entailing vs non-entailing distinction, Cummins et al.’s (2013) re-
sults on backgrounding of lexical vs resolution triggers, Kripke’s (2009) judgments
on global accommodation difficulty and Beck’s (2007) notion of anaphoricity, and
Bade’s (2016) obligatoriness mechanism. The present results thus constitute a novel
finding by virtue of highlighting a property with respect to also and again differ. A
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broader discussion of implications for the typology of presupposition triggers, as
well as issues regarding the underlying processing mechanism and the nature of
the Common Ground discussed above, will be provided in Chapter 6.
4.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented three offline dialogue rating experiments to test the pre-
diction of the Focus Presupposition Antecedent Hypothesis (FoPAH) that Focus-
sensitive triggers should be subject to the salience of their antecedent, whereas trig-
gers lacking Focus-sensitivity should be indifferent to the salience of the content
satisfying their presupposition by virtue of being Common Ground entailments.
Salience was operationalized through the QUD.
The first two experiments tested whether the position of an antecedent licens-
ing an otherwise degraded use of even in the QUD-structure would affect its ac-
cessibility. This prediction was borne out in Experiment 1a insofar as ratings im-
proved more when the utterance containing the intended antecedent and the ut-
terance containing even were responses to questions forming an immediate super-
question than when the questions were an additional layer apart.
In order to assess an alternative explanation for the results in terms of general
world-knowledge reasoning, Experiment 1b used the same design and items but
replaced even with either the modal auxiliary might’ve or the epistemic adverb ap-
parently. While this change yielded a slightly different pattern of results, there was
no evidence that the critical interaction differed across experiments. The evidence
from Experiment 1a in favor of the FoPAH therefore has to be considered tentative
insofar as the design was not able to fully exclude an alternative explanation.
Experiment 2 used a different paradigm, comparing also and again with respect
to their sensitivity to material intervening between the utterance satisfying their
presupposition and the prejacent. Crucially, the intervening material was part of
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the same super-question as the utterance satisfying the presupposition and the pre-
jacent. While the intervener led to a decrease in ratings and longer reading times
for also, there was no such effect for again. This result provides evidence for the hy-
pothesized contrast between presupposition triggers with respect to their Focus-
sensitivity and the resulting difference in their representations.
To conclude, the experimental results presented in this chapter provided sup-
port for the Focus Presupposition Antecedent Hypothesis and contributed novel
evidence for a distinction between presupposition triggers in terms of Focus-sensitivity.
However, the evidence thus far has been restricted to a small set of triggers, and
offline dialogue rating studies (including full sentence reading times). One goal
of the next chapter will therefore be to find evidence that warrants a generaliza-
tion to a broader set of triggers, in addition to investigating the online processing





This chapter tests the second prediction of the Focus Presupposition Antecedent
Hypothesis (FoPAH), repeated in (5.1), which draws a distinction between pre-
supposition triggers based on their (lack of) Focus-sensitivity in terms of the rep-
resentations they are grounded in, either requiring a linguistic antecedent in the
discourse model or being entailed by the Common Ground. The prediction is con-
cerned with the extent to which the two classes of presupposition triggers can be
used felicitously when their presupposition is not satisfied in the context, that is,
can be globally accommodated.
(5.1) Focus Presupposition Antecedent Hypothesis (FoPAH)
Focus-sensitive presupposition triggers require a linguistic antecedent in
the discourse model, whereas triggers lacking Focus-sensitivity merely re-
quire their presupposition to be entailed by the Common Ground.
As discussed in Section 2.2, the notion of accommodation is an essential compo-
nent of a theory of speaker presuppositions, according to (Stalnaker, 1998, 2002,
2014). If a speaker presupposes something that is not part of the Common Ground
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prior to her utterance, the hearer can decide to accept the presupposition, assuming
it is fully specified and uncontroversial, thereby avoiding a violation that would
result in an infelicitous discourse. That is, accommodation is governed by cooper-
ative principles of language use in line with those proposed by Grice (1989). This
process has been coined Presupposition Accommodation1 by Lewis (1979), see (5.2).
(5.2) Rule for Accommodation of Presupposition
If at time t something is said that requires presupposition P to be accept-
able, and if P is not presupposed right before t, then – ceteris paribus and
within certain limits – presupposition P comes into existence at t.
Part of the theoretical significance of accommodation is that whether the contex-
tual requirements that a presupposition is supposed to embody are met or not
does not have a strict one-to-one mapping to whether its use is felicitous. Despite
this significance, the factors governing the noted variability regarding when a pre-
supposition can be accommodated or not are not well understood. Aside from fac-
tors like controversiality/plausibility (Beaver & Zeevat, 2007), it has been observed
that the kind of presupposition trigger plays a crucial part for the extent to which
accommodation is available (Kripke, 2009), as discussed in Section 2.4. However,
this trigger variation has not been systematically investigated. The FoPAH predicts
that at least some differences between triggers can be accounted for by appealing
to Focus-sensitivity, by virtue of the difference in underlying representations this
property is hypothesized to correspond to.
Triggers lacking Focus-sensitivity are taken to be Common Ground entailments
1The notion of accommodation in a semi-technical use has been applied to a variety of phenom-
ena in linguistics and psycholinguistics such as perspective or - as seen in Section 3.4 - QUDs, the
former of which is also discussed by Lewis. While there are clear commonalities among these dif-
ferent uses of the term, there may also be differences that make the risk of an equivocation likely. To
avoid this issue, I will implicitly restrict the notion of accommodation used here to presuppositions,
describing situations where a presupposition is not explicitly satisfied in the context.
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and thus predicted to behave according to Stalnaker’s theory. Crucially, on his
view, accommodation is not a repair process in a strict sense but part of the way
people communicate. Consequently, accommodating a trigger that is not Focus-
sensitive is predicted to be easy.
In contrast, if a trigger is Focus-sensitive, the presupposition is hypothesized to
require a linguistic antecedent in the discourse model, which is assumed to not be
subject to Gricean principles. Rather, if parts of the discourse model are missing,
they need to be supplemented, that is, the model needs to be repaired, incurring a
cost. This process could thus be described more aptly as supplementation rather than
accommodation in the sense used so far. The next section discusses formal theo-
retical and experimental research on accommodation, some of which was already
mentioned in Sections 2.4 and 2.5, with a specific emphasis on evidence regarding
differences among triggers.
5.2 Previous research
Kripke (2009) was among the first to note that the extent to which presupposi-
tion triggers can be used felicitously in contexts in which their presupposition is
not satisfied (i.e. can be accommodated) varies with the type of trigger under con-
sideration. Triggers like too (5.3a), either (5.3b), again (5.3c) and it-clefts (5.3d) are
judged to be infelicitous when their presupposition is not present in what Kripke
calls the “active context", in contrast to stop (5.3e).
(5.3) a. #SAM is having dinner in New York tonight, too. (KRIPKE 2009, (14))
b. #SAM is not having dinner in New York tonight, either. (IBID., (34))
c. #Priscilla is eating supper, again. (IBID., (15))
d. #It was JOHN who solved the projection problem. (IBID., (25))
e. Jill has stopped smoking. (IBID., (24))
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Kripke attributes this difference to triggers of the former class including an anaphoric
element, using pronouns as an analogue (see Heim 1992; van der Sandt & Geurts
2001 for an analysis of too in this vein). Notably, with the exception of again, all
hard-to-accommodate triggers are Focus-sensitive (too, either) or involve Focus in
some other way (it-clefts), in line with the prediction of our hypothesis.
A more elaborate - and slightly diverging - list of triggers is discussed in Beaver
& Zeevat (2007). Here, the class of hard-to-accommodate triggers consists of demon-
stratives (that), pronouns (she, it), short definite descriptions, names, another, too,
indeed, politeness markers such as the French tu, and intonational Focus, in con-
trast to long definite descriptions (the author of Waverley), long names (Peter Flem-
ming), factives (realize, regret), implicatives (manage), verbs of judging (accuse, praise
for), aspectual verbs (stop, continue), sortal restrictions (bachelorette), clefts (!), and
pseudo-clefts.
Beaver & Zeevat furthermore discuss - and discard - two potential explana-
tions for these differences. The first proposes that triggers that are not sufficiently
descriptively rich are hard to accommodate.2 This view is argued to fall short in
cases like too, which - taking (5.3a) as an example - can presuppose an elaborate and
specific scenario such as having dinner in New York. The second proposal is that
triggers are hard to accommodate if they have a simple lexical alternative without
a presupposition. The counterexample Beaver & Zeevat note here is that implica-
tives such as manage are easily accommodated but possess non-presuppositional
alternatives. As an alternative proposal, Beaver & Zeevat suggest that accommo-
dation difficulty is determined via the extent to which a trigger appeals to content
in the discourse record such as the entities that are salient to the discourse partici-
2Although this idea at first glance seems similar to Aravind’s (2018) notion of identifiability, the
two are in fact quite distinct. On my interpretation of Aravind (2018), a trigger like too may be hard
to accommodate because in the absence of an alternative in the discourse, its presupposition cannot
be identified. However, it is unclear to me how this might differ from the notion of anaphoricity
also mentioned there such that I will not discuss it any further.
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pants, which is in fact close to the idea investigated here (see also von Fintel 2000,
2008).
Independently of the noted trigger differences, accommodation is known to be
subject to the extent to which what is presupposed is controversial or noteworthy.
Part of what renders the presupposition that the speaker owns a cat in Stalnaker’s
(1998) example in (5.4a) easy to accommodate is that owning a cat is not anything
uncommon. In contrast, uttering (5.4b) instead - without the presupposition that
the speaker owns a sloth being part of the Common Ground - is much more likely
to cause confusion.
(5.4) a. I can’t come to the meeting - I have to pick up my cat at the veterinar-
ian.
Latex-hack (STALNAKER 1998, (1))
b. I can’t come to the meeting - I have to pick up my sloth at the veteri-
narian.
In addition to formal theoretical work, there have been a few offline experiments
providing qualitative evidence regarding differences among triggers with respect
to accommodation difficulty. One acceptability judgment study - combined with a
self-paced reading study which will be discussed in more detail below - comparing
a broad range of triggers in German is reported in Tiemann et al. (2011) (see also
Tiemann 2014, Ch. 3). The set of triggers was comprised of too, again, stop, know
and possessives, which were tested in three kinds of contexts. A positive context
in which the presupposition is satisfied (5.5a), one in which the presupposition is
negated (5.5b), and one that is neutral with respect to the presupposition (5.5c).
Tiemann reports positive contexts being rated higher than neutral contexts, which
are in turn rated higher than negative contexts, for all trigger types with the ex-
ception of possessives (which is attributed to items mixing existence violations -
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which behave like other triggers - with uniqueness violations - which do not).
(5.5) Tiemann (2014), Exp 2, Sample Item for again
a. Positive: Susanne had bought red gloves before.
b. Negative: Susanne had never bought red gloves until now.
c. Neutral: Inge had never bought red gloves until now.
TARGET: Today, Susanne bought red gloves again and put them on
right away.
Although differences between triggers were not statistically evaluated, numerical
trends showed that the decrease from positive to neutral contexts - which we might
take as the relevant contrast to measure accommodation difficulty - was largest for
too, in line with our prediction. However, taken at face value, the results would
also suggest that all triggers show a reasonable amount of accommodation diffi-
culty, contrary to what has been argued for instance for know. One reason for not
taking the results at face value in this regard is a concern about the acceptabil-
ity of the neutral conditions in the absence of a presupposition trigger. Consider
the neutral condition in the example (5.5c) above, which contains an unmotivated
topic shift from Inge to Susanne independently of the presupposition trigger. The
extent to which the neutral condition provides the necessary baseline to compare
the positive case against is therefore questionable.
Another set of rating studies comes from Grubic & Wierzba (2019), who inves-
tigated possessives and additives. Their main objective was to test whether the
claimed accommodation difficulty of additives was due to its presupposition re-
quiring a salient individual or a salient proposition. Grubic & Wierzba used three
types of contexts: a positive context, which provided a salient proposition (thus en-
tailing a salient individual) as well as implied the possession relation presupposed
by the possessive (5.6a), a neutral context, which did not satisfy any possible pre-
177
supposition (5.6b), and a mixed context, which provided an individual but not a
proposition, nor was the possession relation made explicit (5.6c). Each type of con-
text was then paired with one target sentence for each trigger.
(5.6) a. Positive: Hannes met his new classmate Isa. He wears glasses, and is
sometimes teased because of them. She seemed very likeable...
b. Neutral: Yesterday, there was a new student in class. She seemed very
likeable...
c. Mixed: Hannes met his new classmate Isa. She seemed very likeable...
POSSESSIVE TARGET: ...because she complimented his glasses.
ADDITIVE TARGET: ...because she wears glasses, too.
Regarding possessives, accommodating the possession relation led to no discernible
decrease, whereas accommodating a referent did, in line with reported judgments.
In contrast, in their first experiment, additives did not show any accommodation
difficulty in either the mixed or the neutral condition, despite the assumed knowl-
edge that additives are hard to accommodate (see also Gotzner 2019 for similar
results).
To address this unexpected finding, a second experiment manipulated whether
the presupposition was essential for the coherence of the discourse or not as an
additional between-item factor.3 An example of each discourse-type in the crucial
mixed condition is shown in (5.7). To illustrate the facilitating condition for the
additive continuation in (5.7a), the intended presupposition - someone other than
Alfred (namely his new colleague) has ambitions to become the boss - explains why Alfred
and the new colleague would be rivals now. In contrast, the presupposition in
the non-facilitating discourse in (5.7b) does not contribute to the coherence of the
3The full design - in addition to a non-facilitating condition and a facilitating coherence condi-
tion - also included a condition in which the individual satisfying the presupposition in the dis-
course constituted the perspective center, which will be put aside here for reasons of space.
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discourse in any crucial way.
(5.7) a. Facilitating
Mixed: Alfred liked his new colleague when she started. Now they are
rivals ...
POSSESSIVE TARGET: ...because he wants to thwart her ambitions to
become the boss.”
ADDITIVE TARGET: ...because he has ambitions to become the boss,
too.
b. Non-facilitating
Mixed: Paula is going on a winter excursion with her son today. She is
taking care to stay on snow-covered paths, ...
POSSESSIVE TARGET: ...so that his sled does not get scratched.
ADDITIVE TARGET: ...because she has a sled, too.
The results showed that non-facilitating discourses yielded the pattern expected
in light of the literature, with additives being significantly decreased for both the
mixed and the neutral condition relative to the positive condition. Interestingly, in
contexts where accommodating the presupposition contributed to the coherence
of the discourse, ratings were overall improved, but particularly for the mixed
condition such that it was no longer distinguishable from the positive condition.
These results thus show that the relation of the presupposition to the discourse can
play an important role with respect to accommodation. Grubic & Wierzba attribute
this finding to the presupposition being easier identifiable when relevant for the
coherence of the discourse.4
What about processing evidence on the characterization of accommodation as
4An alternative idea might be that the presupposition became relevant to the QUD of the dis-
courses, rendering it at-issue, which might facilitate accommodation.
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a costly process? An early study investigating the processing of presuppositions
in different contexts comes from Haviland & Clark (1974), who measured full sen-
tence reading times of sentences containing a presupposition trigger following a
context sentence, as in (5.8).
(5.8) Haviland & Clark (1974), Exp 1 & 2, Sample Item
a. Direct Antecedent: Ed was given an alligator for his birthday.
b. Indirect Antecedent, Exp 1: Ed was given lots of things for his birthday.
c. Indirect Antecedent, Exp 2: Ed wanted an alligator for his birthday.
TARGET: The alligator was his favorite present.
Their Experiments 1 and 2 focused on the existence presupposition of singular def-
inite NPs. For both experiments, one condition contained a context sentence that
satisfied the presupposition by introducing the required referent via an indefinite
NP, as in (5.8a). The other condition either provided a supportive context without
explicitly introducing a referent (5.8b), or embedded the indefinite under a modal
verb (5.8c). In both experiments, reading times in the Indirect Antecedent condi-
tion was longer than in the Direct Antecedent condition.
In their Experiment 3, Haviland & Clark extended their investigation to the
presuppositions of still, either, again and too. In addition to the Direct Antecedent
condition and an Indirect Antecedent condition similar to (5.8b), a third condition
masked the relevant presupposition with negation to add an extra inferential step.
The different contexts are illustrated for again in (5.9). Both the Indirect Antecedent
and the Negative Antecedent condition took longer than the Direct Antecedent
condition for all triggers, without a significant difference between the former two
(with the exception of either, which showed longer reading times for the Indirect
Antecedent condition).
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(5.9) Haviland & Clark (1974), Exp 3, Sample Item
a. Direct Antecedent: Last Christmas Eugene became absolutely smashed.
b. Indirect Antecedent: Last Christmas Eugene went to a lot of parties
c. Indirect Antecedent: Last Christmas Eugene couldn’t stay sober.
TARGET: This Christmas he got very drunk again.
In order to interpret the results by Haviland & Clark (1974) with respect to accom-
modation difficulty, it is worth highlighting differences between the context ma-
nipulation here and for instance that by Tiemann (2014) discussed earlier. While
both the Positive condition in (5.5a) and the Direct Antecedent condition in (5.8a)-
(5.9a) are comparable by virtue of explicitly satisfying the relevant presupposition,
their respective critical conditions differed in whether - as the condition labels sug-
gest - the context was neutral and did not bear on whether the presupposition
might be satisfied (5.5c), or whether it provided some indirect support without
making the presupposition explicit, see (5.8b)-(5.8c) and (5.9b)-(5.9c) respectively.
Although both Neutral contexts and Indirect Antecedent contexts can be viewed
as involving accommodation insofar as the presupposition is not explicitly satis-
fied, it is worthwhile distinguishing between instances of accommodation proper
as those exemplified by Tiemann’s Neutral context, and so-called bridging infer-
ences (Clark 1977, see Irmer 2009 for a recent discussion) where the context pro-
vides some kind of indirect support for the presupposition as a sub-class of accom-
modation.5
Drawing this distinction is motivated by the fact that the underlying mecha-
nisms for accommodation proper and for bridging may in fact be quite different
given the distinction between presupposition triggers in terms of their underlying
5Bridging inferences have been studied particularly in the context of definite descriptions, as in
Haviland & Clark’s first two experiments (see also Burkhardt 2006 for evidence from EEGs), which
are less central to this thesis such that I will not go into too much detail here.
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representations proposed here. That is, if accommodation proper is difficult for
Focus-sensitive triggers because it requires supplementing a missing antecedent
in the discourse model, material in the discourse model that may help with con-
structing such an antecedent may benefit Focus-sensitive triggers more than trig-
gers lacking Focus-sensitivity, which already rely on cooperative principles rather
than the discourse model. Put differently, “neutral" contexts for bridging are not
entirely neutral in that the information that is available in the discourse offers aux-
iliary albeit incomplete information rather than the discourse model being empty.
Haviland & Clark’s results should thus be viewed as providing evidence for a pro-
cessing cost of bridging inferences rather than accommodation proper, with the
current discussion being primarily concerned with the latter.
One of the first studies on the processing of accommodation proper manipulat-
ing within-sentence material rather than the context comes from Schwarz (2007).
In his Experiment 1, participants read two types of stimuli with relative clauses in
German that were ambiguous due to case marking. For example, the sentence in
(5.10) can be interpreted as the woman seeing the girl or the girl seeing the woman.
However, it is only the latter interpretation that would satisfy the presupposition
of auch (‘also’) - which was compared to a non-presuppositional alternative, here
vorher (‘before’) - in this case, but German has been shown to have a strong parsing
preference against this object relative clause interpretation. An additional manip-
ulation included items where it was the main clause that was ambiguous rather



























‘The woman that (saw the girl/the girl saw) had {also/before} been seen
by the man.’
The results indicated a higher proportion of object relative clause interpretations
when auch was present compared to the non-presuppositional control. This find-
ing suggests that participants rather violate their parsing preferences than not
accommodate a presupposition, or, viewed differently, that the pressure to ac-
commodate was able to override the parsing preference. Moreover, this effect of
auch was stronger when the ambiguity was triggered by case marking in the rela-
tive clause than when it was triggered in the matrix clause, suggesting that prag-
matic/semantic and syntactic factors were in fact interacting with each other rather
than functioning separately.
Experiments 2 and 3 tested the online effects of presupposition satisfaction in
a chunked self-paced reading paradigm in German and English. For ease of expo-
sition, I focus on the English experiment here. Participants again read sentences
with relative clauses that were either subject or object relative clauses, as in (5.11),
only one of which would satisfy the presupposition of auch following the relative
clause, again with a non-presuppositional control.
(5.11) Schwarz (2007), Exp 3, Sample Item
The congressman / who { wrote to John / John wrote to } / had { also /
just } written to the mayor/ to schedule a meeting/ for the fundraiser.
Reading times were significantly slower in the region containing the trigger when
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the presupposition was not satisfied compared to when it was, which was not the
case for the control items, both for English and for German. Thus, Schwarz’ results
suggest that presuppositions are evaluated online, impacting reading times when
a presupposition is not satisfied. However, the tested regions were quite large such
that there was no way to tell at what point the unsatisfied presupposition had its
impact.
Tiemann et al. (2015) (see also Tiemann 2014, Ch. 2) extends these findings to
another trigger, namely the iterative particle wieder (‘again’) in German, in a word-
by-word self-paced reading, which allows more fine-grained resolution of the un-
folding of interpretation over time, in combination with a simultaneous accept-
ability rating task. She compared the effect of wieder in a context that satisfied its
presupposition with a neutral context that neither satisfies nor falsifies it, as en-
countered earlier. In the sample item shown in (5.12)6 this contrast was achieved
by varying the subject of the target sentence.
(5.12) Tiemann (2014), Exp 1, Sample Item
Context: Last week, Linda bought Judith a pink lamp for a room.
TARGET: Two days ago, { Linda / Judith } received a pink lamp again,
when she was out with a friend.
Neutral contexts were correlated with significantly lower ratings, as well as slower
reading times on the critical word which indicated the point when the presupposi-
tion associated with the trigger was fully specified (i.e. the end of the clause). These
results suggest that online effects of presuppositions are not restricted to additive
particles, and also that they arise as soon as the presupposition can be identified.
For more self-paced reading data, we can now come back to the Tiemann et al.
(2011) study, the rating results of which were reviewed above (see also (Tiemann,
6In the original German, again preceded the object.
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2014, Ch. 3) for a more elaborate discussion). As a reminder, this experiment tested
too, again, stop, know and possessives in German, comparing each trigger across a
positive and a neutral context - as in Tiemann et al.’s (2015) study right above - as
well as a negative context in which the presupposition was explicitly negated (see
(5.5) above for a sample item).
Negative contexts turned out to be read fastest for almost all triggers, which
Tiemann attributes to the explicitness of the status of the presupposition allowing
the parser to sidestep additional processing. For know and the possessive, there
was an early but not lasting increase in reading times in the neutral contexts com-
pared to the positive contexts. Similar effects were found for again on the trigger
and too on the critical word. For too, there were furthermore slower reading times
on the word following the trigger (and one before the critical word) in positive
contexts. Finally, stop displayed faster reading times on the critical word in the neu-
tral context. This variation among triggers with respect to when they show signs
of accommodation difficulty, if at all, further emphasizes the need to take multi-
ple factors into account when it comes to developing a theory of presupposition
accommodation.
Additional evidence for accommodation happening rapidly comes from two
experiments by Singh et al. (2016) using the stops-making-sense task. In their Ex-
periment 1, they compared singular indefinites to definites in contexts that made
the existence presupposition of the definite either plausible or implausible (5.13a).
Acceptance rates in implausible contexts decreased as soon as the target word was
encountered for both indefinites and definites, but marginally more so for def-
inites. The same paradigm was used to investigate the presupposition of too in
their Experiment 2, see (5.13b), again showing an effect of implausibility and a -
this time fully significant - larger decrease for too relative to a control.
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(5.13) Singh et al. (2016), Exp 1 & 2, Sample Items
a. Bill went to { a club / the circus } on Friday night.
{ A / The } bouncer argued with him there for a while.
b. John will go to { the pool / the mall } this morning.
Peter will go swimming { tomorrow / too } after he gets back from
school.
One last study investigating the online processing of accommodation is Clifton
(2013) investigating definites. Similar to Singh et al. (2016), Clifton compared def-
inites to indefinites in one kind of context that rendered the uniqueness presup-
position plausible, i.e. kitchen in (5.14), but made sure the other context went the
opposite way by making plausible the existence of multiple entities such that the
indefinite would be felicitous.
(5.14) Clifton (2013), Sample Item
In the { kitchen / appliance store }, Jason checked out { a / the } stove
very carefully.
In addition to providing further evidence that a cost for accommodation can be
detected rapidly, using both self-paced reading and eye-tracking while reading,
this study is noteworthy in that it does not only speak to the question of whether
accommodation is an online process but also under what circumstances it is: for
both methodologies, a processing cost was only detected when the experiment
included a secondary math task to tax working memory. This finding thus suggests
that accommodation may require deeper processing, potentially due to its inherent
connection to the discourse.
Finally, evidence from acquisition comes from Aravind (2018), investigating the
extent to which children take presuppositions to be part of the shared context. In
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two experiments investigating singular definites and too respectively, children lis-
tened to a story featuring three characters, with only one character sharing privi-
leged knowledge with the main character, as illustrated in (5.15) for the definite.
(5.15) Aravind (2018), Exp 1B, Sample Item, Target Condition
Susie, Jane and Mike were hanging out together. But Jane had to go and
run some errands so she left. Then it was just Susie and Mike. The two of
them decided to go to an animal shelter. At the shelter, Mike got himself
a pet bird. Then, Susie decided to go home. After she left, the bird flew
right out of its cage! Later, Mike was on the phone with one of the girls
and he said, "Guess what, the bird that I got flew away!"
The task was to guess which character the main character is talking to, the idea
being that if presuppositional content is being treated as shared knowledge rather
than conveying new information, participants should choose the knowledgeable
character, in this case Susie. Children were at ceiling and did not differ from an
adult control group with respect to the success rate at guessing the knowledgable
character, indicating that children are aware of presuppositions being used to in-
dicate shared knowledge.
Additionally, another experiment tested the extent to which children are able
or willing to accommodate a presupposition by pitting accommodation against the
desire to make an utterance not redundant. To illustrate this design with the sam-
ple item in (5.16) (parts overlapping with (5.15) in parenthesis), the target sentence
containing the definite either requires its presupposition to be accommodated,
if Mike were talking to Jane, or results in conveying information that is already
shared if Mike was talking to Susie. Choosing the knowledgeable character - in
this case Susie - would thus correspond to rendering the utterance uninformative
but containing a satisfied presupposition, whereas choosing the other character -
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Jane - would mean endorsing accommodation to maintain informativeness.
(5.16) Aravind (2018), Exp 3, Sample Item, Target Condition
(Susie, Jane and Mike were hanging out together. But Jane had to go
and run some errands so she left. Then it was just Susie and Mike. The
two of them decided to go to an animal shelter. At the shelter, Mike got
himself a pet bird.)
Right afterwards, the bird flew right out of its cage! Then she had to go
home, too. Later, Mike was on the phone with one of the girls and he
said, "Guess what, the bird that I got flew away!"
Adults in fact overwhelmingly preferred accommodation to redundancy, with the
target responses being statistically indistinguishable from a non-presuppositional
control for which their would be no pressure to accommodate (rate of knowledge-
able character ≈20% in critical condition vs ≈5% in control). In contrast, the willing-
ness to accommodate was lower for the child participants, with the choice of the
knowledgeable character being significantly more likely than in a control condition
(≈40% vs ≈10%), although avoiding redundancy was still numerically preferred.
Moreover, there was a clear developmental trajectory visible such that 4-year-
olds showed a numerical preference for redundancy over accommodation, whereas
6-year-olds patterned like adults. These results suggest either that the cost of ac-
commodation is greater for young children such that they avoid it more than
adults, or that they consider redundant utterances less problematic than adults,
or some of both. Either way, the finding constitutes evidence in favor of conceiv-
ing of presuppositions as contextual requirements, which children at a very young
age seem to be already aware of.
To sum up, the majority of studies investigating presupposition accommoda-
tion thus far has focused on definites and additive particles, providing evidence
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that accommodation costs arise rapidly online, but may require deeper processing.
Additionally, the relation of the accommodated presupposition to the discourse
context may facilitate accommodation. Finally, children recognize presuppositions
early on as indicating shared knowledge, but may not learn how to accommodate
such information until later.
With respect to differences between triggers in terms of accommodation, it has
been difficult to confirm intuitive judgments in quantitative studies. Relevant find-
ings in this regard were that even supposedly easily accommodatable triggers like
stop and know show decreased ratings in Tiemann et al.’s (2011) study and a sup-
posedly hard to accommodate trigger like (German) too fails to receive low ratings
under certain circumstances in Grubic & Wierzba’s (2019) study, both of which ma-
nipulated prior context to examine accommodation. Moreover, with the exception
of Grubic & Wierzba’s comparison between additive particles and possessives -
although the investigation was primarily concerned with the former - differences
between classes of triggers have not been systematically studied in a way that ex-
plicitly contrasts triggers based on a given classification. The following section ad-
dresses this issue with an offline rating study that compares four pairs of triggers
that differ in terms of Focus-sensitivity.
5.3 Experiment 3
The goal of this experiment was to test the prediction of the FoPAH that Focus-
sensitive triggers are harder to accommodate than triggers lacking Focus-sensitivity,
using an offline acceptability judgment task. Additionally, the experiment used a
broader set of triggers from each class to show that the hypothesis is not restricted
to the contrast between also and again found in Experiment 2 of Chapter 4.
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5.3.1 Materials & Design
As the previous section showed, quantifying accommodation difficulty experi-
mentally is not trivial, insofar as it is crucial to control for effects of discourse co-
herence as well as lexical material. To do so, trigger pairs with one trigger of each
type - one Focus-sensitive and one lacking Focus-sensitivity - were used within the
same frame-sentence preceded by a question to create a minimal context and fix the
Focus, as in shown in (5.17).7 The frame-sentence without any trigger was used as
a control condition such that accommodation difficulty could be measured as any
decrease in acceptability of the trigger sentence relative to the bare frame-sentence.
(5.17) Sample Items Experiment 3
a. AGAIN VS TOO (4 items)
A: Who is having dinner in New York tomorrow?
(i) B: Saul is having dinner in New York. CONTROL
(ii) B: Saul is having dinner in New York again. -FOCUS
(iii) B: Saul is having dinner in New York too. +FOCUS
b. STILL VS EVEN (5 items)
A: What’s Mary been up to recently?
(i) B: She’s on vacation. CONTROL
(ii) B: She’s still on vacation. -FOCUS
(iii) B: She’s even on vacation. +FOCUS
7An alternative design would be to compare each trigger and its frame-sentence in a context
that either satisfies its presupposition or is neutral. However, the issue with such a design is that
the trigger-less conditions might not serve as a baseline because omitting the trigger in a context
in which the presupposition is satisfied may lead to decreased acceptability (see the discussion of
obligatoriness in Section 2.4).
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c. BACK VS AT LEAST (4 items)
A: What did Jack do last winter?
(i) B: He flew to Chicago for Christmas. CONTROL
(ii) B: He flew back to Chicago for Christmas. -FOCUS
(iii) B: At least he flew to Chicago for Christmas. +FOCUS
d. CONTINUE VS ONLY (5 items)
A: What did Sue do yesterday?
(i) B: She built a tree house. CONTROL
(ii) B: She continued building a tree house. -FOCUS
(iii) B: She only built a tree house. +FOCUS
Aside from again and too (5.17a), which can be close in meaning to each other, as
shown previously - although their presuppositions differed here due to too asso-
ciating with the subject - the remaining pairs were chosen somewhat arbitrarily
since there was no way to create minimal pairs in terms of their meaning. Using
the same frame-sentence however at least allowed to control for lexical content.
The remaining pairs were (temporal) still vs even (5.17b), back vs (concessive) at
least8 (5.17c), and continue vs only9 (5.17d), all of which have been shown to con-
trast in terms of Focus-sensitivity (see Section 3.3 and Appendix A.3). Aside from
the first pair again and too, for which the context question targeted the subject, the
context question was intended to induce VP Focus for the remaining trigger pairs.
There was a total number of 18 items (see Appendix A.4.3 for full list), split
across pairs as equally as possible as indicated in (5.17), in addition to 62 fillers, 56
from other experiments and 6 catch trials.
8The concessive reading of at least was indicated by placing at least sentence-initially (Kay, 1992).
9The presuppositional aspect of only the experiment was concerned with was its scalar presup-
position (Alxatib, 2017) rather than the status of its prejacent, since - although having been studied
experimentally before (Kim, 2007) - whether the prejacent is in fact presuppositional is controversial
(see Roberts 2006, 2011), as well as more crucially not Focus-sensitive in any relevant sense.
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5.3.2 Procedure
The experiment was implemented via PennController (Zehr & Schwarz, 2018a)
and conducted online. The first sentence of each item (A’s question) was initially
displayed on its own on the screen, with the second sentence (B’s reply) appearing
in a new line below it after pressing the space bar once. After pressing the space
bar a second time, a rating screen (without the item) would appear, with the ques-
tion “How acceptable was B’s response for you?" at the top and a rating scale from 1 to
7 at the bottom, with the 1-end marked as “Terrible" and the 7-end as “Perfect". Par-
ticipants were instructed to think of acceptability as “whether B is being consistent
or to what extent B’s utterance requires additional background knowledge". After filling
out a consent form, a demographic form and receiving instructions, participants
saw three practice items of varying acceptability to familiarize them with the pro-
cedure and illustrate the intended use of the scale. The experiment concluded with
an open response question that was meant to screen for bots. The experiment took
about 15 minutes.
5.3.3 Subjects
48 participants were recruited via Prolific.ac and reimbursed with $3.00 each. All
participants passed the bot-check, as well as catch-trials.
5.3.4 Predictions
The FoPAH predicts +FOCUS triggers to be harder to accommodate than -FOCUS
triggers. In the given design, this should be reflected in lower ratings of the +FOCUS
condition relative to the -FOCUS condition. Regarding differences relative to the
CONTROL condition, at least some of the -FOCUS triggers, such as again, have been
claimed to be hard to accommodate, in contrast to others, such as continue. We
thus are not committed to finding a decrease of the -FOCUS condition relative to
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Figure 5.1:
Ratings collapsed across trigger pairs.
Figure 5.2:
Ratings for each trigger pair.
the CONTROL condition overall, especially given that items were not normed for
plausibility, but by virtue of transitivity, the +FOCUS should be decreased relative
to the CONTROL condition.
5.3.5 Results
The mean ratings per condition collapsed across trigger pairs are shown in 5.1.
Using ordinal mixed effects models, simple effects showed that both the -FOCUS
condition and the +FOCUS condition received significantly lower ratings than the
CONTROL condition (p < .01** and p < .001*** respectively). Additionally, Helmert
contrasts showed that the +FOCUS was rated lower than the -FOCUS condition (p <
.001***).
Mean ratings for each trigger pair are shown in 5.2. There were no statistical
tests performed on the patterns for each pair since there were no prior predictions
made on an individual basis and to avoid conflation of Type I errors, but the nu-
merical pattern of +FOCUS triggers receiving lower ratings than -FOCUS triggers
was present for each pair. Within the +FOCUS triggers, at least received the numeri-
cally lowest ratings, whereas only received the highest. Within the -FOCUS triggers,
only again seemed to show a considerable decrease relative to the CONTROL.
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5.3.6 Discussion
The prediction of the FoPAH was borne out in the results of the experiment: trig-
gers that are Focus-sensitive received lower ratings than triggers that are not Focus-
sensitive in contexts where their presuppositions are not satisfied. This pattern was
present for all trigger pairs, providing support for the hypothesis across a broader
range of triggers. According to the FoPAH, these results are accounted for because
-FOCUS triggers are entailments of the Common Ground, which is itself governed
by Gricean principles. If the presupposition of a -FOCUS trigger is considered un-
controversial by the hearer, the Common Ground is adjusted accordingly with little
to no effort. In contrast, +FOCUS triggers require a linguistic antecedent indepen-
dently of the Common Ground, which cannot be constructed out of the blue as
easily, resulting in a cost reflected by lower ratings.
How do the results match previous research on accommodation difficulty? First,
both again and too received lower ratings than the bare control, while continue -
which falls into the same category as stop - did not, in line with Kripke’s (2009)
intuition. Secondly, while the decrease of too relative to again is also present in
Tiemann’s (2014) data, there is no apparent difference between again and stop, in
contrast to the decrease of again relative to continue here. Thus, the finding that too
received lower ratings than again in a carefully controlled setting constitutes an im-
provement on Kripke and research building on his insights: while there seems to be
a cut between triggers that are hard to accommodate - as reflected in decreased ac-
ceptability - and triggers that seem to accommodate without notable effort, there
is additional variation within the former class in that some triggers can be par-
ticularly difficult to accommodate, as shown here for a range of Focus-sensitive
triggers.
Although there were no specific predictions regarding variation within each
class of triggers, it is worth commenting on the notable numerical trends present in
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the data. First, within the class of triggers lacking Focus-sensitivity, again seemed
to be the only trigger with a considerable decrease relative to the CONTROL, in
line with claims in the literature about again being hard to accommodate. In pre-
vious research, this accommodation difficulty has been attributed to again having
an anaphoric component (see Section 2.4). However, the same reasoning has been
applied to account for the accommodation difficulty of too, which would render
the relative difference between the two triggers unexplained.
One possibility to overcome this issue would be to look for an additional factor
in addition to anaphoricity that makes too particularly difficult to accommodate.
One such factor could be that by virtue of being Focus-sensitive, the comprehen-
der needs to accurately identify what part of the sentence is Focus-marked in order
to compute the right presupposition. In the absence of sufficient cues, this require-
ment might lead to uncertainty regarding what it is that needs to be accommo-
dated, which would be reflected in decreased acceptability. Although we do not
want to suggest that identifying the right Focus-structure is a trivial task, this issue
should have been avoided by virtue of using a preceding question to fix the Focus.
While this does not rule out the possibility that participants added additional Foci
during silent reading, it seems unlikely that participants would go out of their way
to arrive at an unsupported interpretation. However, to fully discard this option,
an auditory study would be required, which will be left for future research at this
point.
A second factor potentially responsible for the larger decrease of too relative
to again might be that Focus-sensitivity comes with an additional cost due to in-
creased complexity. Crucially, on this view Focus-sensitive triggers like too should
have this cost at all times, even in contexts where their presupposition is satisfied.
Intuitively, this prediction does not seem to be borne out in judgments however.
Additionally, rating results from Experiment 2 in Chapter 4 showed that also was
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rated better than again when there was no material intervening, which further dis-
courages such an explanation, at least for offline ratings.
Alternatively, rather than attributing the lower ratings of too relative to again to
the additional complexity of too, it might also be due to a difference in the semantic
types of their presupposition. According to the lexical entries for additive parti-
cles and for again adopted in Section 3.3, repeated in (5.18) and (5.19) respectively,
too presupposes an alternative proposition, whereas again presupposes a previous
time. Thus, in order to account for the observed accommodation difficulty of again
despite it being not Focus-sensitive, one could concede that again also requires
some kind of antecedent in the discourse, but that this antecedent is of a different
kind than what is required by too, the latter of which is by assumption more costly.
(5.18) JADDK = λC.λp.λw: ∃q[q ∈ C(w) & p⇏ q ∧ q(w) = 1]. p(w)
(5.19) JagainK = λt*.λt.λP<i,t> : t*<t & P(t*) . P(t) (BECK 2020, (29b))
However, this explanation would also raise a number of further questions. First
and foremost, it begs the question how to account for the contrast between again
and also found in Experiment 2 in Chapter 4. If again requires an antecedent as well,
why is its antecedent not sensitive to salience determined by the QUD-structure
in the same way also is? Secondly, assuming that again presupposes a previous
time does not distinguish it from the other non Focus-sensitive triggers tested here,
namely continue, back and still, which may be and have been analyzed analogously
by virtue of being aspectual triggers.
The preliminary answer to the question how to account for the intermediate
status of again with respect to accommodation I want to suggest here is twofold.
First, any theory that wants to be able to capture potentially subtle differences
between individual triggers - specifically in the domain of aspectual triggers - has
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to include a representational component in order to distinguish how triggers relate
to the narrative structure or event structure of the discourse. Secondly, given that
triggers differ in the semantic objects they presuppose formally - propositions or
eventualities - such a theory must be able to represent propositions relative to this
representational component in a way that allows them to have structure.
To illustrate the first part of this answer, consider the lexical entry for still in
(5.20), which only differs from that of again in (5.19) in the precedence relation of
the presupposed time having to be immediate (‘≺’) rather than not specified (‘<’).
Taken at face-value, these entries would make it difficult to capture that again is
harder to accommodate than still. On the other hand, the entries can also be in-
terpreted relative to the underlying representations in the discourse, namely such
that the immediate precedence relation of still may not require the introduction
of an additional eventuality into the discourse, in contrast to again. The relative
cost associated with again may then be attributed to this difference in the event
structure.
(5.20) JstillK = λt*.λt.λP<i,t> : t*≺t & P(t*) . P(t) (BECK 2020, (19))
Regarding the question of how to represent propositions in such a theory, one pos-
sibility could be that propositions are not primitives but assembled from parts of
the discourse representation. That is, rather than referring to a proposition as a
simplex entity in the discourse - as one would in the case of a personal pronoun -
propositions are composed of predicates and their arguments, much like the psy-
chological notion of proposition used by for instance Anderson (1974). This idea
has recently been employed in cognitive modeling work by Brasoveanu & Dotlac̆il
(2020) and applied to capture experimental data from Anderson.
I want to argue here that conceiving of propositions in this way, rather than as
possible worlds as used in the formalization of Focus by Rooth (1992), provides
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a path for grounding the processing account proposed here in formal representa-
tions already applied to similar phenomena. However, given that the present in-
vestigation is primarily concerned with the contrast between Focus-sensitive and
not Focus-sensitive triggers - which was supported by the data without exception
- I will postpone spelling out an account along those lines until the concluding
Chapter 6.
Another pattern of variation within each class worth discussing concern only
and at least. Only received comparatively higher ratings than the other +FOCUS
triggers, whereas at least was somewhat lower. The higher ratings for only could
be due to the exhaustive inference it contributes being at-issue rather than presup-
posed, as noted in Section 2.5. To assess this possibility, it would be necessary to
further investigate the relationship between the exhaustive inference and the scalar
component that was targeted here and how a comprehender would choose be-
tween these interpretations, if they turned out to be distinct. Additionally, process-
ing evidence that only’s contribution behaves differently from that of even comes
from Filik et al.’s (2009) finding that only leads to processing difficulty earlier than
even in illicit contexts, as discussed in Section 3.5.10
Regarding the slightly lower ratings for at least, one simple explanation might
be that at least is degraded in response to a question even if there is a suitable
antecedent given in the context, as shown in (5.21). Another reason might have
been that due to its sentence-initial position, the Focus-structure might have been
harder to determine than for the other particles.
10Another explanation for the slightly higher ratings for only, particularly in contrast to even,
suggested to me by Athulya Aravind (p.c.), might be that only is not able to associate with material
preceding it, whereas even has this option (see Erlewine 2014). This restriction might make it easier
for participants in silent reading to determine the set of alternatives for only and could thus result
in higher ratings.
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(5.21) A: Jack has only been traveling to boring cities recently.
What did he do last winter?
B: ?At least he flew to Chicago for Christmas.
To sum up, the prediction of the FoPAH was directly confirmed by the data. How-
ever, there was also additional variation within each class of triggers, notably com-
paratively low ratings for again for the -FOCUS class, and comparatively higher and
lower ratings for only and at least respectively for the +FOCUS class. Thus, although
the experiment showed that Focus-sensitivity plays a crucial role in determining
the accommodation difficulty of a trigger, there are a number of additional factors
that need to be considered in future work.
An open question is to what extent the patterns in the ratings carry over to
online processing. To investigate this issue, the next section presents a self-paced
reading experiment focusing on a comparison between again and too.
5.4 Experiment 4
Building on the rating results of the previous experiment, which showed a larger
decrease in acceptability for Focus-sensitive triggers in contexts in which their pre-
supposition is not satisfied relative to triggers lacking Focus-sensitivity, the fol-
lowing experiment investigates the question whether these effects extend to on-
line processing, using a self-paced reading paradigm. As a secondary goal, the
experiment was meant to address the concern that the previous results might have
been due to Focus-sensitivity adding complexity. That is, Focus-sensitive triggers
may have been harder to accommodate and result in lower ratings because pro-
cessing their Focus-sensitivity may have added a layer of complexity that triggers
lacking Focus-sensitivity do not have. While the discussion pointed out reasons
to be skeptical of this explanation, given that the previous experiment did not in-
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clude a condition which compared triggers in contexts where their presupposition
was satisfied, this alternative cannot be fully discarded. The following experiment
therefore changes the design to compare triggers relative to contexts that satisfy or
do not satisfy the presupposition, rather than use a non-presuppositional variant
as control.
5.4.1 Materials & Design
The study employed a 2x2 Latin-squared design crossing TRIGGER (again as -FOCUS
vs too as +FOCUS) and CONTEXT (context present or absent). Again and too were
chosen since they allow a comparison within the same context by virtue of the
same context sentence being able to satisfy both respective presuppositions if too
associates with times, as in Experiment 2. The items were set up as dialogues,
as in previous experiments, with each utterance introduced as direct speech from
generic interlocutors A and B. To fix the Focus, the target sentence was again pre-
ceded by a question. CONTEXT was manipulated by having the question be pre-
ceded by an utterance of A’s that satisfies the respective presupposition (+CONTEXT)
or omitting such an utterance and begin with B’s question (-CONTEXT).
A sample item illustrating the resulting four conditions is shown in (5.22).
Slashes indicate the presentation regions. Phrases introducing the utterances as
well as the +CONTEXT sentence and B’s question were presented in full, with only
the target sentence being split into pre-critical region, target region containing
again or too (full underline), and spillover (dashed underline). Phrase-by-phrase
presentation was chosen instead of word-by-word since again and too occur in dif-
ferent positions to be fully natural. There were 20 items like (5.22) (full list given in
Appendix A.4.4).
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(5.22) Sample Item Experiment 4
a. +CONTEXT, AGAIN
A says: / Jenny saw a movie with her boyfriend last weekend. /
B asks: / What did Jenny do this weekend? /
A replies: / She went / to the movies again this weekend / I think.
b. +CONTEXT, TOO
A says: / Jenny saw a movie with her boyfriend last weekend. /
B asks: / What did Jenny do this weekend? /
A replies: / She went / to the movies this weekend too / I think.
c. -CONTEXT, AGAIN
B asks: / What did Jenny do this weekend? /
A replies: / She went / to the movies again this weekend / I think.
d. -CONTEXT, TOO
B asks: / What did Jenny do this weekend? /
A replies: / She went / to the movies this weekend too / I think.
In addition to the critical stimuli, there were 20 fillers of two types. The first type
consisted of 8 neutral fillers, all with a context sentence, but without any trigger
and different lexical material, to discourage strategic reading that expects the target
sentence to repeat parts of the context sentence. A sample filler is shown in (5.23).
(5.23) Filler Type I, Accommodation Self-paced reading Experiment
A says: / Jess brought cookies to the office on Thursday /
B asks: / What did Jess do on Friday? /
A replies: / She went / shopping with a friend on Friday / to catch a
sale.
The second filler type were 12 items adapted from Experiment 3 using the same
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three condition design, half comparing still and even and half continue and only,
both relative to a bare CONTROL condition but without a context sentence. These
fillers were for one part exploratory with respect to the question of how the rating
results translate into reading times, and for another meant to provide a broader
variety of triggers so that participants were not expecting again or too in case the
trial started with B’s question. Moreover, the bare condition additionally balanced
the expectation that all items without a context sentence would be infelicitous.
Sample items are shown in (5.24).
(5.24) Filler Type II, Accommodation Self-paced reading Experiment
a. STILL VS EVEN
B asks: / What was Marissa up to in June? /
(i) A replies: / She was / traveling in Bali / from what I recall.
(ii) A replies: / She was / still traveling in Bali / from what I
recall.
(iii) A replies: / She was / even traveling in Bali / from what I
recall.
b. CONTINUE VS ONLY
B asks: / What is Sue doing today? /
(i) A replies: / She is / building a tree house / to her neighbor’s
surprise.
(ii) A replies: / She is / continuing to build a tree house / to her
neighbor’s surprise.
(iii) A replies: / She is / only building a tree house / to her neigh-
bor’s surprise.
Of the total 40 items, 28 were followed by a comprehension question targeting
either the context sentence - if existent - or the target sentence. A sample question
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corresponding to the item in (5.22) is shown in (5.25).
(5.25) Sample Question, Accommodation Self-paced reading Experiment
Who went swimming?
Mary - Sue
Of the 28 questions, only four targeted the content of the presupposition in the
main stimuli. These were included in order to prevent participants from ignoring
the presuppositions and only focus on the at-issue content that is relevant to an-
swering the questions, but kept at a low number so participants would not catch on
to the purpose of the experiment quickly. These questions were treated separately
and not included in the calculation of accuracy since there was no unambiguously
correct answer when there was no context sentence present and the presupposition
needed to be accommodated. A sample question including item is given in (5.26).
(5.26) Sample Item with Accommodation Question
(A says: / Yolanda went hiking in Vermont last Sunday. /)
B asks: / What did Yolanda do on Saturday? /
A replies: / She went / hiking (again) on Saturday (too) / since the
weather was nice.
Comprehension Question: Did Yolanda go hiking before Saturday?
Yes - No
5.4.2 Procedure
The experiment was implemented via Ibexfarm and conducted online. Each trial
started with a dash on the screen. Participants were instructed to press the space
bar to move from region to region (as indicated by ‘/’ in the sample items shown
above), which were displayed on their own in the center of the screen, followed
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by a comprehension question for 70% of the trials. After filling out a consent form,
a demographic form and receiving instructions, participants saw three practice
items to familiarize them with the procedure. The experiment concluded with an
open response question that was meant to screen for bots and took about 15 min-
utes to complete.
5.4.3 Subjects
64 participants were recruited via Prolific.ac and reimbursed with $2.50 each. All
but one participant passed the bot-check. An additional four subjects were ex-
cluded due to less than 80% accuracy. Total accuracy for the remaining 59 par-
ticipants was at 92%.
5.4.4 Predictions
I will focus here on the predictions for the main set of stimuli. According to the
FoPAH, accommodation should be harder for too than for again, as supported by
the rating results of the previous study. This prediction should translate into a
larger increase in reading times for too in the -CONTEXT condition than for again.
This effect is expected to occur in the critical region or in the spillover, given the
variable localization of processing costs in self-paced reading. We additionally ex-
pect a general effect of context for each trigger, given the rating results as well as
previous studies by Schwarz (2007) on also and Tiemann (2014) on again.
5.4.5 Results
Main Stimuli. Due to the variation in size of the different regions, reading times
were trimmed based on divergence from the median for each region individu-
ally, excluding reading times above 4 median absolute deviations from the median
(Leys et al., 2013), which affected 5.2% of the total data. Mean reading times per
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Figure 5.3: Mean reading times per region.
region are shown in Figure 5.3, with regions restricted to the target sentence shown
in Figure 5.4.
Linear mixed effects models with maximal random slopes for subjects and
items were used to analyze the data, with log-transformed reading times as de-
pendent variable. In the critical region, an initial model consisting of CONTEXT,
TRIGGER and their interaction as fixed effects showed a significant effect of CON-
TEXT (t=-5.6, p<.001***), with slower reading times if the context sentence is omit-
ted, and TRIGGER (t=2.33, p<.05*), with again being read slower, but no significant
interaction (t=-.05, p=.96).11 However, given the - albeit small - length difference
between the two triggers, a second model included LENGTH, calculated as number
of characters in the region, as a fixed effect. The effect of TRIGGER was no longer
significant in this model, suggesting that the longer reading times for again were
due to its length difference relative to too rather than a difference in processing.
In the spillover region, there was again a significant effect of CONTEXT (t=-2.99,
p<.01**), with absence of context leading to slower reading times, but neither TRIG-
11The same pattern was present in an analysis of the untrimmed data.
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Figure 5.4: Mean RT per region for target sentence.
GER nor their interaction reaching significance (t=-1.26, p=.22 and t=1.71, p=.11
respectively). However, since the interaction term was close to marginal (and in
fact marginal in the untrimmed data), a post-hoc analysis was conducted to test
for order effects, based on the intuition that accommodation may have gotten eas-
ier with sufficient exposure. While an initial analysis that included TRIAL ORDER -
with trial number (1-5) as levels - as a fixed effect did not differ qualitatively from
the original model, a second model that treated TRIAL ORDER as a two-level fac-
tor (early = trials 1-2 vs late = trials 3-5) revealed a significant interaction between
CONTEXT and TRIGGER (t=2.04, p<.05*), with there being a larger slowdown in the
absence of context for too than for again, as well as an effect of TRIAL ORDER (t=-
6.76, p<.001***). The size of the interaction per trial is given in Figure 5.5, showing
that a large difference on the very first trial is most likely responsible for this effect.
Since the model used the default treatment coding, the interaction is only restricted
to early trials, however. No other effect was significant.
Fillers. The raw reading times were again trimmed using 4 median absolute devia-
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Figure 5.5: Size of interaction (difference between -CONTEXT and +CONTEXT for too
minus difference between -CONTEXT and +CONTEXT for again) in spillover region
per trial.
tions as cut-off, affecting 4.7% for the still-even subset and 6.1% for the continue-only
subset. The mean reading times per region of the target sentence for each subset
are shown in Figures 5.6 and 5.7 respectively.
We again employed linear mixed effects models on log-transformed reading
times, focusing on the critical region, using simple effects and Helmert contrasts,
as for the rating data. Since there were obvious length differences in the critical
region, LENGTH was added to the model as a fixed factor. For the still-even subset,
simple effects showed that still did not differ significantly from the control (t=0.16,
p=.88), whereas even led to significantly longer reading times relative to the con-
trol (t=4.09, p<.01**). Additionally, the comparison between still and even in the
Helmert contrasts was significant as well (t=-7.21, p<.001***), with slower reading
times for even, while the difference between both particles combined relative to the
control was only marginal (t=-2.18, p<.1●).12
For the continue-only subset, none of the simple effects were significant (t=-0.59,
12The same pattern was observed for the raw data.
207
Figure 5.6: Mean RT per region for target sentence of still-even fillers.
Figure 5.7: Mean RT per region for target sentence of continue-only fillers.
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p=.56 for continue and t=1.96, p=.11 for only). There was also no significant differ-
ence between continue and only in the Helmert contrasts (t=-1.04, p=.31).13
Accommodation Questions. The results for the exploratory questions targeting the
presupposed content are shown in Table 5.1. Participants overall accommodated
the respective presuppositions in the -CONTEXT conditions to a similar extent for
both triggers. Somewhat surprisingly, yes responses were lower than overall accu-
racy in +CONTEXT conditions as well, despite the presupposition being satisfied




Table 5.1: Percentage of Yes responses to Accommodation Questions by condition.
5.4.6 Discussion
The experiment provided evidence that both again and too incur a processing cost
that occurs quickly during online comprehension if their presupposition is not
satisfied, as supported by the significant increase in reading times on the criti-
cal region if the context sentence was omitted. This effect is in line with previous
research on these triggers (Schwarz, 2007; Tiemann, 2014; Singh et al., 2016). Ad-
ditionally, although there was no reliable evidence that this cost differed for the
two triggers if the entirety of the experiment was considered, too showed the pre-
dicted increased penalty relative to again once trial order was taken into account.
More specifically, in the spillover region reading times for too slowed down more
in the absence of a supporting context than for again for trials at the beginning of
the experiment.
13The same pattern was again found in the raw data.
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Although the relativization to early trials should be taken as a caveat, the results
nonetheless constitute a novel finding insofar as no previous study has explicitly
compared effects of different triggers in online processing directly. While Tiemann
(2014) investigated multiple triggers at once, a comparison was not implemented
as a factor within the same design. The relevance of trial order suggests that par-
ticipants do detect a difference between again and too early on, but get used to the
illicit use over the course of the experiment such that the difference is no longer
noticeable towards the end of the experiment. The reason this effect occurs in the
spillover region rather than in the critical region can be attributed to the variable
localization of self-paced reading.
We may nonetheless wonder why the difference between again and too was not
more pronounced in this experiment, given the stark contrast in ratings in Exper-
iment 3. One way in which the experiments differed was that too associated with
the subject in Experiment 3, whereas it associated with the VP in the current ex-
periment, due to the way the respective context question was phrased. A possible
explanation could then be that the accommodation difficulty of too’s presupposi-
tion varies with the shape of the proposition it requires as an antecedent. If true,
such a finding would provide a further argument for representing propositions
that allows them to have structure, as suggested in the discussion of Experiment 3.
The current results also bear on the issue of whether Focus-sensitivity per se is
costly and as such could be responsible for the rating data presented in the previ-
ous experiment. Notably, there was no effect of TRIGGER in the critical region nor
the spillover region, suggesting that too does not contribute a cost if its presup-
position is satisfied relative to again. This pattern therefore renders the alternative
explanation for the rating data discussed previously less plausible.
Additional evidence - albeit tentative - for the relevance of Focus-sensitivity
carrying over from ratings to online processing comes from one filler subset com-
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paring still and even. Reading times for even were slower than for still in the crit-
ical region, mirroring the decrease in ratings found in Experiment 3. Given the
small sample size, this effect is notable and promising as a starting point for a full-
fledged experiment. In contrast, the rating pattern did not carry over into reading
times for the difference between continue and only, potentially due to only showing
the weakest effect in the ratings.
Finally, the responses to the accommodation question, specifically in -CONTEXT
conditions, suggests that participants do process the presupposition and accom-
modate it in the majority of cases.14 These results speak directly - and stand in
opposition - to results by Tiemann (2014), who found that people respond nega-
tively to a question intended to target the presupposition of again in contexts that
do not satisfy its presupposition. This contrast is less surprising once the specific
questions by Tiemann are taken into account. A sample item with corresponding
question is given in (5.27). Since the question targets the presupposition rather in-
directly, choosing one as a response may have been simply due to participants re-
stricting the question to the information provided in the context. In contrast, given
the results presented here, participants do recognize the presupposition of both
again and too, if the question targets their content directly.
(5.27) Last week, Linda bought Judith a pink lamp for a room.
Two days ago, Linda received a pink lamp again, when she was out
with a friend.
How many pink lamps did Linda receive?
One - At least two - Cannot be answered
14The slight increase of positive responses for again relative to too in +CONTEXT conditions was
likely due to an error in phrasing the questions, since they asked whether a relevant event had
occurred before, which is not necessarily the case with too.
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5.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented two experiments - an offline rating study and a self-paced
reading study - to test the prediction of the FoPAH that Focus-sensitive triggers
should be harder to accommodate than triggers lacking Focus-sensitivity. The rat-
ing experiment compared four trigger pairs with one instance of each class (again
vs too, still vs even, back vs at least, continue vs only) within the same frame-sentence
relative to a bare variant without any trigger as control condition, preceded by a
question, and had participants rate the acceptability of the target sentence. As pre-
dicted, Focus-sensitive triggers received lower ratings than triggers lacking Focus-
sensitivity, which was true for each trigger pair.
The self-paced reading experiment centered on a comparison between again
and too, manipulating the presence or absence of a context sentence satisfying the
respective presuppositions, rather than use a trigger-less variant as control. In ad-
dition to an increase in reading times for both triggers in the critical region contain-
ing the trigger if the context sentence was absent, the slowdown in the spillover
region was more pronounced for too, although only for trials at the beginning of
the experiment.
The experiments thus provide evidence in favor of the FoPAH from two dis-
tinct methodologies and - at least uncontroversially for ratings - across a broad
range of triggers. Focus-sensitive triggers lead to a larger decrease in ratings in
out-of-the-blue contexts than triggers lacking Focus-sensitivity, and too leads to a
larger increase in reading times when its presupposition is not satisfied than again
under the same conditions. These effects crucially show that accommodation dif-
ficulty affects both offline ratings as a potentially more deliberative measure, and
incremental comprehension, and differentially so depending on the kind of trigger
involved. Additionally, the rating data show - and the reading data to some extent,
given the exploratory status of the still-even comparison - that this is not an arti-
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fact of again and too but generalizes to a broader set of triggers depending on their
behavior with respect to Focus.
To sum up, the data presented here provide novel evidence for a systematic
difference in accommodation difficulty, both in offline and online measures, de-
pending on whether a given trigger is Focus-sensitive or not, and improves on
previous claims in the literature (e.g. Kripke 2009) regarding trigger differences
with respect to accommodation. That is, while confirming that both again and too
are hard to accommodate, this difficulty is greater for the latter. Additionally, some
of the noted variation across triggers within each class, specifically with respect to
the rating data, may serve as a starting point for a more comprehensive theory of
accommodation that takes multiple factors into account.
Relating the findings of this chapter back to the previous chapter, there is con-
verging evidence for the FoPAH from different properties, triggers, and method-
ologies. Particularly the contrast between again and also in Experiment 2 dovetails
with the results in Experiments 3 and - to some extent - 4 presented here. The next





This chapter concludes the present thesis with a summary of the findings and main
conclusions (6.1), some further discussion of the notions relevant to the tested hy-
pothesis (6.2), implications of the findings for linguistic and psycholinguistic the-
ory (6.3), and a discussion of possible extensions and future work (6.4).
6.1 Summary of Findings & Main Conclusions
The goal of this thesis was to investigate representations of context through the
lens of presuppositions, specifically differences among presupposition triggers.
The property examined here was Focus-sensitivity, as diagnosed with the stress
placement test in Section 3.3. Focus-sensitivity was hypothesized to correlate with
a distinction in terms of the representations that different triggers are grounded
in. Triggers lacking Focus-sensitivity (-FOCUS) were hypothesized to require their
presupposition to be entailed by the Common Ground, whereas Focus-sensitive
triggers (+FOCUS) access a linguistic antecedent in the discourse model, as stated
by the Focus Presupposition Antecedent Hypothesis (FoPAH) in (6.1).
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(6.1) Focus Presupposition Antecedent Hypothesis (FoPAH)
Focus-sensitive presupposition triggers require a linguistic antecedent in
the discourse model, whereas triggers lacking Focus-sensitivity merely re-
quire their presupposition to be entailed by the Common Ground.
Chapters 4 and 5 tested two predictions of the FoPAH. The first prediction con-
cerned the extent to which triggers are sensitive to the salience of the content by
which their presupposition is satisfied. +FOCUS triggers, by virtue of accessing a
linguistic antecedent in the discourse model, are predicted to be sensitive to the
salience properties of that antecedent. In contrast, -FOCUS triggers should be indif-
ferent to the salience of the utterance satisfying their presupposition insofar as the
presupposition of such triggers constitute Common Ground entailments, compa-
rable to the extent to which the order of premises is irrelevant to the conclusion of
a syllogism. Salience was manipulated in terms of accessibility with respect to the
structure set up by the Question Under Discussion (QUD).
Experiment 1a used the scalar presupposition of even and the way its scale is
sensitive to what has been mentioned in the discourse to probe how parts of the
discourse are being accessed. That is, when associating with a comparatively low
value, the resulting degraded acceptability of even can be ameliorated due to the
presence of an even lower value. The crucial manipulation was whether the ut-
terance contributing the lower value was part of the immediate super-QUD or re-
mote by an extra step in the QUD-structure. Results from acceptability judgments
showed that the extent to which the presence of a lower value improved ratings
was greater when the lower value was part of the immediate super-QUD relative
to the remote super-QUD, in line with the predictions. However, an alternative ex-
planation for the results may have been that the pattern was due to general reason-
ing about the plausibility of relevant events and the way the QUD-manipulation
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affected them, rather than the results being due to a change in accessibility of the
antecedent.
To address this issue, Experiment 1b used the same stimuli as Experiment 1a,
but replaced even with either might’ve or apparently, since the advantage from gen-
eral reasoning should persist in this case independently of the presence of even.
The critical interaction was no longer significant, as expected if the results of Ex-
periment 1a were specific to properties of even, but an additional model failed to
provide evidence that the interaction differed between experiments, thus weaken-
ing the overall support.
Experiment 2 directly compared one trigger from each class, namely also and
again, in a slightly different design. Rather than changing the relation between the
sentence providing the antecedent and the target sentence in the QUD-structure,
the salience of the antecedent was manipulated via the presence or absence of ma-
terial intervening between the utterance contributing the content satisfying the re-
spective presupposition and the target sentence containing the trigger. Addition-
ally, all utterances were part of the same super-QUD. The specific prediction was
that intervening material should decrease the accessibility of the antecedent for
also and lead to interference, whereas again should be unaffected by the intervener.
This prediction was borne out in that the presence of the intervener incurred a
penalty for also both in ratings and full sentence reading times of the target sen-
tence, whereas it did not for again. The results thus provided initial evidence for a
contrast between presupposition triggers in terms of Focus-sensitivity in line with
the prediction of the FoPAH.
The second prediction tested concerned accommodation difficulty, that is, the
extent to which a trigger can be used felicitously if its presupposition is not explic-
itly satisfied in the context. On Stalnaker’s (1998) view of the Common Ground,
accommodating a presupposition is not a repair process in the strict sense but
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constitutes an essential part of communication. If a hearer recognizes a speaker
presupposing something without it being entailed by the Common Ground, the
presupposition can be accommodated without difficulty, as long as what is being
presupposed is uncontroversial/plausible and interlocutors are cooperative. Con-
sequently, -FOCUS triggers are predicted to be comparatively easy to accommodate.
In contrast, a linguistic antecedent in the discourse model is not taken to be subject
to such cooperative principles but involves proper repair of the discourse model,
which is costly. Thus, +FOCUS triggers are predicted to be hard to accommodate.
Experiment 3 compared four triggers from each class in pairs - too/again, even/
still, only/continue, at least/back - in the same frame-sentence relative to a control
condition that did not contain a presupposition trigger in contexts where the re-
spective presupposition was not satisfied. Both +FOCUS and -FOCUS triggers were
rated lower than the control, but crucially +FOCUS triggers were rated lower than
-FOCUS triggers, as predicted. Moreover, lower ratings for +FOCUS triggers rela-
tive to -FOCUS triggers were numerically present for all pairs, providing support
for the FoPAH from a broader range of expressions beyond the contrast between
also and again shown in Experiment 2.
Experiment 4 followed up on this finding with a chunked self-paced reading
study to test whether the observed effect extended to online processing. The main
set of stimuli restricted the comparison of triggers to too and again, but changed the
design such that what was manipulated was the presence or absence of a context
sentence satisfying the presupposition rather than measuring accommodation dif-
ficulty relative to a trigger-less control. The experiment also included exploratory
fillers comparing even-still and only-continue respectively, using the design from
Experiment 3.
The data for the main stimuli showed a slowdown for both too and again in
the target region containing the trigger when the presupposition was not satisfied,
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but no difference between the triggers in the degree of this slowdown. However,
a significant interaction in the spillover region was present for trials at the begin-
ning of the experiment, indicating a larger slowdown for too than for again, as
predicted. Additionally, data for the exploratory fillers showed a larger slowdown
in the region containing the trigger for even than for still relative to the control,
but no difference for only-continue. The results thus provide tentative evidence that
the difference in accommodation difficulty with respect to Focus-sensitivity is not
restricted to offline judgments but carries over to online processing.
Taken together, the findings of this thesis provide converging evidence in fa-
vor of the FoPAH. The strongest support comes from Experiment 2, with also but
not again being sensitive to intervening material within the QUD-structure, and
Experiment 3, which showed +FOCUS triggers to be harder to accommodate than
-FOCUS triggers. More tentative support comes from Experiment 1a with the rat-
ing data suggesting that the way even accesses its antecedent is sensitive to the
QUD-structure, and the self-paced reading data from Experiment 4 showing that
too incurs a larger penalty than again at an early stage of the experiment when their
presuppositions are not satisfied.
In terms of the main conclusions to be drawn from this thesis, the FoPAH thus
provides novel empirical evidence for a difference between presupposition trig-
gers based on their Focus-sensitivity. The implications of this finding for a typol-
ogy of presupposition triggers will be discussed in more detail in section 6.3. On a
more fundamental level, the thesis provides evidence for distinct representations
of context, the Common Ground and the discourse model. While the psycholog-
ical reality of each of these notions has been supported independently, as well as
their usefulness for formal linguistic theory, their application is usually restricted
to distinct phenomena rather than them being compared directly. The importance
of what I have shown here then is that expressions that share the same kind of
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meaning - presuppositions - may still differ in the kind of representation they are
grounded in depending on a contingent property, namely Focus-sensitivity.
One direct advantage this contingency has is that it simplifies how the proper-
ties following from the FoPAH are acquired. The language learner would only be
required to determine whether a trigger is Focus-sensitive or not, and infer relevant
properties from there, rather than having to acquire each property independently.
This view would additionally make a prediction about the timing of acquisition re-
garding properties like accommodation difficulty. For example, once the language
learner has recognized a trigger as being Focus-sensitive, its accommodation diffi-
culty should follow. I will leave an assessment of this prediction for future research.
In spite of these contributions the thesis makes, there are also further questions
regarding the notions that are central to the FoPAH, namely the nature of the Com-
mon Ground, the discourse model and how to conceive of a linguistic antecedent.
The following section provides further discussion of these issues to see which re-
main open and what additional predictions can be made.
6.2 Further Discussion
This section elaborates on the notion of Common Ground adopted here, as well
as the discourse model and antecedent. The goal is to pick up loose ends from
previous parts of the thesis, and clarify or extend them along the way.
6.2.1 Common Ground
One assumption that is central to the conception of the Common Ground adopted
here, particularly for Chapter 4, has been that the Common Ground is indiffer-
ent to salience with respect to how its contents satisfy the presupposition of a -
FOCUS trigger. That is, by virtue of -FOCUS triggers being hypothesized to depend
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on entailments of the Common Ground, the only relevant factor for comprehend-
ing such a trigger is whether its presupposition is in fact entailed by the set of
propositions that make up the Common Ground, independently of the salience of
the linguistic material with which the propositions were introduced. As an anal-
ogy, it was suggested to think of this process as being comparable to determining
the validity of a conclusion in a syllogism. As long as a conclusion follows from
the premises, it does not matter in what order the premises were encountered for
the conclusion to be valid or not.
There are several ways in which this view requires further qualification, how-
ever. First, the analogy with syllogisms should be seen as an idealization inso-
far as there is evidence from Johnson-Laird & Bara (1984) that the “figure" of the
premises does affect the availability of the possible conclusions. The authors ma-
nipulated the order in which relevant terms occurred in quantified sentences like
(6.2) that served as premises. (For example, the figure in (6.2) would be A-B, B-C.)
The proportions with which participants drew valid conclusions from the set of
premises revealed a figural bias in that certain figures were privileged in terms of
the valid conclusions participants drew from them. It is thus worth distinguishing
between the logical properties of a syllogism - or, in the case of presuppositions,
the grammar - and the processes of reasoning that are part of the comprehension
system.
(6.2) Some of the architects are vegetarians.
Some of the vegetarians are not notaries.
However, these results should also not be taken as directly contradicting the anal-
ogy made here. Firstly, the experiment relied on a range of quantifiers, which may
exacerbate or even cause the observed performance issues. Moreover, the compar-
ison with syllogisms was intended as an idealized analogy rather than a commit-
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ment to the comprehension of -FOCUS triggers behaving in the exact same way. Us-
ing the idea of how inferences are made logically may therefore nonetheless serve
as a useful illustration of how certain aspects of salience are eliminated or reduced
in light of the conception of the Common Ground as a body of knowledge.
This clarification brings us to the second issue worth commenting on, namely
what notion of salience is relevant for the Common Ground. Salience itself is an
ill-defined term that has been used to describe a variety of factors. The present
claims should thus not be taken to mean that the Common Ground is completely
indifferent to any notion of salience. For instance, Wason (1966) showed that par-
ticipants were better at detecting errors when the task was framed in terms of
catching cheaters rather than in a more neutral way. Instructions of this kind and
the change in goals they might result in might naturally affect how accurately or
quickly participants detect a presupposition failure.
More generally, there may still be general memory processes such as mem-
ory decay that differentiate the activation of material that entered the Common
Ground seconds ago from material that was accepted years ago. What is crucial
here is that salience in the Common Ground is not determined in relation to the
QUD. In this regard, it is worth noting that this notion of Common Ground is a
simplification intended to model the processing of presupposition triggers and di-
verges from more complex conceptions in which Common Ground and QUDs are
more tightly linked (e.g. Biezma & Rawlins 2017).
Despite these clarifying caveats, one claim regarding an extension of the present
view that has been made in Chapter 4 and is worth elaborating on concerns the
connection between -FOCUS triggers and the detection contradictions. Specifically,
I suggested that checking whether the presupposition of such a trigger is satisfied
should behave similar to determining the truth of an utterance in the discourse.
That is, much like a -FOCUS trigger requires its presupposition to be entailed by
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the Common Ground to be used felicitously, determining the appropriateness of
an assertion can be viewed as checking whether the asserted proposition is entailed
by the Common Ground. One prediction this view would make is that noting that
an assertion is contradictory to information in the preceding discourse should be
insensitive to - a certain kind of - salience the same way the satisfaction of a -FOCUS
trigger is.
Initial evidence in favor of this prediction comes from a set of studies by O’Brien
& Albrecht (1992). The authors manipulated whether a target sentence was con-
sistent or inconsistent with information in the preceding context, in addition to
whether the relevant information occurred in the sentence immediately preceding
the target sentence or with several sentences intervening, as shown in 6.3.
(6.3) As Kim stood { inside / outside } the health club she felt a little sluggish.
(Workouts always made her feel better. Today she was particularly looking
forward to the exercise class because it had been a long, hard day at work.
Her boss had just been fired and she had to fill in for him on top of her
own work.)
She decided to go outside and stretch her legs a little.
Reading times for the target sentence were increased when there was an inconsis-
tency, as well as when there was material intervening, but without the two factors
interacting. That is, there was no evidence that the penalty for an inconsistency was
larger in the absence of intervening material. This behavior thus resembles what
was observed for again in Experiment 2, where an intervening question-answer
pair did not affect the ratings for again. Although there are notable differences be-
tween this experiment and O’Brien & Albrecht’s (1992) design, as well as other
factors that affect how inconsistencies are detected (see Albrecht & O’Brien 1993;
O’Brien et al. 1998, 2010), these results are promising with respect to the predicted
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similarity between -FOCUS triggers and contradictions.
Another aspect of the notion of Common Ground applied here that is worth
discussing concerns the conditions under which propositions become part of the
Common Ground. On the view adopted here, the Common Ground consists of
all propositions that are mutually accepted by all interlocutors. With respect to
the FoPAH, this view yields another prediction regarding the contrast between
+FOCUS and -FOCUS triggers, namely that the latter should be infelicitous if their
presupposition has not been mutually accepted. In contrast, linguistic antecedents
are not evaluated with respect to the epistemic attitude an interlocutor has toward
them. As long as there is a representation in the discourse model that can serve
as a linguistic antecedent, it should be able to license the use of a Focus-sensitive
presupposition trigger.
As an analogy, consider the behavior of an anaphor like that in (6.4). The pro-
noun simply picks out A’s previous statement without indicating whether B takes
it to be true. Otherwise, B’s reply would be contradictory, which is not the case.
(6.4) A: Jason Zimmermann is the best Smash player ever.
B: That’s not true! Kevin Nanney was way better.
Bare Focus seems to behave much like that-anaphora in this respect. Consider the
response in (6.5a). Focus on first is felicitous - and in fact obligatory - even though
the relevant alternative to first - second in A’s statement - is rejected by speaker B.
This behavior is in line with Wagner’s (2020) characterization of Focus as presup-
posing salience rather than truth. When considering Focus-sensitive expressions
such as even in (6.5b) then, we see the same pattern insofar as even is felicitous even
if the proposition licensing its use is not accepted by speaker B.1 In contrast, for a
1A potential confound here might be that a different antecedent is being accommodated here.
However, the results from Experiment 3 in Chapter 5 showed that accommodating even leads to a
decrease in acceptability. Nonetheless, it is worth keeping this confound in mind for the upcoming
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trigger lacking Focus-sensitivity such as again, what is being presupposed has to
be accepted for again to be felicitous, as shown by the contrast between (6.5c) and
(6.5d).2
(6.5) A: Juan DeBiedma made second place at Evo 2016.
a. B: No, he made [FIRST]F place.
b. B: No, he even made [FIRST]F place.
c. B: #No, but he made second place again the next year.
d. B: Yes, and he made second place again the next year.
The prediction that +FOCUS triggers should be acceptable as long there is an avail-
able - albeit not mutually accepted - antecedent in the context, whereas the same
conditions should result in unacceptability for -FOCUS triggers was tested in a pilot
experiment reported in Appendix A.5. The experiment compared four triggers of
each class in a between-item design and manipulated whether its presupposition
is mutually accepted by varying the response particle used in the target sentence
between yes and maybe. A sample item for even and again is shown in (6.6).
(6.6) Sample Items, Pilot Experiment
a. EVEN
A: Jesse rented an old pickup truck for her roadtrip.
(i) B: Yes, that’s right. Helen even rented a Saab.
(ii) B: Maybe that’s right. Helen even rented a Saab.
experiment.
2However, note that additive particles, despite being Focus-sensitive, seem to pattern like again
in this respect, as shown in (i). There may thus be variation in terms of whether Focus-sensitive
particles additionally care about mutual acceptance or not.
(i) A: Juan DeBiedma made second place at Evo 2016.
B: #No, but he also made second place in 2015.
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b. AGAIN
A: Yesterday, Francine went swimming.
(i) B: Yes, that’s right. Today, she went swimming again.
(ii) B: Maybe that’s right. Today, she went swimming again.
The prediction was that maybe should result in a larger decrease for -FOCUS triggers
than for +FOCUS triggers. Contrary to this prediction, the data showed an overall
decrease for maybe relative to yes, but without this decrease differing for the two
classes of triggers. However, the results may have been confounded by the change
in response particles affecting discourse coherence independently of the require-
ments of use for the respective triggers. The experiment thus remains inconclusive,
but offers an additional avenue for future research.
The next subsection turns to a discussion of the notion of discourse model and a
potential avenue for a more formal representation of a linguistic antecedent within
such a model.
6.2.2 Discourse Model and Antecedent
Up to this point, the notion of discourse model and antecedent have been kept
relatively informal. To make things more precise, it was suggested to think of the
discourse model in terms of the discourse representation structures of DRT. In con-
trast, the standard analysis of Focus within Alternative Semantics - which was also
adopted here - treats antecedents for Focus as propositions, consisting of sets of
possible worlds. Moreover, Alternative Semantics is less concerned with the as-
pects of interpretation that are central to dynamic semantic approaches, namely
the issue of how to represent the contents of the previous discourse (but see Krifka
1993). The formal approaches thus appear to create a tension here.
However, the use of DRT in the following primarily serves expository purposes
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rather than a formal commitment, especially since dynamic semantics has been ar-
gued to be isomorphic to a classical possible worlds semantics (Charlow, 2015).
The main reason for choosing DRT here is that it offers a simple way for repre-
senting an alternative perspective on the results from Experiment 2 in terms of
interference effects, which will be discussed in Subsection 6.3.5 below. There may
nonetheless be empirical advantages of choosing DRT for modeling accommoda-
tion that will be touched upon in Subsection 6.3.2.
To represent propositions in DRT, I will use a simplified purely extensional first-
order logic, inspired by Brasoveanu & Dotlac̆il (2020), that allows a proposition to
be derived from the content of a DRS, which is closer to the psychological notion
of proposition. As an illustration, first consider the example in (6.7a). Recall that
DRT distinguishes between discourse referents and predications, with the former
serving as arguments for the latter, shown in (6.7b). The corresponding proposition
here would then be go-to-school-at(d,w-h).






Analogously, the DRS for a sentence containing also (6.8a) would look as in (6.8b).
Adopting the previous characterization of also as looking for an antecedent that
differs with respect to the Focused element, the respective (set of) proposition(s)
would be of the form go-to-school-at-(x,w-h). Since the DRS in (6.7b) can be used to
derive a proposition that is part of this set, it can thus serve as an antecedent to
satisfy the presupposition of also here.
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Another issue that is somewhat independent of how the antecedent is formalized
but requires further discussion concerns the status of the antecedent as stated in
the FoPAH. The FoPAH states that Focus-sensitive triggers require a linguistic an-
tecedent to satisfy their presupposition. However, as already mentioned in Chap-
ter 1, the presupposition of Focus-sensitive expressions may also be satisfied by
non-linguistic material, as shown in (6.9), repeated from (1.6). The question then is
whether those non-linguistic counterexamples can receive another explanation, or
whether the FoPAH as currently stated is inaccurate and requires revising.
(6.9) Context: Lindsay sees Edgar use cilantro while making breakfast nachos and says:
Paul ALSO uses cilantro for making nachos.
As an argument in defense of the FoPAH, one might take examples like (6.9), de-
spite their apparent acceptability, to require more effort than if the antecedent were
provided linguistically. This - potentially subtle - contrast may be due to the rele-
vant content having to be inferred post-hoc after the utterance is made, prompted
by the way the utterance draws attention to relevant parts of the visual scene, and
then added to the discourse model. However, to fully assess the extent to which
the existence of non-linguistic antecedent examples raises doubt about the valid-
ity of the FoPAH, it would be necessary to explicitly compare linguistic and non-
linguistic antecedents in an experimental setting.
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More generally, cases of non-linguistic antecedents may not pose a serious prob-
lem in light of similar issues arising for personal pronouns. As with presupposi-
tion triggers, the antecedent of a personal pronoun does not have to be provided
via linguistic means but can also be provided in a visual scene as long as the an-
tecedent is sufficiently salient. Nonetheless, it is well known that different inher-
ently linguistic factors such as grammatical role affect the pronoun resolution pro-
cess. The predictions of the FoPAH and the FoPAH itself therefore do not necessar-
ily have to be at odds with the existence of cases where an antecedent is provided
non-linguistically. Linguistic utterances may simply appear to be privileged as an-
tecedents because they automatically render their content salient.
With these qualifications in place, the next section now turns to a discussion of
further implications of the findings of this thesis.
6.3 Implications for Linguistic & Psycholinguistic Theory
This section discusses the implications of this thesis for linguistic theory and psy-
cholinguistic theory, which will be discussed together since some issues are at the
intersection of these two fields. Specific issues to be discussed are the typology
of presupposition triggers, accommodation, presupposition theory more broadly,
theories of Focus and QUDs and the idea of QUDs as processing domains, as well
as discourse processing more generally.
6.3.1 Trigger Typology
The first issue to be discussed is how the current findings and the contrast between
presupposition triggers in terms of Focus-sensitivity relates to previous proposals
that distinguish between classes of triggers. As reviewed in detail in Section 2.4,
there have been numerous distinctions made between classes of presupposition
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triggers based on a number of different properties. Given that not all proposals
are concerned with the same triggers however, and in order to keep this subsec-
tion comprehensive, the present discussion will be restricted to the two potentially
most prominent proposals, namely Abusch’s (2010) soft vs hard distinction and
Sudo’s (2012) entailing vs non-entailing distinction (see also Klinedinst 2016 and
the respective review in Section 2.4 for a connection between the two).
The question to be addressed is to what extent the present proposal can account
for the central data of these proposals or even replace them. An overview regard-
ing the respective proposals is shown in Table 6.1, restricted to those triggers that
have been explicitly discussed or tested in all three proposal (see Appendix A.2 for
the full overview). (I will also comment on one other property that is part of the
trigger typology during the discussion, namely anaphoricity.)
soft/hard entailing/non-entailing +/-Focus-sensitive
stop/continue soft entailing -
again hard non-entailing -
too/also, even hard non-entailing +
Table 6.1: Trigger Typology Overview.
In terms of empirical properties, Abusch’s (2010) distinction is primarily concerned
with the degree to which different triggers project when their presupposition is
unsupported, or - in theoretical terms - the ease with which a trigger can be lo-
cally accommodated. To account for this contrast, Abusch argues for soft and hard
triggers differing in their triggering mechanism, with soft triggers being pragmati-
cally triggered and therefore easily suspended, whereas hard triggers are lexically
encoded and therefore more persistent.
As an initial observation, Abusch’s proposal and the one made here do in fact
seem to overlap quite substantially, as noted in Section 2.4. None of her soft triggers
qualify as Focus-sensitive - insofar as the existential presupposition of bare Focus
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can be argued to be a special case, see Section 3.4 - and all her hard triggers, such
as also, even, and it-clefts, - with one notable exception I will come back to shortly -
can be argued for to involve some dependency on Focus.3 Beyond this superficial
overlap however, a more crucial question is whether appealing to Focus-sensitivity
could account for the noted difference in projection behavior that are the central
data Abusch’s proposal is designed to capture.
One option would be to argue that local accommodation is subject to the same
principles as global accommodation. On this view, only Focus-sensitive triggers,
which require a linguistic antecedent for their presupposition to be satisfied, are
expected to incur any difficulty. As an additional assumption to account for the in-
tuition that locally accommodating a presupposition is easier than globally accom-
modating, the relevant structures could be conceptualized within DRT - which has
been independently supported as a way to capture processing behavior in projec-
tive environments by (Schwarz & Tiemann, 2017) - such that the antecedent would
only have to be accommodated at a sub-level of the discourse model. This feature
may alleviate processing cost, given that an additional projection step could be
avoided.
To illustrate this idea, consider the Abusch-style suspension context in (6.10a).
A DRT representation for the initial stage of the discourse prior to accommodation
is shown in (6.10b), with the presupposition of too in bold.
(6.10) a. (I don’t know whether Samantha is tall, but...)
...if Tory is tall too, Samantha will be upset.
3It-clefts have not been discussed in detail so far and therefore constitute the potentially most












What is crucial here is that, for the discourse to be consistent in light of the speaker’s
suspended belief regarding the content of the presupposition, it is sufficient for the
presupposition to be part of the box associated with the antecedent of the condi-
tional rather than the global structure. That is, although there is still an antecedent
to be accommodated, the additional step of moving up the antecedent could be
avoided and the commitment remain hypothetical, resulting in less processing
costs than if the antecedent were to be accommodated globally. However, this ex-
planation relies on the assumption that local and global accommodation do in fact
pattern together with respect to trigger classes, which would have to be quantita-
tively validated.
As an additional but separate caveat, again constitutes an exception to the over-
lap between the soft-hard distinction and whether a trigger is Focus-sensitive or
not, insofar as again is considered to be a hard trigger by Abusch but does not
qualify as Focus-sensitive with respect to the stress placement test from Section
3.3. However, again also took an intermediate position regarding the rating results
of Experiment 3, with it being rated higher than Focus-sensitive triggers, but some-
what lower than other triggers lacking Focus-sensitivity. It might thus be possible
to rectify the apparent divergence if again turned out to be harder to locally ac-
commodate than other non Focus-sensitive triggers, but still easier than Focus-
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sensitive triggers like too, in line with the pattern for global accommodation. Thus,
a quantitative assessment of the relationship between local and global accommo-
dation seems necessary to decide whether the present proposal could serve as a
replacement of Abusch’s (2010)’s soft-hard distinction.
The second proposal to be discussed here is Sudo’s (2012) distinction between
triggers that entail their presupposition and those that are purely presuppositional.
In addition to the narrow set of representative examples in Table 6.1, other triggers
relevant to the discussion from experimental work by Zehr & Schwarz (2018b) - to
which I will come back to shortly - include return and back, both of which pattern
with non-entailing triggers.4 First considering the overlap between the entailing vs
non-entailing distinction and a trigger’s Focus-sensitivity, it becomes apparent that
there is more divergence than for the soft-hard distinction. The relevant triggers
here are return and back, neither of which are entailing despite not being Focus-
sensitive, in addition to the previous culprit again.
Additionally, regarding the question how to relate the present account to the
distinction between entailing and non-entailing triggers, it is not obvious how
such a connection could be made. One possibility would be to adopt Klinedinst’s
(2016)’s proposal that whether a trigger entails its presupposition or not can be
derived from whether it is soft or hard, which would allow us to appeal to the
ideas regarding the soft-hard distinction discussed above. However, equating the
two distinctions faces independent empirical challenges insofar as the two classes
diverge for a few triggers. For instance, return and back seem to behave like soft
triggers, but do not entail their presupposition, in contrast to stop, which is soft
but does entail its presupposition. This divergence therefore renders an attempt to
equate the two distinctions problematic.
4In Zehr & Schwarz’s (2018b) results, back was interpreted as entailing its presupposition more
so than strictly non-entailing triggers such as also and again, but still much less than a strictly en-
tailing trigger like stop (also: <10% entailing, back: ≈25%, stop: >75%). Thus, for the purposes of
discussion, back will be treated as non-entailing.
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However, an alternative path toward an explanation for what makes - at least
certain - triggers entail their presupposition has already been hinted at by Zehr
& Schwarz (2018b). As a reminder, their hypothesis regarding this question was
that triggers that cannot be removed from the sentence without resulting in un-
grammaticality entail their presupposition, while those which can be removed do
not - essentially contrasting verbal triggers and particles. Since particularly the
case of return as behaving like a non-entailing trigger despite not being removable
was inconsistent with this hypothesis, Zehr & Schwarz suggest that one other po-
tentially relevant factor might be how the eventualities that are being presupposed
relate to the eventualities at-issue. For instance, stop as an entailing trigger requires
the presupposed eventuality to overlap with the at-issue eventuality, whereas the
eventuality presupposed by return and back have to be distinct from the at-issue
eventuality.
This contrast is illustrated in (6.11), where stop in (6.11a) in infelicitous because
Mr Miyagi was not asleep right before, even though he was asleep at a previously
mentioned time, while return and back in (6.11b)-(6.11c) are felicitous with - and
may even require - the intermediate contrasting state.
(6.11) Mr Miyagi fell asleep at 2am and woke up at 2pm.
a. #Five minutes later, he stopped sleeping.
b. Five minutes later, he returned to sleep.
c. Five minutes later, he went back to sleep.
Appealing to these fine-grained representational properties of the respective trig-
gers might already be necessary to account for other data such as the difference be-
tween again and still in Experiment 3 in terms of accommodation difficulty, which
will be discussed in more detail the next subsection. Despite both triggers lack-
ing Focus-sensitivity, the data showed that still could be accommodated with little
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to no effort, similar to continue, while again seemed to incur some - albeit minor
- difficulty. As argued for in Chapter 5, this contrast might be due to the eventu-
ality presupposed by again being distinct from the at-issue eventuality, while still
merely presupposes that the at-issue eventuality extends further into the past, as
illustrated in (6.12). This contrast is thus analogous to the one between return and
back on the one hand and stop on the other mentioned above.
(6.12) Mr Miyagi fell asleep at 2am and woke up at 2pm.
a. Five minutes later, he was asleep again.
b. #Five minutes later, he was still asleep.
Additionally, the contrast between still and again further highlights the need to
distinguish between different uses of the notion of anaphoricity, as hinted at in
Section 2.4. Both again and still are anaphoric according to Beck (2007, 2020) in
terms of their lexical entry including a free variable that can be resolved contextu-
ally, but while still is easy to accommodate, again is not, contrary to Kripke’s (2009)
terminology.
To conclude, these findings can be taken as an argument that a formal account
of presuppositions has to include a representational component. That is, in order
to understand a wider range of properties of a given presupposition trigger, it is
necessary to consider what the discourse representation consists of and what parts
of the representation presuppositions relate to. Combining such a perspective with
the present account might then be able to capture data from both Abusch’s (2010)
and Sudo’s (2012) proposals. Furthermore, emphasizing the representational com-
ponent seems particularly crucial for a theory of (global) accommodation, which
will be discussed in the next subsection.
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6.3.2 Accommodation
Accommodation, both as a formal mechanism in semantic theory and as a cog-
nitive process employed by the discourse processing system, is relevant to many
areas of research in linguistics and psycholinguistics. In light of this relevance,
studying accommodation in terms of the conditions under which what is treated
as contextual requirements leads or does not lead to unacceptability when those
requirements are not met can yield important insights into the nature of the un-
derlying representations and the means the discourse processor has available to
adjust them.
However, the limits of accommodation are comparatively less well understood,
beyond the recognition of factors such as controversiality/plausibility.5 Particu-
larly the variation between presupposition triggers with respect to their accom-
modation difficulty has been known for many years but not received much atten-
tion. While the notion of anaphoricity - despite its terminological issues discussed
in Section 2.4 - has proven useful in this area by highlighting the analogy with
pronominal expressions, which have been more extensively studied, it is concep-
tually inadequate due to the fact that it only yields two classes: anaphoric triggers
and non-anaphoric triggers. The present results show why a two-way distinction
is insufficient, or even inaccurate. While again causes some difficulty, too causes
more, in addition to still being easy to accommodate despite being anaphoric like
again.
To capture these differences, I want to argue that it is necessary to take into ac-
count how triggers differ in terms of their event-structure, elaborating on the ideas
from the previous subsection. Additionally, using the proposed way of formaliz-
5Note that this statement concerns global accommodation exclusively. While research on accom-
modation with respect to projection properties has also been sparse, there are noteworthy proposals
available, such as Beaver & Zeevat (2007) and Romoli & Sauerland (2017), which are not directly
relevant here, however.
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ing the antecedent required by Focus-sensitive triggers with DRT may offer a way
to quantify accommodation difficulty more accurately. Each of these arguments re-
lates to one relevant contrast of the results of Experiment 3 namely the difference
between again and still, and the difference between again and too.
Recall that Experiment 3 showed a larger decrease in acceptability for too when
its presupposition was not satisfied then for again, but again still showed some
decrease relative to the presuppositionless control, which was different for other
triggers lacking Focus-sensitivity, such as still. The hypothesized contrast between
Focus-sensitive triggers requiring a linguistic antecedent and not Focus-sensitive
triggers accessing the Common Ground would thus leave the decrease for again
unaccounted for.
As a first step to capture these contrasts, I propose that aspectual triggers like
again and still whose presuppositions are concerned with eventualities - events
and states - should be conceptualized in terms of a narrative timeline that rep-
resents when events and states take place and how they are temporally related.
Furthermore, I want to suggest that eventualities on this timeline can be treated as
discourse referents in DRT-like structures. Recall that DRT separates its contents
into discourse referents and predications using discourse referents as arguments.
On this account, a personal pronoun would simply pick up an individual-level dis-
course referent. Again would function analogously, only that its discourse referent
is an eventuality rather than an individual.
Assuming such a type is independently necessary in order to capture phenom-
ena related to tense and aspect in a narrative structure. This formal choice should
however not be taken as a commitment to equating the narrative timeline with
what is represented in what I have been referring to as the discourse model, since
such an equation would risk the previously endorsed mapping between triggers
lacking Focus-sensitivity and the Common Ground on the one hand and Focus-
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sensitive triggers and the discourse model on the other.
On this account, the contrast between again and still can be captured as follows.
In the case of again, what is being presupposed is a previous eventuality that can-
not overlap with the eventuality denoted by the prejacent. That is, there has to be
something in between the presupposed eventuality and the at-issue eventuality
for again to be felicitous, similar to the cases discussed earlier in (6.11) and (6.12),
repeated in (6.13a).
(6.13) Mr Miyagi fell asleep at 2am and woke up at 2pm.
a. Five minutes later, he was asleep again.
b. #Five minutes later, he was still asleep.
In contrast, still presupposes that the eventuality denoted by the prejacent extends
further into the past, that is, there cannot be something intervening between what
is presupposed and what is at-issue, as supported by the data in (6.13b). In order
to accommodate again, it is thus necessary to introduce a new discourse referent
on the narrative timeline, which incurs some processing cost. In contrast, still does
not require the introduction of a new discourse referent such that accommodating
its presupposition can take place without major adjustments to the timeline.
Secondly, turning to the contrast between again and too, what is being accessed
by too, as sketched above for also, are propositions, which are composed of dis-
course referents and their predications rather than being primitive propositional
type discourse referents, as illustrated earlier in Subsection 6.2.2. Thus, when the
presupposition of too - or other Focus-sensitive expressions for that matter - is not
satisfied, the repair process involves adding more parts to the discourse model.
The observed penalty may have been further exacerbated by the presence of a pre-
ceding question, since the content of the question may be accessed automatically
due to its relation to Focus, but wrongly so.
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One prediction that the view that propositions are assembled from their parts
makes is that the accommodation difficulty of too’s presupposition may vary de-
pending on what too associates with. That is, if supplementing missing discourse
referents, for instance, is more costly than supplementing predications, the an-
tecedent presupposed by too may be harder to accommodate when too associates
with a DP compared to when it associates with a verb. A illustrative test case is
shown in (6.14). However, given that both instances are unacceptable, a proper
assessment of this issue might require quantitative data.
(6.14) a. Who practiced karate yesterday?
b. What did Aisha do yesterday?
Aisha practiced karate too.
Although the account sketched here needs to be developed further, I hope to have
shown that including a representational component into our approaches to pre-
suppositions may yield insights for a theory of accommodation, and can be made
precise within a framework like DRT. For the time being, I will leave it at the sketch
provided here, but have already pointed out several ways in which such an ac-
count makes further predictions to be tested in future work. The next subsection
serves as a kind of wrap-up of the discussion on presupposition by turning to im-
plications for a theory of presupposition more generally.
6.3.3 Presupposition Theory
One main issue for a theory of presuppositions is to reconcile the idea that there is a
unique notion of meaning we identify as presuppositions with the noted variation
among triggers. The prevalence of this issue is reflected in the way approaches
differ with respect to which aspects of presuppositions are taken as essential and
what constitutes the primary desiderata for a successful theory.
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The position I want to take here is that an attempt at a unified theory of pre-
suppositions may be misguided, in line with Karttunen’s (2016) conclusion that
the heterogeneity of presupposition triggers is due to not all triggers being of the
same “species". That is, differences between triggers may be due to differences in
their underlying representations, which may carry over to a need for using differ-
ent formal approaches for different triggers. Specifically, the idea of +FOCUS trig-
gers requiring a linguistic antecedent may be best captured in a theory like DRT,
whereas the treatment of presuppositions in terms of the Common Ground à la
Heim (1983) may be most appropriate for -FOCUS triggers.6
While developing a formal theory along those lines goes beyond the scope of
the current thesis, the previous subsections offered initial ideas that may serve as
jumping-off points in this respect. Relatedly, it is also worth keeping in mind that
some properties in which triggers differ may also have a psycholinguistic explana-
tion rather than require locating them as part of the grammar, which will also be
elaborated on in the next section. This perspective furthermore highlights the role
psycholinguistic research can have by providing arguments for or against formal
linguistic theories.
6.3.4 Focus & QUDs
The question to be discussed in this subsection is how the findings relate to formal
accounts of Focus, as well as QUDs. Starting with the former, one hitherto disre-
garded aspect of the results are their implications for the difference between bare
Focus and Focus in the context of Focus-sensitive expressions. Most notably Exper-
iments 2 and 3 used questions to indicate the Focus-structure of their respective
target sentences while simultaneously manipulating the kind of presupposition
trigger occurring in the target sentence. That is, Focus was present even in sen-
6Along similar lines, Zeevat (1992) argued that the anaphoric approach of van der Sandt (1992)
and Heim’s (1983) approach may in fact be accurate for distinct sets of triggers.
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tences containing triggers lacking Focus-sensitivity and remained constant across
the compared conditions, but we still saw differences emerge depending on the
respective trigger. From a theoretical perspective, the results can therefore not be
attributed to how Focus-alternatives per se behave in the investigated discourses
but instead to the way these alternatives are used by Focus-sensitive expressions.
With respect to formal theories of Focus such as Rooth (1985, 1992), the fact that
Focus-sensitive triggers showed effects different from other triggers even when Fo-
cus was kept constant may furthermore be taken as evidence to keep the relation-
ship between Focus and Focus-sensitive expressions independent. An argument in
this respect was already made in Section 3.3 by noting that the conditions of ad-
ditive particles and the squiggle operator should be indistinguishable otherwise.
In light of this argument, it was assumed that the purpose of Focus is to indicate a
QUD, whereas Focus-sensitivity is about a covert variable C specified by the con-
text. With respect to the characterization of Focus as anaphoric, the above view
could then be taken to mean that only Focus-sensitive expressions are anaphoric
in the sense of requiring an antecedent. Alternatively, both bare Focus and Focus-
sensitive expressions could be considered anaphoric, but to different aspects of
the context, namely the content as it is shaped by the discourse structure - e.g. a
proposition - or the discourse structure itself - e.g. the QUD.
Regarding implications for QUDs specifically, Experiments 1a and particularly
Experiment 2 provided evidence for the role of QUDs in restricting the retrieval
of alternatives for Focus-sensitive particles. These results may be taken as an ar-
gument in favor of relativizing alternatives of Focus-sensitive expressions to the
QUD-structure, along the lines of Beaver & Clark (2008). Alternatively, the data
could also be explained in terms of a more general way in which QUDs affect the
salience of material in the discourse, which may extend to other anaphora-like ex-
pressions, given that the experiments did not compare the QUD-structure with
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other accounts of discourse structure. The processing side of this issue will be dis-
cussed in the next subsection.
6.3.5 Discourse Processing
The first issue to be discussed in this subsection concerns the idea proposed in
Chapter 4 that QUDs can be viewed as processing domains. That is, material that
addresses the same or a closely related QUD is privileged in terms of its activa-
tion, whereas a change in QUD leads to material being shunted from memory,
analogous to what Gernsbacher (1985) calls processing shifts. The experiments in
Chapter 4 provided evidence that the QUD-structure matters for the way Focus-
sensitive expressions find their antecedent in the discourse, in line with theoretical
proposals such as Beaver & Clark (2008).
While the connection between Focus-sensitive expressions and the QUD-struc-
ture was previously made in terms of salience, we may nonetheless ask whether
there is an alternative perspective on the results. That is, what it is about Focus-
sensitive expressions that yields the observed connection with QUDs from a pro-
cessing point of view? What I want to suggest here as a starting point for address-
ing this question is one that takes seriously the notion of sets that underlies the
representation of Focus-alternatives in formal approaches. In order to address this
question, I first want to elaborate on the proposed view of representing a linguistic
antecedent in DRT and its connection to discourse processing more generally.
As noted at the very beginning of this thesis, there is a considerable amount of
work on memory representations from syntactic processing. For instance, accounts
in terms of cue-based retrieval (Van Dyke & Lewis, 2003; Lewis & Vasishth, 2005) -
which treats representations in memory as content-addressable by virtue of them
being marked by certain features - have been applied to a variety of different phe-
nomena, such as agreement (Wagers et al., 2009), filler-gap processing (Kim et al.,
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2020), reflexives (Sloggett, 2017), NPIs (Parker & Phillips, 2016), or ellipsis (Mar-
tin, 2018). However, work on how information is represented and accessed in dis-
course has been much more sparse in the psycholinguistics literature (but see e.g.
Myers & O’Brien 1998 for relevant research from text processing). A notable excep-
tion in this regard is research on pronouns. What distinguishes the issues that arise
for processing pronouns from those related to the work presented here though, is
that insights regarding personal pronouns are restricted to individual-level entities
rather than a more complete representation of the content of a sentence.
What I want to suggest here is that the previously proposed idea to concep-
tualize the antecedent Focus-sensitive presupposition triggers require in terms of
a proposition that is composed of parts of the discourse model offers an alterna-
tive perspective on the results from Experiment 2. Specifically, the finding that
intervening material led to processing difficulty for also could be viewed in terms
of similarity-based interference. To illustrate this idea, consider the sample item
in (6.15). The prejacent of also can be represented here as stay(amber,motel,Boston),
which yields stay(amber,motel,x), with x ≠ Boston, after substituting a variable for
the constituent also associates with.7 Although the appropriate antecedent is con-
tributed by B1st, the proposition Bint - stay(amber,friend’s-house,Chicago) - still par-
tially matches this antecedent and thus leads to interference.
(6.15) local intervener
A1st: Where did Amber stay when she was in LA?
B1st: She stayed at a motel.
Aint: Where did she stay when she was in Chicago?
Bint: She crashed at a friend’s house.
7Assuming the set of propositions to be of this form is a simplification here, given that the
question actually Focuses at a motel. However, by virtue of the discourse structure, in Boston in
Alast has to receive stress as well, and given that this week cannot be omitted in Blast’s response,
in Boston seems to be what also associates with.
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Alast: Where did she stay when she was in Boston?
Blast: She also stayed at a motel in Boston.
There are a few further predictions this view makes. First, the content of the inter-
vening material should matter, independently of the QUD-structure. That is, even
with leaving the questions in (6.15) unchanged, the amount of interference may
vary depending on how semantically similar the object of Bint is in relation to at a
motel. For instance, motel and friend’s house may be more similar than motel and five
star hotel. A related case may be the suggestive pattern in Experiment 2 of items
with implicit negation showing a numerically larger rating decrease. These cases
could be conceived of as entailing the negation of the required antecedent and thus
matching perfectly except for the embedding operator.
Secondly, the interference view would - similar to the original salience view on
QUDs - predict that changing the QUD of the intervening material should affect
the processing of also, but for different reasons. To illustrate this point, consider the
two dialogues in (6.16) (repeated from (4.21)), which only differ in the intervening
question-answer pair.
(6.16) a. local intervener
A1st: Where did Amber stay when she was in LA?
B1st: She stayed at a motel.
Aint: Where did she stay when she was in Chicago?
Bint: She crashed at a friend’s house.
Alast: Where did she stay when she was in Boston?
Blast: She also stayed at a motel in Boston.
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b. non-local intervener
A1st: Where did Amber stay when she was in LA?
B1st: She stayed at a motel.
Aint: Where did Beth stay when she was in LA?
Bint: She crashed at a friend’s house.
Alast: Where did Amber stay when she was in Boston?
Blast: She also stayed at a motel in Boston.
For the intervening question-answer pair in (6.16a), there is a global QUD available
that spans the whole discourse, namely “Where did Amber stay where?". In contrast,
the intervener in (6.16b) instead sets up a distinct QUD of the form “Who stayed
where in LA?", connecting the intervener with the first question-answer pair. The
intervener in (6.16b) thus has less semantic overlap with the antecedent also would
be looking for. The prediction that changing the intervening QUD should cause
less interference would thus receive deeper grounding. Additionally, interference
itself could be understood in relation to Focus-alternatives being conceptualized
formally as sets, with the relation between its members being causal to the inter-
ference effects. Developing a theory that treats the way Focus-sensitive expressions
access propositional content in the discourse along those lines could therefore yield
broader insights into discourse processing that are tightly linked to approaches in
formal linguistic theory.
However, it is worth emphasizing that the present proposal at its current stage
is not intended as an exhaustive account of discourse memory, but as a starting
point for future research that offers further predictions to be tested. In a similar
vein, the next section delves into some of the limitations of the present thesis and
possible extensions.
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6.4 Extensions and Future Work
In addition to its implications, there are also a few ways in which the current find-
ings are limited. Three specific ones to be discussed here are its restriction to data
from English, the broad but still limited set of triggers tested here, and the restric-
tion to conventionalized Focus-sensitivity. I will elaborate on these issues in turn
and discuss future extensions.
The first limitation concerns the fact that the data presented here was restricted
to English. We might thus wonder to what extent the claims of the FoPAH have
cross-linguistic validity. Minimally, the two main properties providing evidence
for the FoPAH - discourse interference from Experiment 2 and accommodation
difficulty from Experiment 3 - seem to carry over into German, based on my own
intuitions as a native speaker. In the German variant of the sample item from Ex-
periment 2 in (6.17), auch (‘also’) seems less acceptable than wieder (‘again’) when
the intervening material is present.
(6.17) A1st: How did Martha get to work two weeks ago?
B1st: She took the train.
(Aint: How did she get to work last week?
Bint: She took the bus.)


































Blast: ‘She took the train again this week.’
Similarly, including auch in B’s response in the German variant of a sample item
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from Experiment 3 in (6.18) intuitively leads to a larger decrease in acceptability
than including wieder. Although German and English are quite closely related, this
pattern therefore provides evidence against restricting the claims made here to
English exclusively.

















B: ‘Jonas has dinner in Frankfurt tomorrow (too/again).’
However, beyond this minimal extension, the question regarding the FoPAH’s
cross-linguistic applicability is non-trivial for two main reasons. The first concerns
the realization and representation of Focus cross-linguistically. In intonational lan-
guages like English and German, Focus is primarily marked prosodically. How-
ever, languages use different means to indicate Focus, for instance syntactically,
as in Hungarian (Szabolcsi, 1981), or morphologically, as in Gùrùntùm (Hartmann
& Zimmermann, 2009). This variation raises deeper questions regarding whether
the notion of Focus in terms of evoking alternatives assumed here covers other
languages as well. Zimmermann & Onea (2011) argue that this characterization
of Focus does in fact have cross-linguistic validity. However, languages may also
differ in the way alternatives are being evoked, for instance whether they are prag-
matically inferred or restricted to specific mentions in the context. Exploring cross-
linguistic variation in this way will be left for future work.
The second reason a generalization across languages is difficult concerns the
representation of presuppositions. As mentioned in Section 2.3, impressionistically
it seems to be the case that at least some presuppositional expressions have cross-
linguistic stability. That is, the equivalent of a trigger like stop in other languages is
going to make the same cut with respect to which parts of its content are at-issue
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and which are presupposed. However, to what extent presuppositions behave the
same way across languages is an open question. Although there is some cross-
linguistic work, it rarely goes beyond a small set of well-studied languages from
similar language families, such as German (Schwarz, 2007; Tiemann, 2014), Span-
ish (Amaral & Cummins, 2015), French (Chemla, 2009), or Italian (Domaneschi,
2016). Notable exceptions to this restriction are Tonhauser et al. (2013) on Para-
guayan Guaraní - which was discussed in Section 2.4 - and Matthewson (2006,
2008) on Lillooet.
The data on different presuppositional expressions reported by Tonhauser et al.
(2013) can be taken as evidence that some crucial features of the present account
carry over to other languages. The authors show for instance that the Guaraní
equivalents of too and stop pattern as in English with respect to accommodation
difficulty - or Strong Contextual Felicity in their terms. These data are therefore
promising regarding an extension of the FoPAH to languages unrelated to English.
Matthewson (2006, 2008) on the other hand provides evidence for what might
be considered parametric variation with respect to the representation of presup-
positions across languages. Matthewson argues that presuppositions in Lillooet
do not constitute contextual requirements based on data showing that speakers
easily accept presuppositional expressions introducing new information. The trig-
gers she tests include equivalents to again, stop and also, as well as pronouns. Her
account of this variation is framed in terms of an alternative proposal toward pre-
suppositions by Gauker (1998), according to which presuppositions do not have to
be part of the Common Ground but simply the speaker’s take on certain facts.
The crucial question here in order to assess how these findings might be in
opposition to the FoPAH - to the extent that they are not already in opposition
to other more fundamental issues - is how Focus-sensitivity is represented in Lil-
looet, or rather more specifically whether the equivalent to also can be considered
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to be Focus-sensitive. However, Matthewson’s data also already shows that the
equivalent to again can easily introduce new information, despite it lacking Focus-
sensitivity in English and contrary to the results of Experiment 3. On the other
hand, the decrease for again in Experiment 3 might have been small enough to not
be essentially different from its behavior in Lillooet. A potentially interesting path
for further exploration could then be to test whether triggers in Lillooet give rise
to the interference effects observed for also in Experiment 2. If such effects were
absent, the behavior of presupposition triggers in Lillooet would fit with the treat-
ment of triggers lacking Focus-sensitivity in the FoPAH.8 Overall, more data is
needed to assess the scope of the FoPAH across languages.
The second aspect with respect to which the current thesis is limited concerns
the set of triggers tested. Although the investigation was not restricted to just one
trigger from each set and therefore relatively broad, there were also a few promi-
nent trigger types not included here. The potentially most notable ones are factives
and to a lesser degree it-clefts.
Regarding factives, the main reasons for not including them here was due to
their obvious syntactic differences, insofar as their presupposition is expressed
with a full clause. Additionally, at least some factives are known to easily allow
for informative presuppositions, which means a factive might not require access-
ing the discourse in the same way and thus not allow us to probe the underly-
ing mechanism. However, at least the claim that factives are easy to accommodate
would be in line with the prediction of the FoPAH.
Concerning it-clefts, a crucial question that needs to be addressed before being
able to evaluate how they would fit into the current picture is what their presup-
position exactly is. It is usually argued that an it-cleft carries an existential presup-
8An alternative explanation would be that the assumed presuppositional expressions in Lillooet
are not presuppositions in the first place but conventional implicatures, which would be consistent
with Matthewson’s (2006) argument to treat them as presuppositions based on their projection
behavior.
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position identical to the one assumed for bare Focus, as illustrated in (6.19).9
(6.19) a. It was Katie who found Gordon.
b. [KATIE]F found Gordon.
↝ Someone found Gordon
However, as discussed in Section 3.4, the assumed existential presupposition of
bare Focus is quite weak and easily blocked - which was taken as an argument for
treating the presupposition of Focus in terms of QUDs - whereas the presupposi-
tion of it-clefts seems stronger, as shown by the contrast in (6.20).
(6.20) Who found Gordon?
a. #It was nobody who found Gordon.
b. [NOBODY]F found Gordon.
Latex-hack (adapted from DRYER 1996, (12))
Nonetheless, the fact that Focus is involved might be taken as an argument that
it-clefts fit the FoPAH. Thus, while the behavior of other triggers has to be investi-
gated properly in order to assess the validity of the FoPAH, at least on first glance
the predictions for other triggers seem to be met.
The third and final limitation that constitutes more of an intentional restric-
tion concerns the type of Focus-sensitivity relevant to the FoPAH. As discussed
in Section 3.3, Beaver & Clark (2008) distinguish between three different types of
Focus-sensitivity: quasi-association, which covers non-veridical propositional op-
erators like negation; free association, which is the restriction of a free variable for
expressions like always; and conventionalized association, which is a grammatical-
9It has also been argued that the exhaustive inference associated with it-clefts is presupposi-
tional (e.g. Büring & Križ 2013). However, given that this claim remains controversial (see Drenhaus
et al. 2011 for discussion as well as experimental results), it will be put aside here.
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ized dependency on Focus exemplified by particles like only and even. Notably, all
expressions tested here were of the conventionalized type. The motivation for in
turn restricting the claims of the FoPAH to this type was that the formal treatment
of these expressions involves an anaphoric dependency, analogous to the charac-
terization of Focus-sensitive expressions requiring a linguistic antecedent.
However, it may still be the case that certain properties found for convention-
alized Focus-sensitivity are present for other types as well. For example, the idea
of QUDs as processing domains and the evidence from Chapter 4 supporting it
may also apply to free association cases, insofar as such cases are about restricting
the domain of quantification in some way. However, intuitively a case like always
also differs from the expressions tested here with respect to accommodation, since
they are acceptable without contextual support, possibly due to the availability of
a default interpretation. It seems therefore reasonable to maintain the restriction of
the claims of the FoPAH to conventionalized association with Focus, even if some
properties may be shared with other types of Focus-sensitivity.
To conclude, there are quite a number of ways in which the scope of the present
investigation can be extended to other languages, trigger types, and Focus-sensitive
expressions. Additionally, the previous section sketched out ideas that may prove
useful in the development of a theory of accommodation, as well as discourse pro-
cessing more broadly and the question of how contextual information is repre-
sented and accessed. The thesis thus outlines several paths for future investiga-
tions specifically into the representations of propositional content in terms of the




A.1 Presuppositions in a Typology of Meaning - Diagnostics Data
This section presents data from the diagnostics for identifying presuppositional
content - and contrastingly other kinds of meaning - proposed in Section 2.1. The
example for each (type of) expression is ordered as follows: targetability, defeasi-
bility, nondisplaceability. Data is organized with respect to the distinctions made
in Section 2.1, followed by presupposition triggers discussed in Section 2.4, and




Gordon is growing a beard.
⇒ Gordon is growing a beard
a. A: Gordon is growing a beard.
B: That’s not true, he shaved this morning.
b. Gordon is growing a beard.
#In fact, he shaved this morning.
c. Whenever Gordon has a new idea, he is growing a beard.
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→ False/infelicitous if there is any Gordon-having-a-new-idea sit-
uation in which he is not growing a beard.
(A.2) Conversational Implicatures
Donna acquired some of the shares of Mutiny.
↝ Donna hasn’t acquired all of the shares of Mutiny
a. A: Donna acquired some of the shares of Mutiny.
B: #That’s not true, she acquired all of the shares.
b. Donna acquired some of the shares of Mutiny.
In fact, she acquired all of them.
c. Whenever Donna gets enough money, she acquires some of the
shares of Mutiny.
→ False/infelicitous if there is any Donna-getting-enough-money
situation in which she acquires all of the shares.
(A.3) Conventional Implicatures - Epithets
That jerk Joe works at IBM.
↝ The speaker has a negative attitude toward Joe
a. A: That jerk Joe works at IBM.
B: #That’s not true, you said he was super nice just yesterday.
b. That jerk Joe works at IBM.
#In fact, I really like him.
c. Whenever Cameron wants to leave, that jerk Joe convinces her to
stay.
→ Not false/infelicitous if there is any Cameron-wanting-to-leave
situation in which the speaker doesn’t have a negative attitude to-
ward Joe.
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(A.4) Conventional Implicatures - Expressive Adjectives
Bos broke his damn contract.
↝ The speaker has a negative attitude with respect to Bos breaking his contract
a. A: Bos broke his damn contract.
B: #That’s not true, you were happy about the idea of Bos breaking
his contract just yesterday.
b. Bos broke his damn contract.
#In fact, I feel quite happy about it.
c. Whenever Bos gets under pressure, he breaks his damn contract.
→ Not false/infelicitous if there is any Bos-getting-under-pressure
situation in which the speaker doesn’t have a negative attitude to-
ward Bos breaking his contract.
Presupposition Triggers from Section 2.4
(A.5) Definite Descriptions
The TV-show Halt and Catch Fire was never nominated for an Emmy.
↝ There is a unique TV-show called Halt and Catch Fire
a. A: The TV-show Halt and Catch Fire was never nominated for an
Emmy.
B: #That’s not true, there’s no show with that name.
b. The TV-show Halt and Catch Fire was never nominated for an
Emmy.
#In fact, there is no show with that name.
c. Whenever Alex texts Emma in the evening, he talks about the TV-
show Halt and Catch Fire.
→ False/infelicitous if there is any Alex-texting-Emma-in-the-evening
situation in which there is no TV-show Halt and Catch Fire.
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(A.6) Selectional Restrictions
Cameron is a bachelorette.
↝ Cameron is female
a. A: Cameron is a bachelorette.
B: #That’s not true, Cameron is male.
b. Cameron is a bachelorette.
#In fact, (s)he’s male.
c. Whenever Cameron drives out to the country, she celebrates being
a bachelorette.
→ False/infelicitous if there is any Cameron-driving-to-the-country
situation in which she is not female.
(A.7) Achievement Verbs
Haley won a science competition at school.
↝ Haley participated in a science competition
a. A: Haley won a science competition at school.
B: ?That’s not true, she didn’t participate in any competition.
b. Haley won a science competition at school.
#In fact, she didn’t participate in the competition.
c. Whenever Haley gets inspired, she wins a science competition.
→ False/infelicitous if there is any Haley-getting-inspired situation
in which she does not participate in a science competition.
(A.8) Cognitive Factives
Diane discovered that Bos hid something from her.
↝ Bos hid something from Diane
a. A: Diane discovered that Bos hid something from her.
B: #That’s not true, Bos didn’t hide anything from Diane.
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b. Diane discovered that Bos hid something from her.
#In fact, Bos didn’t hide anything from Diane.
c. Whenever Diane looks around the garage, she discovers that Bos
hid something from her.
→ False/infelicitous if there is any Diane-looking-around-the-garage
situation in which Bos didn’t hide something from her.
(A.9) Emotive Factives
Joe regrets that he left Texas.
↝ Joe left Texas
a. A: Joe regrets that he left Texas.
B: #That’s not true, Joe didn’t leave Texas.
b. Joe regrets that he left Texas.
#In fact, Joe didn’t leave Texas.
c. Whenever Joe thinks of Cameron, he regrets that he left Texas.
→ False/infelicitous if there is any Joe-thinking-of-Cameron situa-
tion in which he didn’t leave Texas.
(A.10) Aspectual Verbs: stop
Joanie stopped going to school.
↝ Joanie went to school before
a. A: Joanie stopped going to school.
B: #That’s not true, Joanie never went to school before.
b. Joanie stopped going to school.
#In fact, Joanie never went to school before.
c. A: Joanie went to school on Monday.
B: Whenever Joanie gets a bad grade, she stops going to school on
Wednesday.
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→ False/infelicitous if there is any Joanie-getting-a-bad-grade situ-
ation in which she didn’t go to school on Monday.
(A.11) Aspectual Verbs: return
Lev returned to work at Mutiny.
↝ Lev was working at Mutiny before
a. A: Lev returned to work at Mutiny.
B: #That’s not true, he never worked at Mutiny before.
b. Lev returned to work at Mutiny.
#In fact, he never worked at Mutiny before.
c. A: Lev went to work on Monday.
B: Whenever Lev takes a day off on Tuesday, he returns to work on
Wednesday.
→ False/infelicitous if there is any Lev-taking-a-day-off situation in
which he didn’t go to work on Monday.
(A.12) Aspectual Particles: back
Donna went back to work.
↝ Donna was at work before
a. A: Donna went back to work.
B: #That’s not true, she hasn’t been working before.
b. Donna went back to work.
#In fact, she hasn’t been working before.
c. A: Donna went to work on Monday.
B: Whenever Donna takes a day off on Tuesday, she goes back to
work on Wednesday.
→ False/infelicitous if there is any Donna-taking-a-day-off situa-
tion in which she didn’t go to work on Monday.
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(A.13) Aspectual Particles: temporal still
Gordon is still growing a beard.
↝ Gordon was growing a beard before
a. A: Gordon is still growing a beard.
B: #That’s not true, he wasn’t growing a beard before.
b. Gordon is still growing a beard.
#In fact, he wasn’t growing a beard before.
c. A: Gordon was cooking pasta at 6pm yesterday.
B: Whenever Gordon has a date, he’s still cooking pasta at 7pm.
→ False/infelicitous if there is any Gordon-having-a-date situation
in which he wasn’t cooking pasta at 6pm before.
(A.14) Aspectual Particles: again
Gordon grew a beard again.
↝ Gordon had a beard before
a. A: Gordon grew a beard again.
B: #That’s not true, he’s never had a beard before.
b. Gordon grew a beard again.
#In fact, it was the first time he grew a beard.
c. A: Diane gave Bos a smile yesterday during the meeting.
B: Whenever she’s at the gym, she smiles at him again.
→ False/infelicitous if there is any Diane-at-the-gym situation in
which Diane hasn’t smiled at Bos before during the meeting.
(A.15) Additive Particles
TOM got hired by Mutiny too.
↝ Someone other than Tom got hired by Mutiny
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a. A: TOM got hired by Mutiny too.
B: #That’s not true, Tom was the only one who got hired at Mutiny.
b. TOM got hired by Mutiny too.
#In fact, Tom was the only one who got hired at Mutiny.
c. A: Cameron developed a new game.
B: Whenever he has a good night of sleep, TOM develops a new
game too.
→ False/infelicitous if there is any Tom-getting-a-good-night-of-
sleep situation in which Cameron didn’t develop a new game.
(A.16) Scalar Particles
Ryan even [quit his job]F.
↝ Ryan quitting his job was unexpected or noteworthy
a. A: Ryan even [quit his job]F.
B: #That’s not true, quitting his job wasn’t a noteworthy thing to do
for Ryan.
b. Ryan even [quit his job]F.
#In fact, quitting his job wasn’t a noteworthy thing to do for Ryan.
c. Whenever Ryan feels unfulfilled, he even [quits his job]F.
→ False/infelicitous if there is any Ryan-feeling-unfulfilled situa-
tion in which quitting his job isn’t a noteworthy thing to do for
Ryan.
(A.17) It-Clefts
It was Katie who found Gordon.
↝ Someone found Gordon
a. A: It was Katie who found Gordon.
B: ??That’s not true, Gordon is still missing.
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b. It was Katie who found Gordon.
#In fact, Gordon is still missing.
c. Whenever Gordon goes missing, it is Katie who finds him.
→ False/infelicitous if there is any Gordon-going-missing situation
in which nobody finds him.
Remaining Presupposition Triggers used in Experiments
(A.18) continue
Haley continued to work at Comet.
↝ Haley worked at Comet before
a. A: Haley continued to work at Comet.
B: #That’s not true, Haley never worked at Comet before.
b. Haley continued to work at Comet.
#In fact, Haley never worked at Comet before.
c. A: Haley went to work at Comet on Monday.
B: Whenever Haley gets sick on Tuesday, she continues going to
work on Wednesday.
→ False/infelicitous if there is any Haley-getting-sick situation in
which she didn’t go to work on Monday.
(A.19) only
Joe only offered Gordon [1 million dollars]F.
↝ 1 million dollars is a comparatively small amount
a. A: Joe only offered Gordon [1 million dollars]F.
B: #That’s not true, 1 million dollars is a lot of money.
b. Joe only offered Gordon [1 million dollars]F.
#In fact, 1 million dollars is a lot of money.
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c. Whenever Joe has a new idea for a project, he offers Gordon only
[1 million dollars]F.
→ False/infelicitous if there is any Joe-having-a-new-idea situation
in which 1 million dollars is not a comparatively small amount.
(A.20) concessive at least
At least Cameron gets to travel.
↝ There are worse things than traveling
a. A: At least Cameron gets to travel.
B: #That’s not true, getting to travel doesn’t make things better at
all.
b. At least Cameron gets to travel.
#In fact, getting to travel isn’t good at all.
c. Whenever Cameron has to attend a conference, at least she gets to
travel.
→ False/infelicitous if there is any Cameron-attending-a-conference
situation in which getting to travel isn’t an improvement.
A.2 Typology of Presupposition Triggers - Overview Table
This section provides a summary table of each of the classifications and related ex-
perimental results discussed in Section 2.4 for a selected set of triggers. Although
some classifications might mention other triggers as well, they were omitted here
if those triggers have not received much attention elsewhere. The respective labels
are based on Abusch (2002, 2010); Abbott (2006); Walker (2012) (soft/hard), Sudo
(2012); Zehr & Schwarz (2016, 2018b) ((non-)entailing), Zehr & Schwarz (2018b)
(removable), Glanzberg (2005); Domaneschi et al. (2014) (weak/strong), Tiemann
(2014) (independent), Zeevat (1992, 1994, 2002, 2004), as well as Francis’s (2018)
even-denial (lexical/resolution), Cummins et al. (2013) (backgrounding), Kripke
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(2009) (anaphoric), Beck (2007, 2020); Schwarz (2009) (contextual variable), Ton-
hauser et al. (2013) (SCF, OLE), Bade (2016) (obligatoriness), and the data in the
following section for the present classification in terms of Focus-sensitivity (in
parentheses, if tested intuitively but not included in the next section). For some
of the intermediate labels, the reader is referred to the discussion in Section 2.4.
soft/ (non-)entailing removable weak/ independent
hard strong
Def. Descr. (the N) ∼ non-entailing no (strong) yes
Sel. Restr. (bachelorette) entailing no
Ach. V (win) soft no
Cogn. Fact. (know) soft entailing no strong yes
Emot. Fact. (regret) hard no strong
Asp. V: stop soft entailing no yes
Asp. V: return non-entailing no
Asp. Part.: back (non-entailing) yes
Asp. Part.: still yes
Asp. Part.: again hard non-entailing yes no
Add. Part. (too/also) hard non-entailing yes weak no
Sclr. Part. (even) hard non-entailing yes weak
It-clefts hard yes strong
Table A.1: Trigger Typology Complete Overview, I
lexical/ backgrounding anaphoric contextual
resolution à la Kripke variable
Def. Descr. (the N) resolution (yes)
Sel. Restr. (bachelorette) lexical
Ach. V (win) (lexical)
Cogn. Fact. (know)
Emot. Fact. (regret) lexical no
Asp. V: stop no no yes
Asp. V: return
Asp. Part.: back
Asp. Part.: still no yes
Asp. Part.: again 3rd yes yes yes
Add. Part. (too/also) 3rd yes yes yes
Sclr. Part. (even)
It-clefts 3rd yes
Table A.2: Trigger Typology Complete Overview, II
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SCF OLE obligatoriness Focus-sensitive
Def. Descr. (the N) Maximize PSP (no)
Sel. Restr. (bachelorette) (no)
Ach. V (win) (no)
Cogn. Fact. (know) no yes (Exhaust.) (no)
Emot. Fact. (regret) (no)
Asp. V: stop no yes no
Asp. V: return (no)
Asp. Part.: back no
Asp. Part.: still no
Asp. Part.: again Exhaust. no
Add. Part. (too/also) yes no Exhaust. yes
Sclr. Part. (even) yes
It-clefts (yes)
Table A.3: Trigger Typology Complete Overview, III
A.3 Association with Focus & Focus-sensitivity - Diagnostics Data
This section contains data applying the Stress Placement Test to the presuppo-
sition triggers used in the experiments of this thesis as evidence for classifying
them as Focus-sensitive or not. Triggers qualifying as Focus-sensitive in addition
to also/too are even, only, and concessive at least. Triggers showing no evidence of
Focus-sensitivity in addition to again are still, continue, stop, and back.
+FOCUS
even
(A.21) a. Context A
Tiffany always orders pad thai, and always from Thai Garden.
b. Context B
Tiffany always orders chicken tempura, but never from Thai Gar-
den.
(A.22) a. A: Did Tiffany order anything from Thai Garden yesterday?
B: Yes, she even ordered [CHICKEN TEMPURA]F from Thai Garden.
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b. A: Did Tiffany order chicken tempura yesterday?
B: Yes, she even ordered chicken tempura [FROM THAI GARDEN]F.
→ (A.22a) acceptable in Context A but infelicitous in Context B, and vice versa
for (A.22b)
only
(A.23) a. Context A
Tiffany orders chicken tempura from Thai Garden and from Asian
Taste.
b. Context B
Tiffany orders chicken tempura and pad thai from Thai Garden.
(A.24) a. A: What did Tiffany order from Thai Garden?
B: She only ordered [CHICKEN TEMPURA]F from Thai Garden.
b. A: Where did Tiffany order chicken tempura from?
B: She only ordered chicken tempura [FROM THAI GARDEN]F.
→ (A.24a) acceptable in Context A but infelicitous in Context B, and vice versa
for (A.24b)
Concessive at least
(A.25) a. Context A
Tiffany orders chicken tempura from Thai Garden - which is their




Tiffany orders chicken tempura from Thai Garden - which is their
worst dish, but better than at any other restaurant - but hates the
service.
(A.26) A: Tiffany really hated the service at Thai Garden.
a. B: At least she ordered [CHICKEN TEMPURA]F from Thai Garden.
b. B: At least she ordered chicken tempura [FROM THAI GARDEN]F.




(A.27) a. Context A
Tiffany used to order pad thai from Thai Garden.
Recently, she’s been getting chicken tempura from Thai Garden in-
stead.
b. Context B
Tiffany used to order chicken tempura from Asian Taste.
Recently, she’s been getting chicken tempura from Thai Garden in-
stead.
(A.28) a. A: What has Tiffany been ordering from Thai Garden recently?
B: She is still ordering [CHICKEN TEMPURA]F from Thai Garden.
b. A: Where has Tiffany been ordering chicken tempura from recently?
B: She is still ordering chicken tempura [FROM THAI GARDEN]F.
→ both (A.28a) and (A.28b) infelicitous in either context
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(A.29) Control Context
Tiffany has been ordering pad thai from Thai Garden for a while.
→ both (A.28a) and (A.28b) felicitous in control context
continue
(A.30) a. Context A
On Monday, Tiffany had pad thai from Thai Garden.
On Tuesday, she had chicken tempura from Thai Garden.
b. Context B
On Monday, Tiffany had chicken tempura from Asian Taste.
On Tuesday, she had chicken tempura from Thai Garden.
(A.31) a. A: What did Tiffany order from Thai Garden on Tuesday?
B: She continued ordering [CHICKEN TEMPURA]F from Thai Gar-
den.
b. A: Where did Tiffany order chicken tempura from on Tuesday?
B: She continued ordering chicken tempura [FROM THAI GARDEN]F.
→ both (A.31a) and (A.31b) infelicitous in either context
(A.32) Control Context
On Monday and Tuesday, Tiffany had chicken tempura from Thai Gar-
den.
→ both (A.31a) and (A.31b) felicitous in control context
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stop
(A.33) a. Context A
On Monday, Tiffany had pad thai from Thai Garden.
On Tuesday, she had pineapple fried rice from Asian Taste.
b. Context B
On Monday, Tiffany had chicken tempura from Asian Taste.
On Tuesday, she had pineapple fried rice from Asian Taste.
(A.34) a. A: What did Tiffany order from Thai Garden on Tuesday?
B: She stopped ordering [CHICKEN TEMPURA]F from Thai Garden,
she got pineapple fried rice from Asian Taste instead.
b. A: Where did Tiffany order chicken tempura from on Tuesday?
B: She stopped ordering chicken tempura [FROM THAI GARDEN]F,
she got pineapple fried rice from Asian Taste instead.
→ both (A.34a) and (A.34b) infelicitous in either context
(A.35) Control Context
On Monday, Tiffany had chicken tempura from Thai Garden.
On Tuesday, she had pineapple fried rice from Asian Taste.
→ both (A.34a) and (A.34b) felicitous in control context
back
(A.36) a. Context A
On Monday, Tiffany had pad thai from Thai Garden.
On Tuesday, she had banh mi from Miss Saigon.
On Wednesday, she had chicken tempura from Thai Garden.
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b. Context B
On Monday, Tiffany had chicken tempura from Asian Taste.
On Tuesday, she had banh mi from Miss Saigon.
On Wednesday, she had chicken tempura from Thai Garden.
(A.37) a. A: What did Tiffany order from Thai Garden on Wednesday?
B: She went back to ordering [CHICKEN TEMPURA]F from Thai Gar-
den.
b. A: Where did Tiffany order chicken tempura from on Wednesday?
B: She went back to ordering chicken tempura [FROM THAI GAR-
DEN]F.
→ both (A.37a) and (A.37b) infelicitous in either context
(A.38) Control Context
On Monday, Tiffany had chicken tempura from Thai Garden.
On Tuesday, she had banh mi from Miss Saigon.
On Wednesday, she had chicken tempura from Thai Garden.
→ both (A.37a) and (A.37b) felicitous in control context
A.4 Experimental Items
A.4.1 Experiments 1a/1b
(A.39) A1: Did Anne participate in the { BIKE RACE / ROWING CONTEST }?
B1: She did but she didn’t { win a medal / make it to the finish line }.
A2: Did Beth participate in the bike race?
B2: Yes. She even made it to the finish line.
Experiment 1b: Yes, and she might’ve made it to the finish line.
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(A.40) A1: Did Sue attend the {HISTORY CLASS / CLASS ON GLOBALIZATION}?
B1: She did but she didn’t { get an A / do any background readings }.
A2: Did Sabrina attend the history class?
B2: Yes. She even did all the background readings.
Experiment 1b: Yes, and she might’ve done all the background readings.
(A.41) A1: Did Jeff go shopping { AFTER CHRISTMAS / ON BLACK FRIDAY }?
B1: He did but he didn’t buy { a suit / any socks }.
A2: Did Brett go shopping after Christmas?
B2: Yes. He even bought new socks.
Experiment 1b: Yes, and he might’ve bought new socks.
(A.42) A1: Did Frank go to the { CHARITY GALA / PROM }?
B1: He did but he didn’t get a { limousine / date }.
A2: Did Jake go to the prom?
B2: Yes. He even had a date.
Experiment 1b: Yes. Apparently he had a date.
(A.43) A1: Did Bill play in the { SOCCER / BASKETBALL } game last weekend?
B1: He did but he { wasn’t player of the match / didn’t score }.
A2: Did Ray play in the basketball game?
B2: Yes. He even scored two points.
Experiment 1b: Yes. Apparently he scored two points.
(A.44) A1: Did Charlie { TAKE A COOKING CLASS / MAKE DINNER FOR HIS
FRIENDS } recently?
B1: He did but he didn’t use the { ice cream maker / oven }.
A2: Did Kevin make dinner for his friends?
B2: Yes. He even used the oven.
Experiment 1b: Yes. Apparently he used the new oven.
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(A.45) A1: Is Maggie a member of the { RED CROSS / ACLU }?
B1: She is but she doesn’t donate more than { $100 / $10 } a year.
A2: Is Jill a member of the ACLU?
B2: Yes. She even donates $20 a year.
Experiment 1b: Yes. Apparently she donates $20 a year.
(A.46) A1: Did Karen go to { THE MOVIES / CHURCH } last week?
B1: She did but she didn’t stay {for the whole thing / longer than 5 minutes}.
A2: Did Susie go to church last week?
B2: Yes. She even stayed 10 minutes.
Experiment 1b: Yes. Apparently she stayed 10 minutes.
(A.47) A1: Did Mark go to the { ROCK CONCERT / FRAT PARTY } on Saturday?
B1: He did but he didn’t drink { any hard liquor / anything }.
A2: Did Jim go to the frat party?
B2: Yes. He even had some beer.
Experiment 1b: Yes, and he might’ve had some beer.
(A.48) A1: Did Francine go to the { BEACH / SWIMMING POOL }?
B1: She did but she didn’t { swim much / sit close to the water }.
A2: Did Meg go to the swimming pool?
B2: Yes. She even sat close to the water.
Experiment 1b: Yes. Apparently she sat close to the water.
(A.49) A1: Did Garry go out to dinner at the { COUNTRY CLUB / NEW ITALIAN
PLACE }?
B1: He did but he left before the { dessert / main course }.
A2: Did Hank go out to dinner at the new Italian place?
B2: Yes. He even stayed for the main course.
Experiment 1b: Yes, and he might’ve stayed for the main course.
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(A.50) A1: Did Mike go to the { GROCERY STORE / FARMER’S MARKET } on
Sunday?
B1: He did but he didn’t buy any { rhubarb / onions }.
A2: Did Joe go to the farmer’s market?
B2: Yes. He even bought onions.
Experiment 1b: Yes, and he might’ve bought onions.
(A.51) A1: Did Marina go to { EVERGLADES NATIONAL PARK / THE NATIONAL
AQUARIUM }?
B1: She did but she didn’t see the { great white shark / carp }.
A2: Did Phil go to the National Aquarium?
B2: Yes. He even checked out the green frogs.
Experiment 1b: Yes. Apparently he checked out the green frogs.
(A.52) A1: Did Ron go to { NEW YORK / BOSTON } last weekend?
B1: He did but he didn’t { take a bus your / go downtown }.
A2: Did Luke go to Boston?
B2: Yes. He even walked around the downtown area.
Experiment 1b: Yes. Apparently he walked around the downtown area.
(A.53) A1: Did Greg visit { HARVARD / MIT } last Friday?
B1: He did but he left { before dinner / around 11am }.
A2: Did Luke visit MIT?
B2: Yes. He even stayed for lunch.
Experiment 1b: Yes, and he might’ve stayed for lunch.
(A.54) A1: Did Mark go to { WHOLE FOODS / BUTCHER } on Friday?
B1: He did but he didn’t buy any { filet mignon / ground beef }.
A2: Did Ginny go to the butcher?
B2: Yes. He even bought ground beef.
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Experiment 1b: Yes. Apparently she bought ground beef.
A.4.2 Experiment 2
Weak Contrast
(A.55) A1st: Where did Amber stay when she was in LA?
B1st: She stayed at a motel.
(Aint: Where did she stay when she was in Chicago?
Bint: She crashed at a friend’s house.)
Alast: Where did she stay when she was in Boston?
Blast: He (also) stayed at a motel (again) in Boston.
(A.56) A1st: How did Duane get to work two weeks ago?
B1st: He took the train.
(Aint: How did he get to work last week?
Bint: He took the bus.)
Alast: How did he get to work this week?
Blast: He (also) took the train (again) this week.
(A.57) A1st: Where was Karim’s office at his first job?
B1st: It was right next to the kitchen.
(Aint: Where was his office at his second job?
Bint: It was close to the bathroom.)
Alast: Where was his office at his fourth job?
Blast: It was (also) next to the kitchen (again) at his fourth job.
(A.58) A1st: What did Jimmy have for breakfast?
B1st: He had some fruit and a yogurt.
(Aint: What did he have for lunch?
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Bint: He had a large meal with lots of protein.)
Alast: What did he have for dinner?
Blast: He (also) had fruit and yogurt (again) for dinner.
(A.59) A1st: What was Eileen’s favorite class in fifth grade?
B1st: She was really into math.
(Aint: What was her favorite class in eight grade ?
Bint: She liked literature a lot.)
Alast: What was her favorite class as in college?
Blast: It was (also) math (again) in college.
(A.60) A1st: Who did Jasper stay with in Denver?
B1st: He stayed with a friend of his parents.
(Aint: Who did he stay with in New Orleans?
Bint: He stayed with his brother.)
Alast: Who did he stay with in Toronto?
Blast: He (also) stayed with a friend of his parents (again) in Toronto.
(A.61) A1st: When did Deirdre go to bed on Sunday?
B1st: She stayed up until midnight.
(Aint: When did she go to bed two days ago?
Bint: She went to bed around 10pm.)
Alast: When did she go to bed last night?
Blast: She (also) stayed up until midnight (again) last night.
(A.62) A1st: How did the employees react to the pay cut?
B1st: They went on strike.
(Aint: How did the employees react to the firings?
Bint: They spammed the manager’s cell phone.)
Alast: How did the employees react to the increase in their insurance
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rate?
Blast: They (also) went on strike (again) about their insurance.
Strong Contrast
(A.63) A1st: What did Derek do on Thanksgiving?
B1st: He visited his parents in Idaho.
(Aint: What did he do for Christmas?
Bint: He stayed home because his flight got cancelled.)
Alast: What did he do for Easter?
Blast: He (also) visited his parents (again) for Easter.
(A.64) A1st: What did Felicia have for dinner on Friday?
B1st: She went to her favorite Thai restaurant.
(Aint: What did she do for dinner the day after?
Bint: She skipped dinner because of her diet.)
Alast: What did she do for dinner on Sunday?
Blast: She (also) had Thai (again) on Sunday.
(A.65) A1st: What did Janey do in December?
B1st: She went skiing in the mountains.
(Aint: What did she do in January?
Bint: She had to stay home because of a foot injury.)
Alast: What did she do in February?
Blast: She (also) went skiing (again) in February.
(A.66) A1st: What did Mary do on Monday?
B1st: She went to the gym for an hour.
(Aint: What did she do on Wednesday?
Bint: She had to stay late at work.)
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Alast: What did she do on Friday?
Blast: She (also) went to the gym (again) on Friday.
(A.67) A1st: How many goals did Cassandra score in first half of the season?
B1st: She scored five times.
(Aint: How many goals did she score in the cup matches?
Bint: She didn’t score at all because she was injured.)
Alast: How many goals did she score in the second half of the season?
Blast: She (also) scored five times (again) in the second half.
(A.68) A1st: When did Robert leave for school on Tuesday?
B1st: He left the house around 8am.
(Aint: When did he leave on Thursday?
Bint: He got a stomach ache and stayed home.)
Alast: When did he leave on Friday?
Blast: He (also) left the house around 8am (again) on Friday.
(A.69) A1st: Who did Leslie date as a freshman?
B1st: She was going out with Dave.
(Aint: Who did she date as a sophomore?
Bint: She was single for that time.)
Alast: Who did she date as a senior?
Blast: She (also) was going out with Dave (again) as a senior.
(A.70) A1st: Who did the university hire to fix the roof?
B1st: They hired an outside contractor.
(Aint: Who did they hire to fix the wifi?
Bint: There were no outside contractors available so the IT staff fixed it.)
Alast: Who did they hire to fix the broken plugs?





(A.71) A: Who is having dinner in New York tomorrow?
B: Saul is having dinner in New York (again/too).
(A.72) A: Who did Rose file a complaint about?
B: She filed a complaint about a co-worker (again/too).
(A.73) A: Who mowed Mrs Robinson’s lawn this morning?
B: Jenny mowed the lawn (again/too).
(A.74) A: Who went to the mall during lunch break?
B: Ellen went to the mall during lunch break (again/too).
still vs even
(A.75) A: What’s Mary been up to recently?
B: She’s (still/even) on vacation.
(A.76) A: What is your colleague doing today?
B: He’s (still/even) looking for a new apartment.
(A.77) A: What is Beth doing this weekend?
B: She is (still/even) working on her dissertation.
(A.78) A: Who is Carl living with currently?
B: He’s (still/even) living by himself.
(A.79) A: What is Marianne doing in the living room?
B: She’s (still/even) watching a documentary.
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back vs at least
(A.80) A: What did Jack do last winter?
B: (At least) He flew (back) to Chicago for Christmas.
(A.81) A: What did Zoe do over Thanksgiving break?
B: (At least) She drove (back) to Vermont for Thanksgiving break.
(A.82) A: What did Jim do over spring break?
B: (At least) He took a trip (back) to LA.
(A.83) A: What did Carmen do last spring?
B: (At least) She went (back) to Texas.
continue vs only
(A.84) A: What did Sue do yesterday?
B: She {continued building / (only) built} a tree house.
(A.85) A: What did Fred do last week?
B: He {continued painting / (only) painted} a self-portrait.
(A.86) A: What did Doris do on her day off?
B: She {continued cutting / (only) cut} down the cherry tree in her back-
yard.
(A.87) A: What did Eric do on Tuesday?
B: He {continued prepping / (only) prepped} for Angela’s birthday party.
(A.88) A: What did Nikki do last evening?
B: She {continued reading / (only) read} Moby Dick.
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A.4.4 Experiment 4
(A.89) A says: / Mary went swimming on Sunday. /
B asks: / What did Mary do on Monday? /
A replies: / She went / swimming (again) on Monday (too) / according
to Sue.
(A.90) A says: / Saul had dinner in New York last week. /
B asks: / Where did Saul have dinner on Tuesday?
A replies: / He had dinner / in New York (again) on Tuesday (too) /
from what I’ve heard.
(A.91) A says: / Amber took a break at noon on Wednesday. /
B asks: / When did Amber take a break yesterday?
A replies: / She took a break / at noon (again) yesterday (too) / if I
remember correctly.
(A.92) A says: / Duane got to work by bus a few weeks ago. /
B asks: / How did Duane get to work last week?
A replies: / He got to work / by bus (again) last week (too) / as far as I
know.
(A.93) A says: / Jenny saw a movie with her boyfriend last weekend. /
B asks: / What did Jenny do this weekend?
A replies: / She went / to the movies (again) this weekend (too) / I
think.
(A.94) A says: / Rahul complained about his boss last week. /
B asks: / Who did Rahul complain about this week?
A replies: / He complained / about his boss (again) this week (too) /
according to Meredith.
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(A.95) A says: / Cassandra stayed at a motel when she was in LA. /
B asks: / Where did Cassandra stay when she was in Chicago?
A replies: / She stayed / at a motel (again) in Chicago (too) / if Serene
is to be believed.
(A.96) A says: / Lee worked from home in March. /
B asks: / How did Lee work in May?
A replies: / He worked / from home (again) in May (too) / to save gas.
(A.97) A says: / Yolanda went hiking in Vermont last Sunday. /
B asks: / What did Yolanda do on Saturday?
A replies: / She went / hiking (again) on Saturday (too) / since the
weather was nice.
(A.98) A says: / Henry biked twenty miles last weekend. /
B asks: / How far did Henry bike this weekend?
A replies: / He biked / twenty miles (again) this weekend (too) / ac-
cording to his wife.
(A.99) A says: / Rachel spent the fall in Vietnam. /
B asks: / Where did Rachel spend the summer?
A replies: / She spent the summer / in Vietnam (again/too) / if Gary is
right.
(A.100) A says: / Elton mowed the lawn in the evening last Saturday. /
B asks: / When did Elton mow the lawn this Saturday?
A replies: / He mowed the lawn / in the evening (again) this Saturday
(too) / right before dinner.
(A.101) A says: / Holly visited her parents in Idaho for Thanksgiving. /
B asks: / What did Holly do for Easter?
278
A replies: / She went / to Idaho (again) for Easter (too) / to see her
family.
(A.102) A says: / Karim had pad thai for lunch earlier this week. /
B asks: / What did Karim have for lunch yesterday?
A replies: / He had / pad thai (again) yesterday (too) / as a treat.
(A.103) A says: / Deirdre stayed up until midnight on Monday. /
B asks: / When did Deirdre go to bed on Wednesday?
A replies: / She stayed up / until midnight (again) on Wednesday (too)
/ from what I’ve been told.
(A.104) A says: / Robert collaborated with Phyllis for the chemistry project. /
B asks: / Who did Robert collaborate with for the math project?
A replies: / He collaborated / with Phyllis (again) for the math project
(too) / as far as I’m aware.
(A.105) A says: / Kelly drove to Colorado in October. /
B asks: / What did Kelly do over winter break?
A replies: / She drove / to Colorado (again) over winter break (too) /
according to Sam.
(A.106) A says: / Stanley left for school at 7:30am on Tuesday. /
B asks: / When did Stanley leave for school on Thursday?
A replies: / He left for school / at 7:30am (again) on Thursday (too) /
to catch the bus.
(A.107) A says: / Celeste ate her pasta with a fork at lunch. /
B asks: / How did Celeste eat her pasta at dinner?
A replies: / She ate her pasta / with a fork (again) at dinner (too) / for
whatever reason.
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(A.108) A says: / Jared ordered his groceries from Amazon last month. /
B asks: / Where did Jared get his groceries this month?
A replies: / He got his groceries / from Amazon (again) this month (too)
/ out of laziness.
A.5 Pilot Experiment
The goal of this experiment was to test the prediction that Focus-sensitive triggers
should be licensed by content present in the discourse independently of whether
it is mutually accepted by all interlocutors or not, whereas triggers lacking Focus-
sensitivity should only be felicitous if their presupposition is mutually accepted.
Materials & Design
In order to test the prediction, we used short dialogues as in (A.109)-(A.110). B’s re-
sponse always contained a presupposition trigger that was satisfied by A’s preced-
ing utterance. The crucial manipulation was that B either accepted A’s statement
by using the positive response particle yes, or remained neutral with respect to the
statement by using maybe. Since it was not possible to use minimal pairs where the
same content would satisfy the presupposition of both a Focus-sensitive and a non
Focus-sensitive trigger for a broad range of triggers, triggers were manipulated
between-items, with four items per trigger. The +FOCUS triggers were also, even,
only and at least, with sample items shown in (A.109). For also, the presupposition
to be satisfied by A’s statement was that the subject did something additionally,
for (A.109a) that Elena visited someone else. For even and only, we used a design
similar to Experiment 1a in Chapter 4, namely using relatively low (for even) or
high (for only) ranked scalar values in the target sentence that should be degraded
on their own, but provided a higher or lower ranked value in A’s statement that
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should license their use. To illustrate this with (A.109b), renting a Saab is not par-
ticularly special, but more so when compared against renting an old pickup truck.
The reasoning for at least was similar in that its prejacent was something notably
positive that should be inconsistent with at least’s settle-for-less meaning, but li-
censed by A’s statement negating an even better outcome, in the case of (A.109d)
winning gold being usually highest ranked, but not relative to also breaking the
world record.
(A.109) Sample Items, Acceptance Experiment: +FOCUS Triggers
a. ALSO
A: Elena visited her brother during the holidays.
(i) B: Yes, that’s right. She also visited her parents.
(ii) B: Maybe that’s right. She also visited her parents.
b. EVEN
A: Jesse rented an old pickup truck for her roadtrip.
(i) B: Yes, that’s right. Helen even rented a Saab.
(ii) B: Maybe that’s right. Helen even rented a Saab.
c. ONLY
A: Sue got promoted to CEO.
(i) B: Yes, that’s right. Dwight only got promoted to vice-president.
(ii) B: Maybe that’s right. Dwight only got promoted to vice-president.
d. AT LEAST
A: Naomi didn’t end up breaking the world record.
(i) B: Yes, that’s right. At least she won gold.
(ii) B: Maybe that’s right. At least she won gold.
The -FOCUS triggers used were again, still, stop and continue, shown in (A.110). In all
cases, the presupposition satisfied by A’s statement was that a previous event like
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one in the prejacent had occurred. The relevant events were set up in a way that
they furthermore satisfied the specific restrictions of the triggers involved, e.g. for
still in (A.110b) and stop in (A.110c) that the presupposed event directly preceded
the current one, in contrast to continue in (A.110d) requiring a gap. Additionally,
all relevant temporal adverbial phrases were put sentence-initially to minimize the
risk of an unintended interpretation that the potential disagreement is not about
whether a previous event had occurred, but when.
(A.110) Sample Items, Acceptance Experiment: -FOCUS Triggers
a. AGAIN
A: Yesterday, Francine went swimming.
(i) B: Yes, that’s right. Today, she went swimming again.
(ii) B: Maybe that’s right. Today, she went swimming again.
b. STILL
A: Earlier this week, Lindsey started working on her job presenta-
tion.
(i) B: Yes, that’s right. On Friday, she was still working on it.
(ii) B: Maybe that’s right. On Friday, she was still working on it.
c. STOP
A: At 10am, Henry started cleaning the apartment.
(i) B: Yes, that’s right. At noon, he stopped cleaning.
(ii) B: Maybe that’s right. At noon, he stopped cleaning.
d. CONTINUE
A: On Thursday, Stuart started painting the kitchen.
(i) B: Yes, that’s right. The next day, he continued painting.
(ii) B: Maybe that’s right. The next day, he continued painting.
There were 48 fillers in addition to the 32 target items, part of which were the items
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for the accommodation rating study reported in Chapter 5.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as for the accommodation rating experiment in Chap-
ter 5, given that the stimuli were part of the same experiment. The experiment was
implemented via PennController (Zehr & Schwarz, 2018a) and conducted online.
The first sentence of each item (A’s question) was initially displayed on its own on
the screen, with the second sentence (B’s reply) appearing in a new line below it
after pressing the space bar once. After pressing the space bar a second time, a rat-
ing screen (without the item) would appear, with the question “How acceptable was
B’s response for you?" at the top and a rating scale from 1 to 7 at the bottom, with 1
end marked as “Terrible" and the other as “Perfect". Participants were instructed to
think of acceptability as “whether B is being consistent or to what extent B’s utterance
requires additional background knowledge". After filling out a consent form, a demo-
graphic form and receiving instructions, participants saw three practice items of
varying acceptability to familiarize them with the procedure and illustrate the in-
tended use of the scale. The experiment concluded with an open response question
that was meant to screen for bots. The experiment took about 15 minutes.
Subjects
48 participants were recruited via Prolific.ac and reimbursed with $3.00 each. All
participants passed the bot-check, as well as catch-trials.
Predictions
On the hypothesis that -FOCUS triggers require their presupposition to be entailed
by the Common Ground and thus mutually accepted, the maybe condition should
lead to a decrease in ratings relative to the yes condition. If +FOCUS triggers in con-
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trast are able to be satisfied by content merely present in the discourse regardless of
it being accepted, there should be less of a decrease in the maybe condition for such
triggers - taking into account that the maybe condition could lead to a decrease for
reasons of coherence independent of presupposition satisfaction. The prediction
therefore is an interaction between TRIGGER TYPE and RESPONSE.
Results
Mean ratings per condition collapsed across triggers of each class are shown in
Figure A.1. The data were analyzed using ordinal mixed effects models, yielding a
significant effect of RESPONSE with maybe conditions leading to a decrease relative
to yes conditions (z=-13.7, p<.001***) and a marginally significant effect of TRIGGER
TYPE with +FOCUS triggers rated lower than -FOCUS triggers (z=1.7, p<.01●). The
interaction was not significant (z=-0.7, p=.49). Mean ratings for each individual
trigger are shown in Figures A.2 and A.3. Based on the numerical pattern, the
marginal effect of TRIGGER TYPE seemed to be driven primarily by low ratings
for even and only.
Discussion
The results showed that using a presupposition trigger when its respective pre-
supposition is not mutually accepted led to a decrease in acceptability, but failed
to provide evidence that this decrease varies depending on whether the trigger is
Focus-sensitive or not, contrary to what the FoPAH predicted. Moreover, this pat-
tern seemed to be quite consistent across the triggers under consideration, with
even being the only notable exception with respect to the size of this decrease.
The experiment also found a marginal decrease in acceptability for +focus triggers,
which also seemed to be driven by even, in addition to only.
One potential reason for why the results diverge from what was predicted and
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Figure A.1: Mean ratings per condition.
Figure A.2:
Mean ratings for +Focus Triggers.
Figure A.3:
Mean ratings for -Focus Triggers.
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prior intuitions regarding examples discussed previously could have been that the
ratings reflect other - tangential - properties of the tested dialogues rather than the
extent to which the use of a certain trigger requires its presupposition to be part
of the Common Ground. A possible culprit in this regard might have been how
changing the response particle affected discourse coherence. A hint toward such a
possibility would be the overall decrease in ratings for even and only in the YES con-
dition, which was supposed to serve as a neutral baseline. By virtue of the triggers
differing in meaning to varying degrees, it is unsurprising that the contributions
they make in a discourse may differ as well. As illustration, consider the sample
item for even in (A.111) repeated from (A.109b). Even in the YES condition, the
comprehender would have to find a way to conceive of B’s response as relevant in
some way, which is not straightforward, and even less so in the MAYBE condition.
(A.111) EVEN
A: Jesse rented an old pickup truck for her roadtrip.
a. B: Yes, that’s right. Helen even rented a Saab.
b. B: Maybe that’s right. Helen even rented a Saab.
Moreover, the change in response particles might have affected how the following
target sentence is integrated into the discourse beyond its presupposition. Intu-
itively, the target sentence in the MAYBE condition in (A.111) seems to be meant as
providing evidence for why B does not believe A’s previous statement, whereas the
yes condition allows the target sentence to merely add some related information.
This intuitive difference could be spelled out in terms of a difference in discourse
relations between A’s statement and B’s response, in terms of maybe raising a new
QUD of the form “Did Jesse rent an old pickup truck for her roadtrip?" that the sen-
tence is meant to comment on, or in terms of Farkas & Bruce’s (2010) Table model
discussed previously, with yes resolving the issue on the table, in contrast to maybe
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leaving it open.
One option to avoid this confound would be to change maybe to no, as in ex-
ample 6.5, insofar neither agnosticism nor explicit denial qualify as acceptance.
However, the previous example, (partially) repeated in (A.112), did not include
a minimal pair corresponding to an acceptance condition for the Focus-sensitive
trigger even. Adjusting the example directly as in (A.112d) would not work since
the target sentence is still a correction. Similarly, changing the previous sample
item to vary between yes and no, as in (A.113), would leave the target sentence af-
ter no seem even more out of place than maybe, potentially because the no response
would still leave the issue open, albeit from a different direction.
(A.112) A: Juan DeBiedma made second place at Evo 2016.
a. B: No, he even made [FIRST]F place.
b. B: #No, but he won again the next year.
c. B: Yes, and he won again the next year.
d. B: #Yes, he even made [FIRST]F place.
(A.113) A: Jesse rented an old pickup truck for her roadtrip.
a. B: Yes, that’s right. Helen even rented a Saab.
b. B: No, that’s wrong. Helen even rented a Saab.
Since the problem of response particles differing in the extent to which they re-
solve an issue, an alternative might be to add a discourse marker that resolves
the issue independently, such as either way or anyway. An adapted sample item is
shown in (A.114). Intuitively, this addition seems to improve the maybe condition.
A potential worry would be that it might also waive the contextual requirements
for triggers lacking Focus-sensitivity, see (A.115).
287
(A.114) A: Jesse rented an old pickup truck for her roadtrip.
a. B: Yes, that’s right. Either way, Helen even rented a Saab.
b. B: Maybe that’s right. Either way, Helen even rented a Saab.
(A.115) A: Yesterday, Francine went swimming.
a. B: Yes, that’s right. Either way, today, she went swimming again.
b. B: Maybe that’s right. Either way, today, she went swimming again.
Another option addressing the problem regarding the raised issue might be to
make a question overt for both conditions, as in (A.116). Rather than trying to
fix the problem by solving the issue independently, this option would make sure
that both conditions address an open issue. Intuitively, this might result in even
supposedly good examples be rather marked however.
(A.116) A: Do you think that Jesse rented an old pickup truck for her roadtrip?
a. B: Yes, I think so. Helen even rented a Saab.
b. B: No, I don’t think so. Helen even rented a Saab.
A quite different alternative way of testing the prediction of the FoPAH without
confounds regarding discourse coherence would be to use a different experimental
paradigm inspired by Aravind (2018), which was discussed in Chapter 5. Aravind
used stories featuring two characters that differed in what information they shared
with the main protagonist and had participants guess to whom a target sentence
containing a presupposition trigger was addressed to in order to test whether par-
ticipants would be able to infer the correct choice based on the contextual require-
ments of presuppositions. The same paradigm could be applied to the current issue
by manipulating whether a character believes or does not believe a previous state-
ment that is meant to license the use of a presupposition trigger. As a preliminary
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example, consider the story in (A.117), where Peach is the skeptic and Zelda the
believer. If again requires its presupposition to be mutually accepted, the target sen-
tence in (A.117a) should lead participants to infer that Samus was talking to Zelda
rather than Peach. In contrast, if even merely requires a linguistic antecedent inde-
pendently of its content being mutually accepted, the sentence in (A.117b) should
be less unambiguous.
(A.117) Samus, Princess Peach and Princess Zelda were discussing the current
mushroom harvest. Samus said that Fox had picked two mushroom yes-
terday. While Peach did not believe Samus, Zelda did. Later, Samus was
on the phone with one of the Princesses and said:
a. “Fox picked two mushrooms again today."
b. “Fox even picked five mushrooms today".
However, taken at face-value in the absence of further studies, the present results
fail to support the hypothesis that +FOCUS triggers solely require a linguistic an-
tecedent in the context independently of the Common Ground. Rather, the Com-
mon Ground seems to play a role for +FOCUS triggers as well as -FOCUS triggers.
This concession raises a question about the exact relationship between the linguis-
tic antecedent and the Common Ground for +FOCUS triggers. One possibility that
can be discarded right away is that there is a simple ordering relation with re-
spect to what is being accessed first and what second. If, for instance, the Com-
mon Ground would be accessed after the linguistic antecedent, it is unclear why
we would see the effects observed in the previous chapters, since the presupposi-
tion should then already be satisfied, and the reverse would be true if it was the
linguistic antecedent that is accessed first insofar as it would leave the results in
the present chapter unaccounted for. A more plausible conjecture would be that
+FOCUS triggers go through the Common Ground in order to find their antecedent
289
such that the lack of material inhibits access in a way that results in the degraded
acceptability observed in the current experiment. I will leave it to future research
to precisify the exact role the Common Ground plays for +FOCUS triggers.
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